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ABSTRACT 
This thesis takes the American architect Steven Holl’s design in Beijing, Linked 
Hybrid, as a case study to investigate the social, political and cultural context of China’s 
contemporary architecture.  The research focuses on the development, in an urban zone in 
the Dongzhimenwai area of Beijing, of a socialist paper mill community from the late 
1980s into the Beijing Linked Hybrid community in 2010. The urban development 
process was analysed through six emic concepts, which were discovered in the course of 
ethnographic fieldwork research. These concepts are dayuan (big community or 大院), 
guanxi (personal connection or关系), mianzi (face or 面子), shi (trend or 势), mofan 
(exemplary model or 模范) and shanzhai (fake product or山寨). 
Fieldwork trips were undertaken between 2007 and 2010 to understand how the 
local community members of the paper mill and Linked Hybrid perceived the changes in 
their living environment. Key community members and architectural practitioners were 
traced and interviewed during the period of research. Written documentation from the 
paper mill’s propaganda department archives and the personal archives of an ex-worker 
about the area before the construction of Linked Hybrid, provided the historical context 
for the case study. 
The Linked Hybrid occupants eventually built a wall to enclose their new 
residential community, which was specifically designed to be an open community to 
solve China’s problematic urbanism. Thus, the architect’s architectural ideals became 
ineffective when his architecture was situated in the Chinese context that is described in 
this thesis.   
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Figure 1: Spatial organisation and development of Linked Hybrid and its surrounding 
area. 1. Zhang Lian’s home, 2. Wang Ji’s home, 3. New gate of Linked Hybrid, 4. New 
gate of Wanguocheng MOMA, 5. Public park used to be workers’ housing, 6. Wall 
between Linked Hybrid and workers’ community, 7. Public space and informal market 
between Linked Hybrid and Wanguocheng MOMA, 8. North gate of workers’ 
community, 9. Cinema in the centre of Linked Hybrid, 10. Li Hu’s old office for OPEN 
Architecture, 11. Steven Holl’s architectural office in Beijing, 12. Li Hu’s new office for 
OPEN Architecture. (Drawing the author). 
12 
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Figure 2: The transformation of Beijing First Paper Mill to Linked Hybrid. (Drawing the 
author). 
 
 
Beijing First Paper Mill (Before 2000) MOMA communities (After 2000) 
 
Figure 3: Spatial organisation of Beijing First Paper Mill and MOMA communities. 
(Drawing the author).  
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INTRODUCTION 
FROM SHAO XIAO TO WANG ZHENFEI 
 
Beijing First Paper Mill was, and remains, a typical socialist work unit in Beijing 
(Figure 4). Located immediately outside the historical city wall, it was one of the 
industrial factories that followed Mao Zedong’s policy of industrialising Beijing. This 
research closely examines Beijing Linked Hybrid (Figure 5), the urban redevelopment of 
the industrial site in Beijing’s city centre that was occupied by Beijing First Paper Mill 
before it moved to another site further away in Shunyi Development Zone (Figure 6). The 
industrial zone of the factory complex was purchased by a private developer for the 
construction of Linked Hybrid and other housing developments, and the factory workers’ 
residences were left in place behind the new developments (Figure 7). As a result, two 
communities composed of two totally different social groups found themselves living 
next to each other, separated only by a single brick wall that had originally separated the 
industrial zone from the residential zone of the factory. These two social groups share 
very different understandings of urbanism and of society due to their different socio-
economic and cultural backgrounds, as well as due to the different experiences and ways 
of thinking of their respective generations. 
I consider Linked Hybrid to be an exceptional case in China because the 
American architect, Steven Holl, attempted to introduce significantly different ideas from 
those that Chinese developers and residents were used to. In particular, Holl’s vision was 
to bring a gateless, open community scheme to this urban industrial land redevelopment 
project. In the end, the residents and the developers enclosed the community with walls  
 11 
 
 
Figure 4: Beijing First Paper Mill in the early 1990s. The photo shows a railway 
separating the factory into two manufacturing zones. The right hand side of the photo is 
the northern zone of the paper mill, which was to be developed into the Linked Hybrid 
community. (Photo provided by Zhang Lian). 
 
 
Figure 5: Beijing Linked Hybrid under construction. (Photo the author, 14 December, 
2008). 
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Figure 6: Beijing First Paper Mill Shunyi Development Zone campus. (Photo the author, 
17 December, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 7: Linked Hybrid behind the paper mill workers’ community. (Photo the author, 
13 December, 2008). 
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and gates. In the process, Linked Hybrid brought cross-cultural, social, and political 
conflicts to the surface, providing a case study to evaluate practices of space development 
in contemporary China, as well as to understand the culture of China from an 
architectural perspective. Holl wrote: 
Rather than a preoccupation with solid, independent object-like forms, it is 
the experiential phenomena of spatial sequences with, around, and 
between which emotions are triggered. There is a scale of distances 
walked and seen and passages available in the area around rue du Bac in 
Paris that offers a gentle urban porosity of movement. The pedestrian can 
change direction in seconds; the pedestrian is not blocked by large urban 
constructions without entry or exit. This freedom of pedestrian movement, 
championed by Jane Jacobs as the ideal matrix, is based on the case of 
Greenwich Village in Manhattan and can be envisioned in different ways 
for the twenty-first century. For larger urban projects made up of several 
buildings, porosity becomes essential for the vitality of street life. 
Especially in the city of Beijing where the urban grid layout (inherited 
from the hutong blocks) tends toward ‘superblock’ dimensions, urban 
porosity is crucial (Holl, 2010, 22). 
Holl thus applied the Greenwich model to his critique of Chinese contemporary 
urbanism.1 Thus, Linked Hybrid was designed as an open community with much 
emphasis on the concept of ‘linkage’, by which concept Holl meant to connect his design 
                                                 
1. Greenwich Village in New York is a large-scale residential community in lower 
Manhattan. It is a well-known artists’ area from the late 19th to the early 20th century. 
The community is famous for its particular lifestyle. 
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to the surrounding neighbourhood by allowing people to walk through the community.2 
His intention for the project was highly praised by the editors of international 
architectural journals as a possible alternative solution to the problematic layout of 
Beijing (e.g. Abrahams, 2007; Capezzuto, 2004, Ho. C. L. 2007; Pearson, 2008; Weeb, 
2004). However, these positive reviews isolated the new architecture from its context.  
The purpose of this research therefore is to describe the Chinese social and 
cultural contexts in which the project was undertaken, and the very different 
understandings of urbanism and society of the two communities who found themselves 
face-to-face when it was built, with resulting cross-cultural, social, and political conflicts.  
Also and very importantly, the design, building and inhabitation of Linked Hybrid 
are having an effect on architectural design in China today because it is being constantly 
appropriated as an architectural model to be followed. This typical process of 
appropriation of Linked Hybrid as a foreign model also forms part of the Chinese context 
and of Chinese culture, and it too therefore is an important part of this research. 
The history of Beijing First Paper Mill can be traced back to 1944, but its heyday 
was during the Cultural Revolution, due to the huge demand for paper for Mao’s Little 
Red Book.3 One of Beijing First Paper Mill’s workers, Shao Xiao, who entered the 
factory in the 1970s and left in the 1990s, represents a specific social group and a 
                                                 
2. Holl (2010, 137) wrote that, “the ground level offers a number of open passages for 
residents and visitors to walk through. These passages include ‘micro-urbanisms’ of 
small-scale shops which also activate the urban space surrounding the large central 
reflecting pond.” 
3. Mao’s Little Red Book was firstly published in 1964 by Liberation Army Post in China. 
It documented 427 quotes from Mao Zedong. The classic edition of the book was with 
red plastic covers, so during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese called it hongbaoshu 
(Red Treasure Book), and in English Little Red Book. 
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generation of citizens in contemporary China. Shao Xiao, now in her 60s, described her 
memories of how she entered the factory: 
I was nervous for the whole morning on the day of December 22, 1971. At 
that time, I was 14. At around 10 a.m., the teacher in my class called out 
my name. I was asked to wait in the school office. Together with me, there 
were a few classmates sitting quietly. My teacher told me that someone 
from a paper mill was recruiting workers. The workers briefly introduced 
the situation to us, but I really cannot remember any of their talk. We were 
asked to jump onto a Liberation truck. It all happened so suddenly; I even 
left all my belongings in my classroom.  
It was a cold winter. The truck was driven on a rough road towards the 
factory. At that time, the Second Ring Road was not yet built. So the truck 
had to drive through the Moon Temple (Yuetan), Fuchengmen Gate to 
reach the Dongzhimen Gate. The children were trembling in the cold air. 
We tried to sit together to keep ourselves warm. I remember that the driver 
was a woman; the person who gave us the introduction was sitting in the 
truck. This gentleman saw we were trembling, so he told us that we could 
use the military coats in the truck. I eventually figured out that these coats 
were from the factory for the paper-manufacturing process. They were 
dirty, but we all put them on in the cold air. Even though we had the coats 
on, my body felt frozen. I cannot remember how I jumped out from the 
truck at the end. After I started working, I realised that the temperature in 
the workshops was so high that workers only wore a shirt. Everyone had 
one of those coats to put on when they left the building. Some old workers 
even dyed the coat black so that they could wear them every day.  
The worker led us around the factory to explain the manufacturing process 
to us. It was the first time that I saw the gigantic machines and spacious 
workshops in person, prior to that I had only seen them in my textbook. I 
tried to remember every detail because I knew my family would ask about 
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them. After someone told us about the recruitment process, we were sent 
back to school. It was 2 p.m. in the afternoon. 
After I went home, my mother had already heard the news from my 
classmates. She also discussed them with our neighbours. As I expected, 
she had many questions. She asked how far the factory was, how big the 
factory was, if people still used their foot to make paper, etc. That day, my 
mother treated me extremely well. To my recollection, it was not usual at 
all.  
This was a big event for my family. Two of my older sisters were assigned 
to northeast China. I could stay in the city with my family, and I could 
work in a big factory. My mother prepared many pancakes for me, with 
egg stuffing. I also tried to describe every detail of the factory: the factory 
was big, there were many workers, the workers wore blue uniforms, 
female workers had white hats, and everyone wore Liberation shoes. The 
thing that gave my mother the most pride was that the paper was 
manufactured by machine, not with people’s feet. Many neighbours came 
to my home, and my mother encouraged me to tell them about my job 
again and again. 
At that time, working was not a choice for us. Except for government 
officials’ children, nobody could control their future. But one thing was 
for sure, government officials’ children could be assigned as soldiers. I 
envied them a lot at that time. . . . 
Before I worked in the factory, I studied at a secondary school run by my 
father’s railway danwei [work unit]. It was the time of the Cultural 
Revolution. My economic and spiritual well-being was poor. The Cultural 
Revolution’s ideology was to persecute intellectuals and totally deny the 
value of knowledge. The movement was unprecedented. Therefore, my 
secondary-school life was all about organising political events and 
criticising others. Humiliating words aimed at relatives, teachers, or even 
towards myself. Real learning was insufficient. Just take English classes 
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for example; we repeated “Long Life Chairman Mao, Long Long Life to 
Him” and “our party is a great party”. After decades, I still can remember 
them all. I really cannot remember what we learnt in other subjects. . . . 
Why did I join the factory? No teenager had any idea about their future at 
that time—at least I was like that. My only desire at that time was not to 
leave the city. Working for government units was not an option for me 
because such jobs did not match my social class. I was only an ordinary 
person living in the dormitory housing in a railway danwei. Listening to 
the Party, obeying the assignment—these actually were equal to allowing 
oneself to be exploited [ren ren zai ge]. Continuing to study was not an 
option either because the teacher would only choose a few who could go 
to high school. Moreover, there was an organisation, called the ‘worker-
propaganda team’ [gongxuan dui]. This organisation inspected everyone’s 
background in schools and in danwei for high-school education 
opportunities. The inspection criteria went by family background, political 
appropriateness, ideological deliberateness, and high scores in school. In 
the end, there were only a few students in a 40-student class allowed to 
continue their studies.  
However, in such a politicised atmosphere, continuing to study was not an 
enviable situation. The development of society was halted by the Cultural 
Revolution for a long period, so there were many classes of graduates 
waiting for jobs; plus many people who had been assigned to work away 
from the city would have liked to have come back. This meant that 
working for money was more important than anything in such a 
competitive period. The education of ‘the working class leading society’ 
influenced me a lot at that time. So being a worker was something to be 
really proud of. . . . 
Moreover, Beijing First Paper Mill was one of the biggest state-owned 
enterprises. Even though those secret factories, such as 798 or 251, were 
more competitive, it was a lot better than being assigned to work in the 
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tertiary cities. Two of my sisters were sent to Helongjiang Province; the 
painfulness of separation at that time gave my family a sense of horror. 
My job was also a lot better than the rest of my classmates’ jobs, who 
were assigned to work in the Bureau of Commerce. Their titles seemed 
attractive, but actually their jobs were to sell food and recycle rubbish. At 
that time, all these businesses in the planned economy were controlled by 
the Bureau of Commerce. After I entered the factory, I realised it was also 
the headquarters of Beijing Paper Mills. Its site was not small: there were 
many shops, small restaurants, workers’ hostels, a day care, and other 
basic facilities. So it was like a small city. This job also differed from my 
classmates’ assignments to Beijing Second Paper Mill or Beijing Third 
Paper Mill. Those factories were squeezed into small alleys. All these 
facts made me really proud of my job at that time (Shao Xiao, personal 
Communication, 15 December, 2010). 
Shao Xiao left the factory in the early 1990s due to her health problem. But she 
still kept close relationships with her past co-workers. Moreover and importantly for my 
research, she is  a member of my family. She therefore introduced me to all her past co-
workers, including Wang Ji, Qiu Lai, and Zhang Lian, who became major informants in 
my research. Except Zhang Lian, all of them left the factory in the late 1990s, when it 
was developed for high-class residential housing. It is still, however, very easy for Shao 
Xiao to get in touch with her friends, because all of them are still living in the paper mill 
workers’ community. 
There are two major changes to the workers’ community. The first one is that 
only a few workers in the workers’ community are still working for the paper mill 
enterprise. The second is that the area south of the workers’ community, which used to be 
the paper mill factory, became a private residential community, with connecting bridges 
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located at high level (Figure 8 and Figure 9, also see Figure 1 for location of Linked 
Hybrid). The workers found the appearance of this architecture qiguai (strange). During 
my fieldtrip in the summer of 2009 to the workers’ community, a few residents expressed 
their feelings about Linked Hybrid. One of them even told me they found the form of the 
architecture brought bad luck to them according to the Chinese fengshui theory.4 In the 
new Linked Hybrid community, there is a totally different social group and generation of 
citizens. Wang Zhenfei from this new community told me about himself and the story of 
entering this community: 
I was originally from Tianjing. I was born in 1977. I am a typical Tianjing 
person, who tends to stay in the city. All Tianjing people are relatively 
honest and timid. So, I stayed in the city for my undergraduate degree  
at Tianjing University. After school, I continued to work in the city, at 
Huanhui [Architectural Design Institute]. Actually, I started working there 
since I was a student. After working for six years, I left the country in 
2005 and went to Holland. I studied there for two years, and worked at UN 
Studio for one year. 
When I returned to China, I was deciding whether to go to Shanghai or to 
my home town of Tianjing. If I went to Tianjing, I would have worked in 
the Huahui head office. However, after some hesitation, I felt Tianjing 
might not be such a fertile soil [for practicing architecture]– not such a 
productive atmosphere. So, finally, I decided to come to Beijing, and 
started a branch of Huahui here. 
I have two office rooms here. I moved approximately this time last year, in 
January. I started my design studio in 2009. At the beginning, I set up my 
                                                 
4. Fengshui is a traditional Chinese system of geomancy. It is literally translated as ‘wind 
and water’. It is a study of how to position one in the natural environment, in order to 
improve one’s life.   
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Figure 8: Bridges in the Sky. The photo shows how Linked Hybrid is seen from the 
workers’ community. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 9: Bridges in the sky. The photo shows how Linked Hybrid is seen from its 
courtyard. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2009). 
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office at Jianwai SOHO and then I moved to here, Linked Hybrid. 
Because Jianwai SOHO has some problems: it is too crowded. Indeed, it is 
interesting [architecturally], but there are too many people. So you feel 
you are in a battle every day, fighting for elevators, fighting for food, and 
fighting for parking lots. It was so painful. There was an opportunity in the 
beginning of last year, so I decided to move here. At that time, the 
construction had just finished. The rent was not that high. I liked this place, 
because it is quiet and not that crowded. At the beginning, there was really 
no one in the complex; it is a lot better now. I feel the space is more 
suitable for an office, especially when your office is smaller scale. If you 
want to live here, it is impossible. The size of this apartment is 220 square 
meters, with only two bedrooms, three toilets, and one gigantic corridor. 
The corridor will cost you a few millions yuan. So I think the design is not 
for living. I heard from my friends that the design criteria for Linked 
Hybrid at the very beginning accorded to the standard of the ‘tertiary 
apartment’. 5  So if you observe closely some details, such as the open 
kitchen design, it is definitely not for a normal family. It is more for 
occasional living or as an investment. I have been staying here for a year; I 
personally feel the design is good. I cannot discover any big mistakes, 
such as being annoyed by the spatial quality. The only problem is its 
transportation connection to the city: it seems close to everywhere on the 
map, but you cannot reach anything easily. 
My story about finding this place is interesting. At the beginning, I was 
cheated by a real-estate agent. When I was looking for somewhere to 
move, the advertisement said this place was very cheap. So I met with the 
owner, and checked out the space. I found the space was good too, so I 
                                                 
5. By ‘tertiary apartment’, Wang Zhenfei meant that apartments in Linked Hybrid are not 
for basic living needs, nor for investment needs. Real estate products for these two types 
of needs are considered as the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ apartments. Linked Hybrid is 
considered as the tertiary type, which is only for possession, like luxury antiques. I will 
discuss this idea later on in the thesis. 
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asked again about the rent. The owner told me a number almost double the 
advertised amount. The difference between what the agent told me and the 
reality was so big. I told the owner that I think that what he proposed as 
rent was reasonable for the space, but I did not want to pay that much. At 
that time, it was very difficult to find tenants, because it was the end of the 
year and the building was too new. But the owner was very keen to rent it 
out. So he asked how much I would like to pay. I said the advertised 
amount was affordable for me and I could only rise a few thousands more. 
The owner finally agreed the deal, so I moved to here from Jianwai SOHO. 
To use the space as an office, I found there was another good thing about 
it: the interior design of the room is very elegant and complete. You just 
need to bring your things here, and you can start working. Another good 
thing is its view. The courtyard view makes me feel comfortable. Actually, 
when you talk about the views, I think about this every day: I look at the 
housing just across the wall; they are so different from this community. 
Across the wall, there are different communities, different people and 
different things happening every day. No one knows who is doing what. 
People from this side may think those people are monsters, and people 
from that side may think people here are monsters… I have never entered 
their community. But I have the feeling that they are different. So I think 
architects, or developers, may actually do something about it. Sometimes, 
we need to contribute to the society (Wang Zhenfei, personal 
communication, 10 December, 2010). 
 
These seemingly unrelated life histories of two individuals from the two 
different generations –the stories of Shao Xiao and Wang Zhenfei– will continue 
to reappear throughout this thesis and to help form many arguments in my thesis 
about a modern residential development, such as the struggle for reform, 
architectural agency, and the eventual sacrifice of one generation and the rise of 
another one. 
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CHAPTER I 
DAYUAN 
Dayuan Defined by Wang Ji 
Wang Ji was the informant in my fieldwork directly using the word dayuan, when 
I asked him to describe the original workers’ community before the construction of 
Linked Hybrid. Dayuan is how the Chinese typically refer to their communities in the 
socialist danwei period. Duyuan literally means ‘large compound’, and the term is 
associated with a large-scale, enclosed, industrial community. People often use dayuan 
and danwei interchangeably; however, I argue that the two concepts are different.  
Wang Ji worked in the factory since he was 20. He was laid off in the late 1990s 
along with almost all of his co-workers. He gave the following description of the workers’ 
community, after it had already been demolished for Linked Hybrid. When describing the 
community, he needed to sketch on a piece of paper to recall his memories (Figure 10). 
The following is his description of the factory:6 
[Dialogue 1] 
This is the road; this is the gate; and this is the railway. [Pauses to think.] 
The situation is like this: when coming in from here [the gate], this side is 
                                                 
6. The interview was conducted by the author with Wang Ji, an ex-factory worker of the 
paper mill. The interview was held at a hotel coffee shop close to where Wang Ji worked 
after being laid off from the paper mill. The interview place was about five minutes 
bicycling distance from the original site of the paper mill and where Wang Ji lives. Wang 
Ji offered responses to five questions about his memories of places and locations. When 
Ji started to answer those questions, he began to draw in a sketchbook to help clarify his 
explanations. The interview with Wang Ji was conducted on 14 January, 2009 at Yuyang 
International Hotel coffee shop. 
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Figure 10: Wang Ji’s sketch of the historical Beijing First Paper Mill dayuan space. 1. 
North, 2. Northern zone, 3. Material storage warehouse, 4. Dinning hall, 5. 1860 and 
1880 machines, 6.  Machine no. 4, 7. Dining hall, 8. Machine no. 1 and no. 2, 9. Offices, 
10. Housing. (Image from fieldwork notebook).  
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the residential zone, for living. Once getting into the gate, this was a 
workshop. On this side, there was the factory manager’s office, a place for 
administration. What was behind it were some small machine shops and 
places for repair and maintenance. I mentioned that this is the entrance, 
right? So this is a machine shop: machine no.3, machine no.2 and machine 
no.1 were next to each other. Across the road, this was machine no. 4.  
[Points back to machine no. 3.] There were more when walking towards 
this direction. On the side there was a special machine called youjiang 
yuanzhi, another machine shop. If walking continuously, the area was all 
about youjiang yuanzhi [a type of paper manufacturing machine]. This 
was all territory of the factory. If you moved further into this area, this was 
the power unit, which was on the other side of the road, at the corner, for 
the power supply. . . . Once you passed through the gate, this was another 
office, and some more offices, and finally there was the cutting room for  
machine no. 3.  
 
[Dialogue 2] 
This was the southern factory. Crossing the railway, this was the northern 
factory. For the northern factory, after going in, there were two machines. 
One was called 1880 and one was called 1860. There was also another 
copper plate paper [machine]. So that was the general description of the 
place.  
Points for Landmarks 
In Figure 11, I try to put Wang Ji’s words into a diagram. The worker used a few 
components, including points, lines, surfaces, space, and time, to describe the factory. His 
descriptions read almost like a journey. If we read his descriptions again separately, they 
can be thought of as five distinctive journeys. In this type of description, the starting 
points and finishing points are extremely important. The starting points are usually 
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Figure 11: Wang Ji’s presentation of the space. (Diagram the author).  
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something iconic, big, or significant in his everyday life, such as the road, the gate and 
the manager’s office. These things can be special architecture, political or symbolic  items, 
or simply indicative objects. All of these things act as landmarks that allow him to 
navigate through his memories of spaces. This phenomenon was particularly obvious 
when I asked Wang Ji to describe the spatial organisation of the factory (see dialogue 1). 
Before giving the description, he needed to locate three important elements on the map: 
the road, the gate and the railway. The road is the main one running along the southeast 
end of the southern zone of the factory, and the gate is the main gate of the factory. These 
two elements can be understood as the front of his dayuan community. The importance of 
these two elements stem from their frequent exposure to the worker in his daily routine, 
because he used to live across the road in his single-story dormitory. Unlike the everyday 
life landmarks, the railway line that entered the factory shows another kind of landmark, 
an iconic and monumental one. Indeed, because Wang Ji worked at the southern zone of 
the factory, he seldom crossed the railway to enter the northern zone. He mentioned the 
railway not because it was an important part of his daily routine, but because the sheer 
scale of the railway’s infrastructure gave it landmark character. In his narrative, these 
landmarks were always the starting points of the journey.  
Linear Journeys 
After these three points were located, Wang Ji was able to imagine the space in a 
three-dimensional sense through which the navigation process was linear and sequential. 
If we continue to examine dialogue 1, Wang Ji started from the gate, a place he is very 
familiar with, and he described what he could see from the position—the housing zone on 
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the other side of road. After he described entering the gate, he continued with what he 
could see: the manager’s office on one side and machine shops on the other side. He used 
the words ‘entering’, ‘coming’, and ‘getting into’, to emphasise his movement in the 
space. Linear movement is not his only mechanism of spatial remembrance: the imagery 
at different spots creates a secondary layer of points, where he stopped in his mind.  
More interestingly, once he finished his first journey, he needed to return to those 
landmarks again, and in the case of the first dialogue, the relevant landmark was the gate. 
The gate provided a reference point to identify a series of other points, in particular 
machine houses no. 3, no. 2 and no. 1. The cardinal directions in these descriptions are 
weak because throughout them, Wang Ji never used any terms such as east, south, right 
or left. Instead, he used scenes and different levels of detail in his descriptions. This 
reading of space is cinematic in that the perceived spatial organisation consists of 
sequential snapshots linked by zooming in and zooming out. 
Sense of Territory 
Certain boundaries stopped Wang Ji’s linear movement in the space. In dialogues 
1 and 2, once he had reached the boundaries, he suggested that the territory had ended, 
and he then shifted his description to a more zoomed-in view within that boundary, 
introducing the special machine area.  
[Dialogue 3] 
Here was the land for housing. Behind it was all the housing. Basically, all 
the land was part of the factory complex; this was the extension of the 
factory. Later on, we walled this part. [This is] the factory housing, the 
residential zone. All these residences are still there now; we all live at this 
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place. This part [of the housing at the south end] has been demolished and 
replaced with a green park. 
The perceptual boundary is constructed by symbolic architectural elements, such 
as, very importantly, walls. The above transcriptions show the importance of boundaries 
in the conception of dayuan. The residential zone belonged to the factory, but there was 
no wall at the beginning. To indicate the ownership of the extended piece of land at the 
north end of the factory, the management first walled it off. The land was developed later. 
The ideas of boundary and wall are thus very important in the reading of dayuan space. I 
will further discuss the implications of these ideas later in the thesis. 
Time and space 
Finally, time plays a very important role in this spatial conceptualisation process. 
Wang Ji mixes up memories from different times. The synchronisation of spatial 
memories constructs a very complex idea of dayuan. During the interview, I was very 
confused by Wang Ji’s description when, several times, he jumped from one moment in 
time to another.  
[Dialogue 4] 
There [the northern zone] experienced a lot of changes. In the past, there 
was no paper machine; here was just a warehouse. After some 
redevelopments, the warehouse was no longer there. Nothing big was 
there, just some small storage facilities (Figure 12). 
 
[Dialogue 5] 
[There are] two dining halls. In the northern zone—the railway has 
become a road, but before there was a road beside the railway—a dining 
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hall was located along the road. In the southern zone—this was the 
machine no. 3, see?—there was a road beside machine no. 3 and machine 
no. 4, leading people inside. There is supposed to be a great conference 
hall here, but it was demolished a long time ago. When we were in the 
factory, the conference hall was there, but it was demolished. There was a 
dining hall beside the conference hall. This used to be a kindergarten here 
(Figure 13).  
This fourth dialogue is a description of the northern industrial zone of the factory. 
The northern zone was developed in the early 1990s. Before that, this area was a 
warehouse for storing raw materials. Wang Ji’s description shows a mixture of temporal 
elements when the worker imaginatively stopped at some position in his description 
(Figure 12). Thus Wang Ji’s descriptions are like cinematic spatial-temporal 
organisations: the imagery shifts back-and-forth between periods in time. The fifth 
dialogue demonstrates this shifting more explicitly. When Wang Ji was describing the 
location of the two dining halls, he began to refer to historical landmarks. The 
information given by him mixed with his memories across several decades. For example, 
he used a historical building, the conference hall, to locate the position of the dining hall 
in the southern zone of the factory compound (Figure 13). But he also told how at night 
he usually went to the conference hall to watch a movie after eating in the dining hall. 
This routine also influenced his conceptualisation of the spatial organisation of the area.  
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Figure 12: Wang Ji’s description stopped at the railway to describe two scenes from 
different times. (Diagram the author). 
 
A historical location connecting  
to a historical location 
 
A historical location connection  
to a contemporary location 
 
 
Figure 13: Wang Ji’s mixing up of memories of different times. (Diagram the author). 
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Dayuan Place Making 
In this respect, Wang Ji’s description of the paper mill space fits Bray’s study of 
the spatial organisation of danwei (Bray, 2005). Bray (2005, 147) stated two central aims 
in the designing of danwei: first was to symbolise and to reproduce in miniature the order 
of the socialist state and secondly was to promote a socialist, collectivist lifestyle. Bray 
also explained that the basic design principle was to align key architectural elements 
along a central axis.7 But, to Bray’s study, I want to add that dayuan is a different concept 
from that of danwei because it has to do with the everyday experience of community and 
place making.  
I argue that a different rationale lies behind the spatial organisation of the dayuan 
as presented by Wang Ji and that this has been overlooked by previous studies. From the 
analysis of the four different space description systems by Wang Ji when he tried to 
reconstruct the place of his dayuan (Figure 14); dayuan space is organised through 
subjective experiences and personal memories. Frequently visited or spatially defining 
physical structures, such as the gates and the walls, are used as reference points. The 
connection of spaces is linear and sequential. Each stop in this linear sequence of 
reference points is an image from memory. The images span different temporal 
frameworks. This system constructs a map of a place, blurring the boundary between 
synchronicity and diachronicity. The presentation of the space is very episodic, so that  
                                                 
7. Bray suggested that the symbolic meaning of the central axis was quite different from 
that of traditional Chinese architecture; specifically, danwei communities were generally 
organised with the principal architecture at the front to create an immediate and dominant 
focal point. This strategy aims to create a timeless imagery for danwei communities.  In 
danwei communities, architecture and physical structures in general are designed to 
symbolise power. 
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Figure 14: Four space description systems to reconstruct the place of dayuan by Wang Ji. 
(Diagram the author). 
  
 34 
 
one could imagine Wang Ji actually walking in the space across history.8 Moreover, a 
sense of nostalgia is very strong in Wang Ji’s narrative. For example, when Wang Ji 
mentioned (in dialogue 5) that the conference hall used to be there but has been 
demolished, he was saddened. Much of his leisure time had been spent in this place. He 
could not find such place in the new development. Wang Ji’s description of the past was 
very critical of the contemporary development of Linked Hybrid. 
I would like to provide another example to support my argument about the 
differences between dayuan and danwei. I interviewed other workers about their 
memories of the original spatial organisation of the factory before the construction of 
Linked Hybrid. Though the descriptions were very personal and varied, similar 
landmarks always played important roles in their narrations. In another interview, Zhang 
Lian began explaining the original organisation by referring to three structures, which 
still exist: a school at the east side of the factory, the wall between the residential zone 
and the industrial zone, and a local power supply building between the two new 
developments (Figure 15). “I always use these three things to locate my memories”, said 
Zhang Lian. The comparison between the old and the new, and the emphasis on the 
surviving structures, forms the basis of Zhang Lian’s criticism of the new development of 
his living environment. 
 
  
                                                 
8. For a more detailed discussion about episodic memory and semantic memory, see 
Fentress and Wickam (1992). 
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Figure 15: Three elements did not change in the redevelopment of the area. They are the 
school (left), electricity transformer (middle), and the wall (up). (Diagram the author). 
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Collective Memories in Dayuan Community 
Other than mundane memories of the place, some historical events happened in 
the dayuan community, which also helped to reinforce the neighbourhood bonds between 
workers.  Because of the importance of the paper mill during the 1990s, different 
generations of Chinese government leaders visited the factory. The stories of their visits, 
reconstructed through a combination of official documentations and community gossip, 
were told by the workers. The telling of these stories helped to further define the dayuan 
community. Wang Ji told how, 
The government official Zhao Ziyang came to our factory once. Another 
official Li Peng might have come even earlier than him. Jiang Zhemin 
came as well; he is the one I remember most clearly (Wang Ji, personal 
communication, 14 January, 2009). 
The propaganda cadre Zhang Lian and the worker Wang Ji told me the same story when 
they were asked to share any interesting memories from their dayuan communities. Zhao 
Ziyang’s visit was recorded in an internal documentary video (Figure 16). The visit took 
place on 30 May, 1986. The intention of this visit was to inspect the development of a 
new machine at the factory. The video documented the whole process of how Zhao 
Ziyang talked to the supervisors of different production departments and to the factory 
manager. The voices of the people in the video are not audible. Instead, a narrator speaks 
throughout the video, describing the inspection and what the people were saying. The 
narrator in the video says, 
The prime minister asked, ‘Where was this paper manufactured?’ Manager 
Guo answered, ‘This was made in Shanghai, a Chinese product’. In front 
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of a machine, Prime Minister Zhao picked up a piece of paper and asked, 
‘What is this paper?’ Manager Guo answered, ‘This is writing paper for 
students. Although this paper is not marketable, we keep manufactur ing it’. 
The prime minister was happy and nodded his head’.9 
The other special visitor mentioned by Wang Ji was Jiang Zemin, the state chairman. 
Wang Ji could not remember the exact year of the visit when he was asked to tell the 
story, but in the interview transcription, he placed it in the 1990s. Jiang Zemin’s visit was 
recorded in the factory newspaper the day after his visit (Figure 17). It was recorded that, 
First, chairman Jiang and other cadres listened to a presentation from the 
factory manager, Guo Chunguang, about the new technology of a water-
coal boiler machine. Chairman Jiang was also concerned about the 
production situation of the paper mill, so he asked about the factory’s 
product marketing and the raw-material-supply situation. Manager Guo 
Chunguang briefly explained the factory achievements of the water-coal 
boiler project in the sixth, seventh and eighth Five Year Plans and how 
this machine was used in the factory. During the presentation, Chairman 
Jiang asked about the spraying mechanism and the efficiency of the 
machine (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1996). 
The newspaper article recorded Jiang Zemin’s interaction with factory managers. 
The report presented the historical events in a style of writing that was meant to appear 
neutral and unemotional, though government officials edited and censored the story, 
ensuring that it served as a propaganda and governance tool. These kinds of stories 
                                                 
9. Video of Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang inspecting Beijing First Paper Mill, from the 
digital archive at the Beijing First Paper Mill’s Propaganda Department. The video is 
called ‘Qianjinzhongde Zhaozhiyichang’(First Paper Mill Moving Forward).  
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Figure 16: Zhao Ziyang’s (waving hand in the photo) visit documented in an internal 
documentary video of the paper mill. (Photo captured from ‘First Paper Mill Moving 
Forward’ video provided by Zhang Lian). 
Figure 17: Jiang Zemin’s visit was documented in the paper mill internal newspaper. 
(Photo capture from Beijing First Paper Mill, 1996). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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appeared in all types of media, including newspapers and videos. In the same new report 
article, it was recorded that, 
Jiang came to look at one of our new machines, perhaps because this 
project was internationally famous. He came and had a very quick look. 
Before he came, we needed to prepare for a lot in advance. I think the 
preparation work started two years before when we knew he was coming. 
Some of the stores on the street were renovated. 
When Jiang came, the factory manager, Guo Chunguang, attended to him. 
We saw him from machine house no. 3 coming with a ‘Red Flag’ car. We 
saw him immediately enter the factory office. The diplomatic standard for 
him was extremely high, so all those who served him were department 
supervisors from our danwei. He did not drink the tea served to him 
though. He took a very quick look at some machine shops. We needed to 
make sure all those fixtures hanging from the ceiling were safe for him 
before he came. In any case, he did not stay long, perhaps only around one 
hour. He just walked around the factory briefly. Afterwards, he was shown 
our new machine. I think this trip was meant to inspect some energy-
saving technology and improvement at our danwei. 
During the visit, all workers needed to do their routine tasks as usual. 
Some workers lined up and waited for him, but he just nodded his head 
from far away. He did not come to shake hands with them (Wang Ji, 
personal communication, 14 January, 2009). 
The story above was recounted by Wang Ji. The video of Zhao Ziyang’s inspection, the 
newspaper report of Jiang Zemin’s visit and the personal narration by Wang Ji have 
different tones. In particular, Wang Ji’s personal narration is concerned more about the 
details of the historical event; for example, how the preparation work took two years, the 
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car’s brand was ‘Red Flag’, the tea was served but not touched, the fixtures needed 
additionally security, and finally how Jiang Zemin did not shake hands with the workers. 
Thus Wang Ji’s description of his memory implicitly counteracts the official 
history. The concept of ‘counter memory’ introduced by Foucault (1977) helps explain 
why Wang Ji shifted from a simple description of the official record to a critique of the 
manpower and resources invested in a one-hour meeting. By ‘counter memory’, I refer to 
the particular type of narrative that attempts to dismantle the authority of people and 
events of official history, which in my case, is the newspaper version of Jiang Zemin’s 
visit of Wang Ji’s community, by focusing on the mundane characteristics of the event, 
such as the details remembered by Wang Ji.10 Thus, Wang Ji’s story contradicted and 
challenged the political hegemony of the government, reversing the relationship between 
himself and the centralised political power. The worker’s memories closely relate to his 
personal experiences and observations. For example, the brand of the car and the task of 
making sure all hanging fixtures were safe. However, some memories were about other 
people’s interactions, such as the story about Jiang Zemin not drinking the tea served to 
him. This kind of memory recalls stories and gossip in the dayuan community.11 Jiang 
Zemin’s visit was treated as a big event in the community, and the residents were buzzing 
with discussion about it at the time. Through informal networks in the community, an 
                                                 
10. ‘Counter memory’ or ‘effective history’ from individuals is the idea proposed by 
Foucault (1977) to describe the opposition of ‘traditional history’ from the political 
hegemony. 
11. In Chapter 3, I also introduce gossip about the reason why part of the workers’ 
community needed to be demolished. 
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unofficial history was established and mixed up with personal experience as a collective 
memory of the community.  
Francesca Cappelletto (2003) used the concept of ‘mnemonic communities’ to 
describe a fusion between autobiographical and historical memory, which meant telling 
what apparently happened with a combination of personal experiences and stories told by 
others. Consequently, a web of stories was synthesised into a shared memory of the 
community. This shared memory, comparable to the official history of the visit by Jiang 
Zemin to the factory, also involved a selection process. Usually these memories are 
highly critical, not solely as counter memories that challenge the hegemony of authorities, 
but also as intentional demonstration of individual consciousnesses. Therefore, the 
concept of dayuan does not need to present a stable and unified society like the concept 
of danwei, but, instead, dayuan refers to a more chaotic living environment and more 
dynamic social relationships.  Further support for my argument about the difference 
between dayuan and danwei is to be found in another story by Wang Ji about the death of 
a co-worker when he was asked about his feelings about the neighbourhood relationships 
in the community. The story was about one of Wang Ji’s neighbours and co-workers, 
who died due to a heart attack while he was playing a card game in the community. When 
he was dying and after he died, Wang Ji said no one in the community wanted to help his 
family. In that story, Wang Ji focused on the fading of neighbourhood affection in his 
dayuan to demystify a common belief in harmonious neighbourhood relationships and to 
express his individual thoughts. 
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Li Long’s Travelling Journals 
Around the mid-1990s, China’s open market finally reached the workers’ 
community. Thanks to this, one normal factory worker, Li Long, got the opportunity to 
travel abroad, and, through his diary, other workers were able to read about the idea of 
the modern city and of modernity (Figure 18). In 1995 and 1996, Li Long, who was a 
staff member of the Beijing First Paper Mill’s propaganda department and a factory 
leader, published a series of journals in the paper mill’s community about his experiences 
travelling to a xiandaihua (modernised) country—Japan. His friends in Japan invited him 
to visit several cities over fifteen days. In his journals, he expressed his admiration for 
these modern cities and their cultures, and he also openly criticised the urbanism of China. 
Li Long’s critical thinking differentiated him from the rest of the workers. I use his 
writings to illustrate how some new contemporary ideologies in Chinese society, such as 
consumerism, the market, management, and even modernity, emerged in the paper mill 
dayuan in the mid-1990s. These critical ideas from Li Long planted the seeds of 
modernity in the workers’ community. 
State of Politeness and Kingdom of Automobile 
Li Long was fascinated by both the qualitative and the material sides of modernity. 
On the qualitative side, he wrote that his first positive impression of Japanese cities was 
suzhi (quality), or wenming (civility), of people. He compared the Japanese people he met 
on the trip and Chinese people in general. At Fukouka airport customs, he found Japanese 
officials to be extremely polite and friendly. One official tried to talk with him even 
though they were speaking different languages. He also recalled in his journal that just 
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Figure 18: Li Long’s journal publication in the paper mill’s internal newspaper. The 
Chinese expressions of ‘state of politeness’ (left) and ‘kingdom of automobiles’ (right) 
are highlighted by the author. (Photo captured from BeijingYiqing Bao, Li L., 1995a).  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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three hours previously, when he had left Beijing airport, the Chinese custom officials just 
checked his document but did not even look at him. He called Japan liyi zhibang, or a 
state of politeness. He continued: 
There were many colourful and beautiful buildings and many automobiles 
following each other on the roads and streets (Li L., 1995a). 
Also on the material side, Li Long wrote about his view from the airplane before landing 
at Fukouka airport. The number of automobiles on the street caught his attention first. His 
surprise did not decrease when he was sitting in his friend’s private car driving along the 
airport highway. At this point in his journal, he referred to Japan as qiche wangguo, or a 
kingdom of automobiles. ‘A state of politeness’ and ‘a kingdom of automobiles’ 
contributed to the qualitative and material aspects of Li Long’s fascination with 
modernity, or in his words, xiandaihua. 
On both sides of the roads and along the highways penetrating the 
suburban and village areas, I saw small private cars parked in front of 
every house. This was my first impression of a Japanese city (Li L., 
1995a). 
Li Long wrote that, on his way to his friend’s home, he found Japanese suburban 
and rural areas very different from Chinese ones: they were so xiandai, or modern. I will 
discuss this particular idea in the following passage. Suburban lifestyle for Li Long, and 
generally for Chinese people then, was an ideal. When he arrived in the Japanese city of 
Fukouka, Li Long made another comparison with Beijing: both cities were full of 
automobiles, but almost all of them were private cars in Fukouka, whereas public 
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transportation vehicles were in a majority in China. With this comparison, Li Long 
implied the backwardness of the Beijing transportation system and his appreciation of 
popularisation of the private automobile in Japan.  
To conclude, the image of the modern city for Li Long is composed of a few 
elements: endless urban sprawl in suburban areas, large-scale infrastructural 
constructions, automobiles, quiet pedestrian streets and more importantly, the concept of 
private property. All these elements make up the contemporary urbanism in Japan.  
Technology and Infrastructure 
Japan’s highways connect everywhere. Drivers pay for how long they 
drive. At the toll entrance, everything is automatic without a human 
attendant. At the end of the highway, some workers collect the fee 
according to how long you drove. The driver can pay with some magnetic 
cards (Li L., 1995b). 
In part of Li Long’s journal, he wrote about his experience at the highway toll 
station. He described the advanced technological equipment and infrastructure in detail. 
He also observed that drivers in Japan were more obedient to the rules and signs on the 
highway than drivers in China. Finally, he compared the system of alleyways in both 
cities. In particular, he noted that cars could pass through alleys easily in Fukouka, but 
Beijing alleys (hutong) were narrow, lacked signage and often ended unexpectedly. He 
also implied that Chinese drivers would not be as polite as those in Japan in such narrow 
alleyways. 
Li Long’s comparisons not only highlighted modern and nonmodern dualities as 
he saw them, but also a difference in the level of civility between the two countries. In 
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particular, he noted that drivers were openly polite to each other in Fukouka’s alleyways, 
while such behaviour was not present in Beijing’s hutong. Paradoxically, in Chinese, the 
term for modernised Beijing (xiandai) strongly implies civility (wenming). This 
conceptual relationship further develops the Chinese concept of modernity, or more 
precisely xiandai in Chinese. 
Firstly Becoming a Consumer 
Among those of Li Long’s journal entries, which were published in the paper 
mill’s newspaper, one of the most prominent themes was how Li Long first engaged in 
consumerism. His writing style was ironic and critical of Chinese society at that time. In 
his journal, Li Long drew comparisons between the consumerist phenomenon in Japan 
and his personal experience. For instance, he could not find any fast-food restaurants in 
Beijing, but these restaurants proliferated in Japan (Li L., 1996a). He wrote that the 
majority of citizens in Japan seemed to belong to the ‘labour class’. By ‘labour class’, Li 
Long particularly referred to those employees who are paid by the employers in the 
society of the market economy.12 This group of people needed affordable and quickly 
prepared food to save money and time. Therefore, in Japan the restaurants tended to be 
small and low profile because that kept costs down. This type of business model was very 
different from Beijing, where restaurants always tried to cater for the upper class in 
settings with grander decorations.  
                                                 
12. Being an employee and paid by an employer was a new concept in socialist China. 
Even though the workers are paid by the factory, many of their living necessities were 
still taken care by the state welfare system. Therefore, being a real ‘labour class’ means 
to totally engage in a market economy, which Li Long considered as more advanced and 
modernised. 
 47 
 
While he was in Japan, Li Long went to a local restaurant with his friend. Being 
in that restaurant was a completely different experience than he was used to in Beijing. 
First, he was pleasantly greeted by all the restaurant staff, even the manager. This also 
echoes his civility argument. He was surprised that there was no guard to watch the 
customers entering and exiting the restaurant. In other words, he tried to criticise 
Beijing’s restaurants for always being guarded to prevent people from leaving without 
paying. He was also surprised to observe that payment in the sushi restaurant that he 
visited was conducted on a system of trust with the customers. Specifica lly, the restaurant 
used a conveyor system to present a steady flow of individual plates to its customers. 
Different colour plates represented different prices, and the restaurant calculated the bill 
based on the number and colour of empty plates that the customers left at their table. The 
restaurant even allowed people to eat outside, confident that they would pay on their own 
at the end. The restaurant put out sample plates with clearly marked prices, which Li 
Long liked very much because it gave him confidence that he would not be overcharged. 
In another journal entry (Li L., 1996b), Li Long described his shopping 
experience in Tokyo. He was surprised by how free he was in the Japanese supermarket. 
The experience was different from shopping in supermarkets in China; rather, it was 
closer to the experience of an informal street market. The supermarket was large and 
crowded, but no guards were stationed at the entrance and no bags had to be checked. In 
the supermarket, no one was monitoring the customers. He found that cashiers were 
located at different spots in the supermarket, so guests could pay anywhere in the 
supermarket at their convenience. The cashier calculated goods by scanning the barcodes 
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and never checked if the notes were real. After paying, there was even a bagging station 
to provide free boxes and bags. 
Li Long’s experience as a consumer touched on, again, the civility of the Japanese 
people. In general, his praise of the moral standard of the Japanese business operators and 
customers was an indirect criticism of his Chinese community members. More 
importantly, he also disseminated the ideology of consumerism by describing the 
pleasure of consuming in a civilised or modernised society. The ideology of consumerism 
was totally missing in Beijing in the early 1990s, but it became the most powerful force 
behind the development of the city and the state.  
Discovering Disharmony 
Li Long developed a long paragraph to describe the ‘yuppies’ phenomenon in the 
Kasumigaseki area of Tokyo (Li L., 1996b). It was the first time that he had personally 
experienced a subculture that conflicted with his ideal of a harmonious and civilised 
society. He spent the majority of his life in a socialist planned economy and society, in 
which the state regulated people’s behaviour and thought. In Japan, he observed that 
some girls gathered together in groups of two or three at a park. All of them wore black 
dresses, black shirts, leather shorts and boots. They also had their hair dyed red or yellow. 
Some of them were smoking and talking to each other, and some of them were playing 
with dogs and joking around. He asked his friend who these people were. His friend 
could not give him a good answer, but explained that these kinds of people were more 
common in the Shinjuku area, where they liked to dance and sing all night. Li Long 
thought they were not students but yuppies, a concept he had come to know by watching 
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Western movies and television shows. His observations of their dress and behaviour 
suggested that this group of people were not poor, and they seemed to lead a very 
materialistic life. They did not seem to exude the same civility he saw in the sushi 
restaurant or supermarket. He finally wrote his criticism about these people and their 
lifestyle: 
They smoke, chat, and play with dogs to kill their time; I think their hearts 
must be very empty. . . . These people are equivalent to gangsters and 
bullies in our city, who fail to graduate from their schools and are not even 
able to find a job. They might be involved in many illegal activities, not 
individually but in groups. This culture, which is the dark side of Japanese 
society, had a big influence on the productivity of the society (Li L., 
1996b). 
Modern Community 
Li Long explained that the reason why Japanese cities were cleaner than Chinese 
cities was because, in Japan, the municipal waste-treatment system was very well 
developed. As emphasised in his journal entry (Li L., 1996c), the common Chinese term 
used to refer to waste treatment was dao, which means pouring away the waste. Li Long 
thought that the emphasis of the word dao illustrated the fundamental difference between 
the overall appearance of Chinese and Japanese urban areas. Japanese residents put all 
their waste into two kinds of big plastic bags, combustible and non-combustible. A truck 
collected all the bags at some particular spots in the community; in other words, the 
concept of dao did not exist in Japan. In his hometown of Beijing, he was very upset by 
the environmental situation—he was able to find rubbish everywhere in his community. 
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He blamed this situation on the Chinese government. In the early 1990s, the government 
advocated using waste plastic bags to wrap domestic rubbish before disposal. However, 
the government did not provide enough free plastic bags to encourage the movement. He 
argued that if a developed country such as Japan considered the affordability and the self-
discipline of the citizens as reasons to provide enough free plastic bags, China as a 
developing country should definitely consider those issues. Otherwise, everyone will just 
dao rubbish everywhere.  
Li Long found another reason for the better environmental qualities in Japan. 
Unlike Chinese residences, Japanese homes all used coal-gas. Because they did not have 
to burn charcoal, there was no dust. In addition to a better infrastructural system to 
operate the city more efficiently and sustainably, the government also actively intervened 
in communities. Community residents had to pay 520 yen to the local municipal 
department every month, three hundred of which were used to organise sports activities, 
and the rest was used for managing the community.  
For Li Long, dao and recycling were two notions about how civilised or 
modernised one’s community was. I suggest that Li Long’s journals also represented the 
emergence of Chinese society’s desire to upgrade their community. My analysis of Li 
Long’s article indicates an ideological linkage between management and social class: 
well-managed community means a more modernised and civilised community, and in 
turn the community will be perceived as being of a higher social class. 
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Market Economy is the Future 
To summarise the above description from Li Long, on the one hand, advanced 
technology, endless highways, the suburban lifestyle, automobiles, and large-scale 
infrastructure construct the material urbanism of modernity. On the other hand, social 
integrity, a civilised working class, consumerism, and community management make up 
the qualitative side. In his last journal entry, Li Long tried to conclude his experiences 
about his appraisal of the market economy (Li L., 1996d). He attributed all the credit for 
the Japanese achievements in urban and social development to the country’s free-market 
policies. He believed that only the market economy could improve and modernise the life 
of people in China. The freedom of choice and the better services in Japan were results of 
competition. His observations of Japan’s domestic utility services convey this idea: 
The [domestic] boiler was just the size of a Chinese radiating heater. 
Three gas tanks were connected to it. [The heater] supplies hot water to 
the kitchen and bathrooms. Residents living in towers have their 
individual water boiler in the bathroom connected to the central coal gas 
system. A ventilation system was installed to exchange fresh air. My 
friend told me how convenient it was to have all this equipment and also 
how good the service was from the gas, telephone, and electricity 
companies. My friend told me that this was because the market in Japan is 
highly competitive, so if you are not satisfied with one company, you can 
change to another one anytime (Li L., 1996d). 
Li Long believed that the Japanese benefited by the competition of the market 
economy. Because of this, the Japanese residents did not need to worry so much about 
issues that were of daily concern to many people in China. For instance, in China, people 
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always had trouble exchanging gas tanks, and some poor people living in single-story 
housing had to pay for expensive fuel. He blamed all those problems on the domination 
by a single fuel company in the planned economy. He suggested that there should be deep 
reform, so that the fuel companies would one day compete with each other and provide 
better services to the residents. In his eyes, the market economy was the future. Li Long’s 
ideas were widely disseminated in the workers’ community through the internal 
newspaper, but how did all these ideas actually become realities in the workers’ 
community? 
He Xuezhi’s Xiandai Dream 
Deng Xiaoping, generally recognised as a pragmatist,13 was the political leader 
who proposed a total modernisation of Chinese culture and cities. Though he died in 
1997, the transformations in the everyday lives of the workers of Beijing First Paper Mill 
continued. Li Long’s diary and his fascination for Japanese modernity was a 
representation of the mainstream ideology at that time, in both his workers’ community 
and throughout Chinese cities. The process eventually led to the total redevelopment of 
the factory and the construction of Linked Hybrid. The following transcript is from a 
factory worker, He Xuezhi, about his experiences of the transformations in his domestic 
environment by technological upgrades in 1998, one year after the death of Deng 
Xiaoping: 
                                                 
13. Shambaugh (1995, 104) holds a different view than the mainstream description of 
Deng Xiaoping as a pragmatist. He argued that it was Deng’s intention to present himself 
as a pragmatist in front of the media, though he was unlikely to be more pragmatic than 
other international political leaders at the time. 
 53 
 
From the fourteenth National Congress in 1992 until now, our country has 
developed dramatically, and the state’s high productivity surprises the 
world. The living environment of my family, as well as all other families, 
has also been improved. We have our own refrigerator, television, and 
washing machine, and now we are going to have our next three big pieces 
[san-da-jian]: telephone, stereo and computer. The telephone has just 
recently been installed in my home, and my dream of owning a telephone 
at home has finally been realised (He X. Z., 1998). 
He tried to recall his childhood memory of when making a private telephone call 
was something beyond his imagination in 1980s China: 
In 1980, I went to a business trip to Sichuan. Right after I arrived at the 
danwei compound at Sichuan, I got a telegraph from Beijing. I was 
notified that my wife was seriously ill. At that time, the fastest way to get 
back to Beijing would take at least three days. So I decided to make a 
long-distance phone call. I went to the only post office in the town, where 
a long-distance phone-call service could be found. The connection 
operator in the phone was speaking in the Sichuan dialect and it was very 
difficult for me to understand. The process was extremely difficult. Finally 
I was connected. However, I still needed to wait for my family to go to a 
particular place to pick up the phone. After one and a half hours, I finally 
talked to my family member, and his voice was as small as a mosquito’s, 
so I needed to yell into the phone. Fortunately, I heard what the other side 
was saying and knew my wife was fine (He X. Z., 1998). 
He Xuezhi applied to install a private telephone in his home in 1996, but he found 
out that he could not afford the installation fee at that time. Moreover, the application 
process might take a year to have a technician to do the installation. Therefore, he gave 
up his dream at the time. Just two years after his first attempt, he was finally able to 
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install a private telephone in his home, so he wrote an article to express his happiness in 
the paper mill’s internal newspaper. The installation waiting time had also shortened to 
about a month. The installation fee and the telephone bill became affordable to him, and 
his income had increased dramatically. He Xuezhi described in his writing that his 
“dream could now be realised easily (He X. Z., 1998)”. This story shows how fast the 
transformation and modernisation was in the workers’ community. 
He Xuezhi recognised the change of his social life before and after the installation 
of a private telephone. He described the telephone as “a window to connect the world 
outside his family” because it dramatically shortened the distance between himself and 
his friends, relatives and co-workers. Some of his perceptions had also changed. For 
instance, he described how he used to laugh at people who spent a lot of time talking on 
the telephone, but after installing a telephone himself, he thought his son and daughter 
talking on the phone for twenty minutes at a time was normal. When his wife and father 
were sick, the telephone became very busy and helpful. In the Spring Festival (the 
Chinese lunar calendar New Year), he could also call his brother in the westernmost 
Xinjiang province to give him his blessing. He was surprised that the long-distance call 
was as clear as a local call. Finally, He Xuezhi connected these changes in his life to the 
reform leader, Deng Xiaoping. He believed in the idea that development should be the 
core principle, as proposed by Deng Xiaoping, to develop the country towards a new era.  
Xiandai Versus Xiangzhen 
Li Long, in addition to his Japan travel journal, was a prolific writer in the 
community’s internal newspapers. In another article written by him in 1996, entitled 
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‘Confronting Xiangzhen Phenomenon in the Urban Area’, he criticised some ‘backward’ 
phenomenona in his neighbourhood, referring to the workers’ community at the north end 
of Linked Hybrid (Li, L., 1996e). As he described, there were many illegal hawkers 
“occupying pedestrian walkways, open spaces, and streets in his community; these 
hawkers constructed temporary structures for commercial activities, and these activities 
resulted in inconvenient, circuitous walking paths and disruptions in the daily lives of the 
residents”. He described the environment was zang, luan, cha (dirty, messy, low quality). 
At the end of the article, he labelled this kind of negative environment as the xiangzhen 
phenomenon.  
He realised that the positive side of those informal commercial activities was that 
they made goods more accessible to the residents. However, from the perspective of the 
appearance of the city (shirong), he argued that the commercial activities were not 
compatible with constructing a xiandaihua, or modernised city. He even questioned 
whether any other modern city in the world shared the same phenomenon presented in his 
community. He suggested that Beijing municipalities should eliminate the informal 
economy to achieve a more ‘orderly’ and ‘gorgeous’ city, so that Beijing could actually 
progress towards its goal of being an international modern metropolis (guojixing xiandai 
daduhui). 
What is xiangzhen? The closest translation of the term is probably county or 
village. Li Long used this concept as a metaphor in an article describing undeveloped 
rural conditions in urban areas. On the one hand, xiangzhen is a governing administrative 
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concept of the smallest unit in China.14 On the other hand, people from small county or 
villages are generally not seen as being as advanced and civilised as those from big cities, 
so that conceptually Chinese society can be separated into two social groups, the 
prestigious urban group and the poor nonurban xiangzhen (Lu D., 2006a, 155). I say that 
it is a perceived difference because a person does not necessarily have to be from a 
country village to be labelled as xiangzhen. This labelling is a subjective judgement about 
the behaviour and appearance of people, and the dichotomy between xiandai and 
xiangzhen is entirely evaluative.  
Li Long called the other side of xiangzhen the international modern metropolis 
(guojixing xiandai daduhui). Ten years after Li Long’s criticism of xiangzhen and after 
the total redevelopment of the site with Linked Hybrid, the xiangzhen phenomenon still 
actively influences the urban-development process, and Chapter 6 discusses the dynamics 
of the xiangzhen phenomenon in emergent forms of Chinese society. 
Steven Holl to Open Up Chinese Communities 
Having seen the factory workers of Beijing First Paper Mill, who wished to 
transform and modernise their built environment, I now turn to the other protagonists, the 
architect and the developers of the new community of Linked Hybrid. So what did the 
practitioners think? 
                                                 
14. Xiang, or village government, is under the control of the country government. If a 
village’s non-agricultural population makes up two thousand people or more than 10 per 
cent of its total population, the village can be upgraded to form a zhen, or town. 
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The developer’s marketing booklet for Linked Hybrid told the potential tenants 
that their development would help them realise their dream of living in an international 
metropolitan residential community, or guoji duhui zhuzhai shequ in Chinese (Figure 19 
and Figure 20).15 It is as if the developer of Linked Hybrid had read the journal entries of 
Li Long and were responding to what Li Long imagined about a more civilised, 
modernised and international community: 
In the history of Chinese residential housing, there has never been such a 
pioneering plan envisioned for the residential community and such epoch-
making superior work featuring sustainable development and sufficient 
space. 
Our project does not only strive to be the highest in quality; it also has a 
long-term perspective, and it will become one of the finest international 
urban residential communities. The Grand MOMA [Linked Hybrid] will 
display an unprecedented level of housing community design, create a 
new architectural vision, present the first international town, create a 
landmark, and aim for farsighted visions (Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 4). 
The above description of Linked Hybrid emphasises the two marketable concepts: 
sustainability and international connection. In particular, I will discuss how the developer 
defined the ‘residential community of an international metropolis’ in the marketing 
publication. The marketing material also included the following description (Figure 21): 
  
                                                 
15. The marketing publication is called ‘Realise Your Dream in the Residential 
Community in the International Metropolis’. The year of the publication cannot be found 
in the book, but the earliest electronic version of it dates back to 2004. 
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Figure 19: Marketing material of Linked Hybrid in Chinese (top) and English (bottom). 
The painting, The Dance (1910) on the left hand side of the image is by French artist 
Henri Matisse. The painting was used by the developer to be a metaphor of Linked 
Hybrid. Steven Holl did not mention any connection of Linked Hybrid to that painting in 
his publication materials. (Image captured from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, 
Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 1-2).  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 20: The use of the Linked Hybrid model in the marketing material. At the time 
when this marketing material was made, Linked Hybrid was not yet finished, therefore 
the developer could only use the model of Linked Hybrid to present the project to the 
potential buyers. (Image captured from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, Dangdai 
MOMA, n.d., 3-4).  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 21: The image presents Louis Vuitton as part of the international lifestyle to 
emphasise the importance of consumerism in the marketing strategy of the project. 
(Image captured from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 11-12).  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Snap-shot of a Metropolis, the Domain of International Life 
How should people live when we step into the twenty-first century? What 
are the lifestyles of different international metropolises? Looking at 
international metropolises, such as New York, Tokyo, Shanghai, and 
Beijing, the novel residential domain of the twenty-first century is clear—
a long-term and attainable international living venue! The eternal heart of 
the America is New York, and the eternal centre of New York is 
Manhattan. The capital city Tokyo leads Japan towards the world, and the 
Roppangi Hills are located in Tokyo. Shanghai is the focus of China 
facing the world, and the new Pudong district was constructed in Shanghai.  
Turn our face towards China’s capital, Beijing. The area in Beijing that is 
able to compete with other international metropolises is Dongzhimen. Say 
goodbye to the traditional model.  Today’s Dongzhimen has become the 
most gorgeous urban living space. The combination of international 
headquarters, global business centres, and multiple and materialistic urban 
consumerist lifestyles, perfectly demonstrate the richness of the 
international metropolitan lifestyle. The high-quality international living 
atmosphere is comparable to any international metropolis. Beijing’s 
second national gate, Dongzhimen, enjoys an international living 
environment (Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 12).16 
The author of the essay in the marketing booklet emphasised several times the 
internationally recognised status of Linked Hybrid. The marketing strategy for the 
architecture was through the branding of a new lifestyle. To achieve this objective, an 
international architect, Steven Holl, was commissioned for this project. In 1985, Steven 
Holl wrote about ‘Hybrid Buildings’ in Architecture Pamphlet No. 11: 
                                                 
16. Text originally in Chinese, translated by the author. 
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What pressures specific to the twentieth century does the combination of 
program impose on architectural form? Concentration of many social 
activities within an architectural form distends and warps a pure building 
type. Certain previously neglected forms of associations have been 
wrenched together in the modern city so as to generate buildings which 
might stand as an anti-typology, if examined under current theoretical 
preoccupations. . . . Although there are examples of combined function 
buildings throughout history (the house over the shop is prevalent in many 
ages and cultures), Hybrid Buildings developed most rapidly in the 
twentieth century. The modern city has acted as fertilizer for the growth of 
architectures from the homogenous to the heterogeneous in regard to use. 
Urban densities and evolving building techniques have affected the mixing 
of functions, piling one atop another, defying critics who contend that a 
building should ‘looking like what it is’.  
Geographic dispersion has had a centrifugal effect on American cities. 
Dispersion, evident in the countless examples of freeways deformed towns, 
has been the typical mode of development in the past three decades. Free-
standing corporate headquarters, industrial ‘parks’, shopping centres and 
suburban housing are now scattered throughout what was once rural 
countryside, the negative consequence of this type of development have 
now become apparent: the dissipated centres of towns, drained of activity, 
call for revitalization. New concentrations of activities would invigorate 
the towns socially as well as providing the physical architecture to rebuild 
common spaces (Holl, 1985, 3). 
Holl related the hybrid function building typology to the American suburban 
crisis. His argument suggested that the homogeneity of suburbia is the basis of asocial 
and developmental crisis, but also that the mixed programmed (or in Holl’s word, hybrid) 
building typology is a possible solution to the suburban situation. This writing from Holl 
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from 1985 helps us to understand his conceptualization of Linked Hybrid. From 1988 to 
1991, Holl worked with his colleagues on a series of hypothetical projects and published 
them in Edge of a City (Holl, 1991b).17 In these projects, the link between his critique of 
suburbia and the hybrid typology become more obvious and direct. Ten years later, all of 
the concepts from this research were amalgamated in the Linked Hybrid project (Figure 
22).  
In terms of scale, Linked Hybrid was the largest project for Holl’s office at that 
time (Ho C. L., 2007). The design attempts to combine two types of Chinese urbanism—
the ‘horizontality’ of the urban form before the 1980s and the ‘verticality’ of the urban 
form after the 1980s. The design also tried to rearrange (as will be discussed later in this 
research) the public and private configuration of a traditional Chinese gated community 
within a new architectural framework. The complexity of the architectural programme 
responding to the suburban context had been developing in Holl’s thinking for more than 
a decade: 
Urban space has a vertical ‘Z’ dimension equal to or more important than 
the horizontal ‘X-Y’ plane. This perpendicular spatial order is amplified 
by a range of viewpoints, from various levels… Isolated buildings with 
single function, the suburban norm, typical at the modern city’s periphery, 
give way to these projects to hybrid buildings, with diverse programs. 
                                                 
17. See also Holl (1991a). The first actual trial of a hybrid building by Steven Holl is 
perhaps the Gymnasium Bridge project of Holl in 1977 (Holl, 2010, 41). The Gymnasium 
Bridge project is also the start of the horizontal skyscraper scheme, that is, tall buildings 
with high- level bridges. 
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Figure 22: Towers linked by bridges in the sky in Linked Hybrid. At the back of this 
image, it is the workers’ community. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 23: Steven Holl’s diagram of the Linked Hybrid idea as a hybridity of two 
architectural typologies for Chinese cities. The upper diagram represents the horizontality 
of traditional urbanism, the middle line represents the verticality of point-towers in 
modern China, and the bottom line represents the mixture of these two typologies of 
architecture in the Linked Hybrid design.  (Diagram captured from Steven Holl 
Architects’ website). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 24: Parallax Tower designed by Steven Holl (Image captured from Holl, 1991a). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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An effort towards programmatic richness—an open association of spaces 
to program suggestions—is fertilized by gathering and juxtaposing a 
variety of activities (Holl, 1991b, 13-15). 
Holl’s 1989 Parallax Tower hypothetical project for the Hudson Yard of New 
York City, as one of the city-edge projects, was the prototype of Linked Hybrid (Figure 
24). The design included buildings with multiple functions and hybrid programmes 
connected by horizontal underwater urban-transit infrastructure and high-speed elevators, 
as well as floating bridges with public spaces, such as concert halls, movie theatres and 
banquet halls (Holl, 1991b).  
Beijing architect Wang Hui (2009) suggested two notions of ‘hybridity’ in Linked 
Hybrid: the hybridisation of urbanism and community, and the hybridisation of verticality 
and horizontality (Figure 23). He stated that both of these hybridities have sociological 
implications for public space in the Chinese context. The latter hybridity even redefined 
the location of public space in vertical towers. He claimed this concept is relatively easy 
to accept, but that the former hybridity is more controversial for the Chinese and he 
defends the gated community critique of Chinese communities because of the different 
sizes of Chinese and Western housing communities. Very similar to the ‘minor public 
spaces’ (xiaogong) argument discovered by political scientist Xiaobo Lü (1995) in the 
danwei system (see Chapter 2 for more discussion), Wang Hui (2009) argued that the size 
of the housing community is instrumental in forming neighbourhoods and enhancing 
security. The opening up of the community also helps to sustain its ‘minor public spaces’. 
Thus, instead of literally opening up the gate of the community, the design opened up the 
doors of individual families. By opening up the individual’s door, Wang Hui refers to the 
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individualisation of domestic space in contemporary China. The shift from the previous 
danwei communities to contemporary China’s private communities is not about the 
enclosure of community, because communities from both eras are closed. In general, 
Wang Hui believed that the closed community is the original community form in China. 
Therefore, the Linked Hybrid design actually allowed individual families or units to 
become more intimate, comparing to other private developments in China.  
Walls and Bridges 
Walls and bridges have their own symbolism in architectural language. 
Often, a wall represents a border, which has a defensive connotation. All 
Chinese communities are walled. Bridges symbolise a linkage or openness. 
There is no wall in this project, but there are many bridges. In this regard, 
we would like to thank the architect, but this design also gives developers 
many problems (Chen Yin, speech at Megablock Urbanism symposium, 
15 March, 2011). 
 
The concept of implanting the ‘third space’ creates a sense of a boundless 
mystery and brings happiness to your soul.[ 18] Dangdai MOMA [Linked 
Hybrid] is an open space; it is a pedestrian-friendly community. On the 
ground floor, all essential living services can be accessed on foot. Besides 
that, there is also a corridor in the air on the twentieth floor. With different 
extra functions, the corridor in a certain sense is a dreamlike city in the 
sky. Living here, residents cannot sense the feeling of a condominium 
[gongyu]; instead, they can experience a novel world : fulfilling all 
                                                 
18. The idea of ‘third space’ in this paraphrase refers to the space between public and 
private space. 
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memories, comforts, experiences, and changes in life (Dangdai MOMA, 
n.d., 58-59). 
Chen Yin, from the development company, is the primary supporter of the 
architect’s open community idea. In Chen Yin’s words, the goal of constructing an open 
community is very clear: “to express a sense of openness and to critique the 
defensiveness of other residential development projects” (Chen Yin, speech at 
Megablock Urbanism symposium, 15 March, 2011). In one of the marketing booklets 
from the development company, I even found the definition of ‘open community’ to be 
equivocal, because it can be interpreted as resident-oriented. But what is the architect’s 
own interpretation? 
When I first designed Dangdai MOMA (Linked Hybrid), I tried to create 
an open space and a pedestrian-friendly atmosphere. On the ground floor 
of the community, all daily- life necessities, including a full-service 
laundry centre, banks, and supermarkets, can be found. Residents do not 
need to rely on cars, but they can walk to their destinations…. In a typical 
suburban environment, residential areas are scattered and far away from 
commercial areas, so people need to spend a lot of time in traffic. This is 
what we need to reconsider and transform. In many of my designs, I tried  
to allow residents to live collectively and reduce the vehicular traffic. This 
idea tries to connect different parts of the city on a macro level and 
connect everyday life and architecture on a micro level (Steven Holl, 
recorded in Ho, C. L., 2007). 
In the above interview, Holl directly linked other private developments in China 
to the suburban gated communities in the United States (Ho, C. L., 2007). In particular, 
he compared the contemporary large-scale developments in Beijing with the suburban 
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landscape in America because they share the similarity of heavy dependence on vehicular 
transportation and on the separation of zones with different programmes. As a response to 
those phenomenona, he attempted to integrate his large-scale urban development, Linked 
Hybrid, with the rest of the city. Indeed, architectural critic Clifford Pearson (2008) 
described this project as a reaction to the prolific, isolated and high-rise housing projects 
in Beijing, emphasising the connections between the various buildings and the city 
around them. On the one hand, the architectural design was a criticism of the closed 
superblock (large-scale closed community) urbanism in contemporary Beijing, while, on 
the other hand, it attempted to provide an alternative model and to challenge the 
superblock perceptions of the developer and the residents. Linked Hybrid was an open 
superblock with hybrid programmes, which allowed it to serve other superblocks around 
it, instead of only functioning for its own residents. This model thus also attempted to 
establish inter-superblock connectivity and to enhance continuous social networking. 
Architect’s Intention 
From the architectural perspective, Holl, as the architect, was the main agent in 
the making of Linked Hybrid.19 Throughout the process, he demonstrated independent 
and reflective thinking, and creative design input. More evidence of Holl’s architectural 
intentions can be found in his journal entries in a Chinese architectural magazine from his 
2001, 2003, and 2005 trips to China (Holl, 2007). Holl’s first trip was a short visit in 
2001. His first stop was Hong Kong, where he met his client for another residential 
                                                 
19. Here, I stress the influence of Holl only from the design perspective, because, later in 
the research, I rethink his importance from the social perspective, when Holl’s critical 
and independent thinking is seen to become in reality ineffective. 
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design project. After a relaxing two-day tour in Hong Kong and the celebration of his 
fifty-fourth birthday, Holl arrived in Nanning, a moderately developed city in southwest 
China on 10 December, 2001. This date marks Holl’s first real experience with Chinese 
society in his diaries. The next day he went to Shanghai. In his journal, he compared the 
two cities: 
Like Nanning, the direction of Shanghai growth is sprawling: chaotic and 
wasteful in disregard to land and infrastructure. It is automobile-driven, 
almost anti-pedestrian. This contradicts the history of a culture whose 
written tradition was opposed to indiscriminate scattering of objects across 
the landscape. 2,500 years ago, Kaogongji’s ritual prescribed compact 
urban organisms—square, walled, and gated—to create an urban habitat, 
and [the people] filled it. This led to an economic use of mass and void  
and protection of landscape. New capitalism is a kind of ‘invader’ turning 
old horizontal cities into chaotic spreads of peaks and voids. I am trying to 
like the smiling optimistic energy of Shanghai, but the new lack of 
connections of buildings to street is a crucial broken condition now 
destroying urban tissue (Holl, 2007, 24). 
The Linked Hybrid scheme was cultivated from his first day of contact with 
Chinese urbanism. Reconnecting destroyed urban tissues by privatised land properties 
was his biggest focus. Still, his design scheme was also influenced by his ‘edge of city’ 
solution to the American urban sprawl from the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In that 
research, Holl designed mixed-use, large-scale housing to react against the single 
programme planning strategy of American suburbia. During this same trip, Holl’s 
Chinese friend, Ma Qingyun, told him about the ‘Chinese speed of practice’ and, in his 
journal, Holl wrote what he had learned from Ma Qingyun, that the average housing 
 71 
 
block in China was designed in about four months, a little more than half the time used 
for similar projects in the United States. Holl’s critique of suburban housing and his 
knowledge of the ‘Chinese speed of practice’ foreshadowed the future architect-
developer dynamics in this project. 
Informal Activities and Street Life 
Holl’s second trip to China began on 20 August, 2003. This time, he travelled 
directly from San Francisco to Shanghai. The primary objective of this trip was to 
participate in an international architectural forum at Nanjing, a city that is a three-hour 
drive from Shanghai. Holl decided to stay at Shanghai for one night after the long flight 
from San Francisco. In his journal, he wrote about his experience travelling from 
Shanghai airport to the city centre: 
Arriving Shanghai at 6:00 p.m. and taking a car into the city. By 7:30 p.m., 
it’s very dark. The city seems surreal in darkness. They turn off almost all 
lights in office buildings. The few lights in apartments grow meekly 
maybe long fluorescent tube in a few kitchens. The hot August night is 
breezy. The air blows quite wonderfully, I notice the people sitting pushed 
back in a darken(ed) barbershop (Holl, 2007, 26). 
The airport Holl referred to was Pudong airport, which is about a one-hour drive 
from the city centre. The drive takes people through the new development area south of 
the Pudong business district. This area consists of a mixture of old danwei (work unit 
housing compounds), ready-to-demolish linong (a type of traditional Shanghai housing), 
and new developments of office skyscrapers. It supposed to be the most modern and 
advanced part of the city. For Holl, the darkness of the city in the late afternoon pointed 
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out problems of modernised urbanism in China.20 However, at the end of that paragraph, 
Holl’s attention was drawn to the humanity of the city. In his journal, he wrote: 
Traditional instrument music blares very loudly into the street. Looking 
out to the river, I see boats crossing all over, back and forth. People on the 
riverfront doing sunrise Tai Chi. A woman crossing the street in a black 
dress with a white parasol tilted toward the morning sun, but it is so windy 
that the parasol is blown inside-out. She closes it. 
Several kites fly in the sky over the river. All this with only a few horns: 
the loud traditional music dominates over an occasional loud boat horn 
honk (truly an urban scene!) (Holl, 2007, 26). 
Holl wrote about another experience the next morning after his arrival. His phrase in the 
parentheses, “truly an urban scene!”, is intriguing; I suggest this sentence has two layers 
of meaning: the first idea is that the traditional overpowers the modern while the second 
is that the scene demonstrated how rich urban activities can be and how conflict ing ideas 
can mix harmoniously. 
Beyond Cultural Boundary 
On 23 August, 2003, Holl arrived at Nanjing for the forum. It was organised by 
the Japanese architect, Arata Isozaki, who is a friend of Holl. The project invited many 
architects from around the world to design exhibition pavilions at a rural site. This was 
Holl’s first architectural design in China. His first sketch was based on his understanding 
                                                 
20. The problem of a high unoccupancy rate is actually widely reported by the media. 
Around the period when Holl visited Shanghai in 2002, Morio (2006) found that the sold-
but-empty rate in China was around 26%. The author also quoted former Prime Minister 
Zhu Rongji’s speech about his concern about the high vacancy rate and the real estate 
bubble. 
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of the axonometric perspective in Chinese painting to capture the essence of Chinese 
culture (Figure 25 and Figure 26). Holl’s intention to learn from different cultures seems 
clear. In the public forum, one of the most frequent questions that Chinese journalists 
asked Holl was how traditional Chinese culture would fit into contemporary Chinese 
architecture. These questions represented the struggle of Chinese local culture to persist 
in the face of globalism. The questions also demonstrated the anxiety and scepticism of 
the general public about the unusual-looking new urban developments following the shift 
to the open market economy. Holl answered those questions in his journal: 
What about a new Lebanese architecture? A new Australian architecture? 
A new American Architecture? The issue of the local and the global is not 
to be solved in a shallow opposition between regionalism and 
globalisation. However, in some deeper considerations—more carefully 
considered relations—and with the architecture of our time, together on 
this earth, a focus. It is the dilemma of central concern in international 
exhibitions of this type—the six dynasty capital city of Nanjing and its 
relation to silk, China’s greatest export for centuries 
(Holl, 2007, 27).21 
Beijing Linked Hybrid 
On 20 August, 2003, Holl received a phone call from the developer in China. He 
was invited to participate in a project designing eight housing towers in Beijing. His first 
reaction to this call was concern about the scale of this architectural project in China. He 
wrote in his journal, “When a society like China is retooling, urban architecture should be 
                                                 
21. Steven Holl responded similarly to one of my interview questions. For more 
discussion about the East–West debate, please see Chapter 6. 
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Figure 25: Holl’s sketch of Nanjing Museum of Art and Architecture. In this sketch, Holl 
tried to use parallel projection axonometric to draw the architecture, and Chinese 
landscape ink-painting style to draw the mountains behind the architecture. (Sketch 
capture from Holl, 2010, 131). 
Figure 26: Nanjing Museum of Art and Architecture. (Photo captured from Steven Holl 
Architects website). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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one of its first concerns”. On 23 August, Holl and his Chinese partner, Li Hu, were 
invited to the developer’s office to discuss the potential housing project. The meeting was 
held on the fourth floor of a converted building, which used to be an office building of 
the paper mill in the northern industrial zone. After the project was presented by the 
president of the development company, Zhang Lei, the only comment noted by Holl in 
his journal was about the impossible schedule of the project—to be completed by 2006 so 
that it could be sold and rented out by 2008 for the Olympics.22 This requirement 
reminded Holl about his friend’s information about the incredible design speed requested 
by Chinese developers. After the meeting, Holl and his team were given a tour of the first 
phase of the development in the southern zone, Wanguocheng MOMA. Holl expressed 
his disagreement with the postmodern style and the typical introverted housing 
community. He described it as a “depressingly anti-urban work” (Holl, 2007, 27). In 
contrast, he proposed his own idea to the developer: open, urban architecture with a real 
public dimension. The vision of the architecture should set a new example for Beijing. 
The following statement about this new idea marked the cornerstone of the development: 
A fragment of a city within a city with all functions needed to live, work 
and recreate without needing to get in a car and drive (Holl, 2007, 27). 
                                                 
22. Although this schedule was set up, the major construction work of Linked Hybrid was 
finished in 2009, after the Olympics. The government requested the developer to finish 
the exterior of the architecture before the Olympics. 
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Walling Linked Hybrid by Occupants 
Having now seen some protagonists from both the old factory community, Beijing 
First Paper Mill, and the new proposed residential community, Linked Hybrid, it is 
interesting to note how the idea for a modern community, which was described by the 
factory worker, Li Long, echoes the intentions of the developer; and, equally interesting, 
how Steven Holl interpreted the project in his own way. To recall Holl’s intention, the 
housing complex was originally designed as an open community, so that spaces and 
programmes in the community could be shared with its neighbourhood. The Chinese 
residents, however, did not appreciate Holl’s intended architectural innovation. They felt 
that the design was antithetical to their ideas about what a housing community should be. 
Consequently, they transformed and appropriated the architecture, turning it back into a 
closed and big compound community, or dayuan in Chinese. It is the attempt to 
understand the nature of this antagonism between Holl’s architectural intentions and the 
responses of the local people from both the old factory community and the new 
residential community; as well as the resulting processes of conflict, change, and 
adaptation, which is the topic of my study and the reason for the development of my 
research approach and methods. At times, my topic and my research strategies 
overlapped, as with the concept of guanxi. Concerning guanxi, I studied, for example, the 
system of control of the entrances around both the workers’ community and the Linked 
Hybrid community during several field visits. On 16 December, 2008, I was conducting 
fieldwork around and inside the Linked Hybrid community. At the beginning, the 
research was not interrupted, even though some security guards saw that I was taking 
pictures of the community. However, later on, the guard at the entrance started to ask 
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what I was doing. He told me that the reason for not allowing me to enter the Linked 
Hybrid community was due to the community regulations. The following year in 2009, I 
was involved in the organisation of a public event in the Linked Hybrid community from 
13 to 19 March, 2009, with the senior operating manager of Modern Group Development 
Company, Wang Jingli. During this period, I attempted to enter the community in 
different ways. On 13 March, Wang Jingli tried to bring me to the theatres which are 
located at the centre of the complex, in order to let me see the venue of the event. We 
walked together from the development company, located at Wangguocheng MOMA, 
across the river and under the airport expressway bridge, to the south gate of Linked 
Hybrid. A security guard was standing at the entrance. When he saw me, he tried to stop 
me. Before he started talking, Wang Jingli said, ‘zijiren’ (our people). The guard then 
smiled to me and walked back to his stand. On 17 March, at 9:30 a.m. in the morning, I 
was supposed to meet Wang Jingli again for the event, but this time the meeting place 
was in Linked Hybrid. I drove into the community by myself. There was one security 
guard standing at the entrance. He did not stop the car but just observed me from a 
distance. After I parked the car inside the community, another security guard walked 
towards me and asked if I was going to the sales office, which is located by the other 
entrance of Linked Hybrid. I told him that I was going to have a meeting with someone 
from the development company. He did not inquire further and instructed me to park the 
car in a designated spot. On 19 March, I drove into the complex again for the event. 
Because the management and security offices had been informed that there was a public 
event in the community on that day, the security guard did not prohibit me from entering 
the complex, but he did keep a watchful eye on me from a distance. These fieldwork 
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experiences revealed that the control system at Linked Hybrid was based on another 
important Chinese concept, guanxi, which I will discuss further in the next chapter. The 
categorisation by Wang Li of me as ‘zijiren’ placed me inside their own social circles, or 
more precisely their guanxi network. Therefore, I was allowed to ‘get things done’.23 
As to the system of control of entrances at the new community of Linked Hybrid, 
there were two main steps in closing the open community designed by Steven Holl. The 
first step was to tighten the control at the openings with intensive security. The vice 
president of the Modern Group Development Company, Chen Yin, explained that the 
architectural purpose of having bridges instead of walls was to show “openness” instead 
of “defensiveness”. However, this design introduced a number of unprecedented 
problems, particularly that of managing an open superblock community for upper-class 
residents. A strict system of control proved essential for managing such a community. 
Thus, the Linked Hybrid community was closed by a security guard system. 
Holl’s design to eliminate walls and to provide public spaces in the Linked 
Hybrid compound had paradoxical consequences. During my fieldwork one day, I 
discussed these issues with a real estate agent who was selling apartments in the Linked 
Hybrid community. She mentioned how open the community was to show its difference 
from other housing products. However, she also had to mention the security system. To 
turn this into a selling point, she emphasised that tight security is a mark of a luxurious 
                                                 
23. See Ledeneva (2008, 122) for more discussion about the idea of being in someone 
else’s social circle in order to get things done. Particularly she wrote about the concept of 
shouren (familiar person) and banshi (get things done). The idea of zijiren is very similar 
to shouren. 
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lifestyle. About this paradoxical reality, the in-house architect of the development 
company, Ke Jin, said in an interview: 
This is a very unusual design in China. The idea is to attract people to the 
community, especially the high-end customers. The design is very 
challenging for the developer, as it gives the developer a problem to solve: 
how to promote this open community concept and how to manage it. 
Gated communities in general tend to avoid these issues. Now we are 
thinking about how to operate those bridges, who is going to operate them, 
how to make it economically viable, and how to establish the interactions 
between residents, retail shops, and cinemas and so on, rather than make 
them function on their own (Ke Jin, personal communication, 15 January, 
2009). 
Other paradoxical results were the provision of public space in a private community, the 
issue of managing those public spaces, and of making public space economically viable. 
A community with good management is a representation of luxury, social prestige, and 
higher status in China (Wu F., 2005). The management of the public bridges, three towers, 
and theatre in the Linked Hybrid community was to be subcontracted to a five-star hotel 
and a cinema company from Hong Kong, respectively.24 In other words, some of the 
public spaces needed to be privatised even before they were open to the public. Ke Jin 
raised concerns about emphasising the community as open as it was very unusual in the 
market. In his opinion, it was very risky for a developer to sell an openly accessible 
community. The developer eventually could not resist the pressures from the clients and 
                                                 
24. The selection of the hotel management has not yet been decided as of October, 2011. 
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the management office to close the community, even though some of the important staff 
members in the development company wished to maintain the open design.  
But the residents’ appropriation also indicates that the idea of an open community 
goes fundamentally against the Chinese perception of a desirable living environment. In 
one of Linked Hybrid’s sales publications, the concept of public space has been 
interpreted as communal space linking residents from different towers together and 
creating a shared community (Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 2). A membership system was 
introduced to make sure the users of the public spaces, such as the theatres at the centre 
of the complex, were all high-class customers. The system was designed for those who 
could afford to buy property from the development company. With this system 
established, luxury service providers and retailers can find a reason for locating their 
businesses in this community. In other words, the commercialisation of public space 
makes the notion of an open community marketable to a certain social class. The shared 
perceptions of the developer’s management office and of the residents essentially 
reclaimed Holl’s conceptualization of space. 
This led to a second step in 2009, which was much more radical. Linked Hybrid 
was further appropriated by adding architectural structures and ornamentation (Figure 27 
and Figure 28). The developer and the management office changed some small details of 
the building to diminish the sense of modern architecture. These interventions included 
the addition of wood craftsmanship to the metal door-handles and the interiors of the 
elevators, and installing Chinese-style wood furniture in the interior spaces of the public 
lobbies and the theatre (Figure 32). The intention behind these changes was to 
accommodate the demands of the market because the development company was 
 81 
 
concerned that the modernistic style was “too cold” for the potential tenants (Li Hu, 
personal communication, 17 September, 2009). Other than these decorations, the 
residents also requested that a wall be added to enclose the open community (Figure 29 
and Figure 30). In July 2009, a traditional Chinese-style wall was constructed. Holl 
refused to design the wall, so the developers contracted a Chinese architect and his wife, 
a Chinese architectural historian. The construction of the wall was in the style of the 
Ming dynasty, with delicate wood construction details (Figure 31).  
Workers: Justifying the Wall Construction 
How did the residents from the workers community react to this wall? In my 
interviews with them, they justified using a wall to separate them from the upper class. 
Before further discussion, we should understand the general demographic background of 
the workers’ community. Many of the workers and ex-workers, at the paper mill have 
very limited formal education. They gave up school and joined the factory during the 
Cultural Revolution or were assigned to do so by the government, as in the case of Shao 
Xiao, whom we met at the beginning of this research. Even though they could have 
continued their education in the 1990s, when the economy was growing rapidly, they 
could not afford to take advantage of the opportunity.25 Additionally, the residents of the 
paper mill workers’ community were basically all near or past retirement age at this time. 
This was because eligibility for housing in the workers’ community was based on the 
number of years of service to the factory. 
                                                 
25. The story of Zhou Guangquan and his wife (Chapter 5) is a good example of the 
education situation of the workers. 
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Figure 27: Construction of the wall. (Photo the author, 13 July, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 28: New wall and gate constructed to enclose Linked hybrid. (Photo the author, 14 
September, 2009). 
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Figure 29: Linked Hybrid without wall before August, 2009. (Photo the author, 16 
December, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 30: Linked Hybrid with wall after August, 2009. (Photo the author, 14 September, 
2009). 
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Figure 31: Ming-dynasty style wall with wood craftsmanship details. (Photo the author, 
13 July, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 32: Interior intervention of elevators in Linked Hybrid. (Photo the author, 14, 
September, 2009.) 
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When I raised concern about the new wall, former factory worker Wang Ji did not 
react to the question directly. Instead he began by explaining the differences between his 
own community and the new community. He called his community jicengfang 
(grassroots housing) and the new community gongyu (high-end condominium). His 
perspective of the Linked Hybrid community was based on his daily observations in the 
restaurant in the surrounding area where he worked; he noticed that many residents living 
in the new community were Westerners, especially Russian. The only person he knew 
from the new community was his boss at the restaurant where he worked. He also 
described how the new community had private elevators for some particular luxury 
apartments, and the neighbours seemed to be more distant from each other. He said, 
“even when they meet, they seem to not know each other, and they do not even nod their 
heads”. Because of the physical wall between his community and Linked Hybrid, and the 
psychological wall between his social class and the higher social class in Linked Hybrid, 
these descriptions are based on Wang Ji’s imagination. 
The housing manager, Qiu Lai, also described the two communities as belonging 
to two different dangci, or levels of social class. He speculated that there would be no 
connection between these two communities due to the difference in dangci. The 
developer would not open the Linked Hybrid community to them, but they might open it 
to the south, where their other development projects (MOMA phase 1 to 3, also see 
Figure 1 and Figure 2) are located. Qiu Lai speculated that the clubhouse and the theatres 
would never be open to them. During his meeting with the developer at the new 
community’s clubhouse, the housing manager representing the workers’ community 
pointed out that the prices at the restaurant were not accessible to the general population. 
 86 
 
He perceived that, on the one hand, the developer did not want to mix their upper-class 
community with the workers’ community, because they belong to two different dangci; 
and, on the other hand, that residents from the workers’ community could not afford the 
consumption level of the new community. Due to the tightened security system of the 
new community, the residents from the workers’ community could only speculate about 
the new urban space through indirect social networks. The closed community prevented 
the residents from the workers’ community from interacting with the residents in the new 
community. 
Contrasting the workers’ community to the Linked Hybrid community, the walls 
and gates of workers’ community do not imply control because everyone can walk in 
freely. Although Qiu Lai mentioned that the community is co-managed by an external 
management office and the residents’ committee (jumin weiyuanhui), strangers could 
easily enter the community. The social homogeneity and the tight-knit social networks—
the residents know each other very well (Feng L.,1989)—of this kind of work-unit 
community provides a system of control through the guanxi informal social network. The 
housing manager stated that the increasing diversification of the community’s 
demography was making the management more difficult. By comparing the two cases of 
the workers’ community and the Linked Hybrid respectively, it is clear that the walls and 
the gates in both cases do not only provide a real physical barrier; rather, they create a 
symbolic division of the communities. I found it interesting that both Wang Ji and Qiu 
Lai actually justified the building of the Linked Hybrid’s wall in order to separate them 
from the new community. The workers naturally put themselves into a different dangci 
from those living in the Linked Hybrid community.  
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Architects: Absurd Urbanism 
When I interviewed Steven Holl (12 October, 2010), he appeared to be indifferent 
to the wall. However, architects in his Beijing office were critical and even angry about 
the addition of the wall. The project manager of Linked Hybrid, a Japanese architect 
called Hedeki Hirahara, expressed his frustration with the change in the project: 
It does not only happen in China, all the countries are the same: the 
architects’ dimension [conflicts with] the developer’s dimension. The 
project needs to be productive—this must be understood. First, they want 
to make a profit, which is the main issue, and second…to realise the 
project…. We reduce the floor area and use some of the floor area for 
public space so that it can engage people [the public], such as by having 
schools [on the ground floor], and make the sky [floor] do the same thing. 
And also, in our concept, we try to open [the superblock] to the public 
because it ends up being a city within a city; this can keep the life of our 
city alive, right? … [Today], their interest in this project is totally different. 
So the cinema, [managed by a company] from Hong Kong, will open in 
the Chinese New Year. And now also the developer wants the Hyatt to 
manage all the apartments in the three towers.26 They are also interested in 
the swimming pool, the gym, and the bar. It is not finalised yet, but we are 
having so many meetings already. But the issue is totally different. If [the 
superblock] is closed, the original project is lost. If we can keep it open, it 
                                                 
26. During the time of the interview with Li Hu, Hyatt was the most possible hotel 
management company to take over Linked Hybrid management. However, the selection 
was not confirmed yet. 
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will be so different (Hedeki Hirahara, personal communication, 13 
January, 2008).27 
Even the developer, Chen Yin, the primary supporter of Holl’s novel design, 
expressed his disappointment to me during a private discussion on the Linked Hybrid 
bridges.28 But he could not continue to maintain the original design against the louder 
voices of opposition in the office and the market, mainly from the younger-generation 
leadership. 
This is certainly not the first time that residents have appropriated an architect’s 
design.29 Still, opposition to the addition of the wall did exist, and one prominent critic 
was Liang Jingyu, an occupant of the Linked Hybrid community and one of the most 
avant-garde architects and spatial artists in Beijing.30 He is very interested in critical 
theory, especially the discussion of the public sphere in modern China. When I visited his 
office at Linked Hybrid, there were four to five staff members working in his living room. 
                                                 
27. Hedeki was the project manager of Linked Hybrid in Steven Holl’s Beijing office. He 
is originally from Japan. 
28. Chen Yin is the vice president of the Modern Group Development Company. We 
came in contact after I translated a few symposia and forums for him. The day of the 
discussion was not an official interview. I was walking with several students from 
Columbia University for a site visit at the Linked Hybrid community, and Chen Yin was 
walking from his office across the street of the community to meet with the management 
office. He recognised me because of the public events. He was afraid that our visit would 
be interrupted by the management office, so he took us to the elevator and the public 
floor on the bridge. He mentioned that he was disappointed about the addition of the wall 
and frustrated by the tightened security requested by the residents. However, he could not 
do much about the situation because of the internal politics in the development company.  
29. A classic case is the occupants’ modification of the Pessac development designed by 
Le Corbusier (Boudon, 1972). More discussion about appropriation of architectural 
designs by users can be found in the ‘flexibility’ idea proposed by Forty (2000). 
30. Liang Jingyu was working in Linked Hybrid when I interviewed him in December, 
2009. However, he left Linked Hybrid in December, 2010. 
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He explained that one of the reasons that he moved his office to Linked Hybrid, other 
than the architectural design, was because the community was designed to be open. The 
enclosure of the community brought with it some inconvenience, as visitors and staff 
always needed to report to the security guards. His thought was that walls, gates, and 
public spaces in China are the expression of the absurdity of modern Chinese society: 
“the developers are unaware of the implications of the wall and the gate, but they just 
build them” (Liang Jingyu, personal communication, 14 September, 2008). Li Hu, the 
Chinese architect of Linked Hybrid, expressed a similar view. In my interview with him, 
he stated that 
sometimes, when something is really absurd, it becomes humorous. Good-
looking or bad- looking is irrelevant, because it is absurd. This 
consequence [of enclosing Linked Hybrid with a Chinese postmodern-
style wall] is perhaps better than if the developer really finds a good 
architectural office, such as Urbanus, to do it. 31 Because at least everyone 
feels absurd, so I think this ending is good. [Laughs.] If they build the 
[more modern style] gate on our side of Linked Hybrid, that would be a 
disaster, and that is worse than absurd. In that case [the architecture] 
would be like a comedy movie—the Linked Hybrid comedy. I think that 
many things that the developer is doing now belong to this comedy movie 
(Li Hu, personal communication, 15 July, 2009). 
 Liang Jingyu’s and Li Hu’s explanations demonstrated a type of thinking in China 
which criticises the use of walls in contemporary China. Specially, they believe that 
developers, residents, and some architects support this practice for no good reason. 
                                                 
31. Urbanus is a Chinese private architectural office in Shenzhen and Beijing. 
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However, is the Chinese practice of walling really without a reason? I will suggest 
another concept, shanzhai, to explore this question in detail in Chapter 6 by locating it in 
its Chinese context. However, in this section, I would like to reveal another irony in the 
Linked Hybrid reality: the workers, who have been excluded by the wall, justified the 
wall; but the users of Linked Hybrid criticised the wall, which is supposed to protect 
them from the lower dangci social class. If we can analyse this ironic reality closely, we 
can also perceive the background of the residents of Linked Hybrid, given that the 
background of the workers was usually their socialist danwei working experience and 
dayuan lifestyle. Conversely, the young elites, like Liang Jingyu, who can afford Linked 
Hybrid, are usually educated internationally with more foreign ideologies.  
Steven Holl: Designing Timeless Architecture 
Steven Holl was surprisingly indifferent to the appropriation of his design by the 
users: 
This project will stand for one hundred years, and who knows what kind 
of frustration the government leadership will have. So try to build the best 
possible building, the highest sustainability and the most public space, and 
hope the ethical climate of the leadership in China improves (Steven Holl, 
personal communication, 12 October, 2010). 
He argued that, compared to the of time scale of political regimes, architecture 
should be seen as apolitical. However, Holl was actually very aware of the problems of 
China’s urban development. He stated in the interview that he had three principles when 
practicing architecture in China: (a) never demolishing an existing residential community, 
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(b) never mistreating workers, and (c) being highly selective in choosing projects with 
potential (Steven Holl, personal communication, 12 October, 2010). Additionally, he also 
refused to only design the façade of the building, as he was asked to do by the developer 
at the beginning; instead, he proposed inserting his critical ideas about Chinese urbanism 
into the entire residential design. Thus, Holl attempted to demonstrate his individuality 
and criticality in his architectural practice. He was also very careful about developers 
using his name for the marketing purposes. However in reality, Holl’s name and 
reputation were used by the developer for marketing. Linked Hybrid received the ‘Ten 
Greatest Building’ awards from Business Week. The image of Linked Hybrid and Steven 
Holl were used in all marketing materials (Figure 33 and Figure 34). 
However, he understood that it was because of his reputation that the developer 
agreed to follow his proposal.32 Open and shared public spaces, and other innovative 
ideas from the American design team, could only solve half the marketing problem for 
the developer. Those ideas could establish a different image in the market for the product, 
but the insistence on ideal concepts does not always coincide with the demands of the 
market. For Linked Hybrid, the developer needed to seek other ways to reconfigure a 
nostalgia for the past with a postmodern style. 
Holl’s initial intentions to create a hybrid typology of architecture and to promote 
a pedestrian-friendly living environment with Linked Hybrid were widely disseminated  
                                                 
32. Li Hu proposed another reason why the developer agreed to try the new housing 
model. He thought that, due to the economic boom, the developer was willing to try 
anything at that time (personal communication, 17 September, 2009). 
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Figure 33: Reportage of Linked Hybrid as one of the ten greatest of China’s architecture 
in the marketing booklet of Linked Hybrid. The titles are “American Business Week 
Selected China’s 10 Architectural Miracles” (left) and “Dangdai MOMA [Linked 
Hybrid]: New Gateway Landmark, Sustainable City within City” (right). (Image captured 
from Linked Hybrid marketing booklet, Dangdai MOMA, n.d., 55-56). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 34: One of the five special features of Linked Hybrid introduced by the developer. 
The translation of the title is: “Transnational Agent: Project by World Class Architectural 
Master and His Team, To Accomplish the Grandest Architectural Culture with 
Technology and International Horizon”. The other four special features are creativity 
(bridge design), heritage (neighbourhood making), new wave [trend] (international lift 
style), and art (object for collection). (Image capture from Linked Hybrid marketing 
booklet, Modern Group, n.d., n.p.).  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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in architectural circles. The intentions were straightforward and represented a 
fundamental critique of the phenomenon of Chinese urban sprawl and suburbanisation of  
the city.33 But eventually, Linked Hybrid was redeveloped as an enclosed and single-
function luxury housing block. The project failed to achieve its explicit goal. Yet, despite 
the failure of its intention, Holl’s idea of designing the best architecture for the 
transformation of Chinese society has been, and is being, appropriated and adapted 
according to the concept of shanzhai, which I will introduce in the last chapter of this 
thesis. However, I need to look more in detail at those concepts of community, such as 
dayuan, that were mentioned by my informants during fieldwork, in order to see what lies 
behind them, which will lead to the next chapter, which is a study of guanxi.  
Implications of the Gate and the Wall 
Before the end of this chapter, there are two additional articles in the archival 
materials provided by propaganda cadre Zhang Lian that show interesting perspectives 
from different generations. One is from the paper-mill era and one is from the private-
housing era. The similarity is that these two stories are both about conflicts at the gate.  
In 1996, the northern gate (Figure 35) of the paper mill was guarded by a new, 
young migrant named Small Zhang. Small Zhang stopped a female worker on her bicycle 
                                                 
33. In the Chinese way of speaking, urban sprawl is called ‘tandabing’, or pan-frying a 
big pancake. Wu points out three forces operating within contemporary suburbanisation: 
first is housing development driven by land and housing reform; the second is developer-
driven, luxury and low-density housing projects attracting upwardly mobile households; 
and the third is the development of new economic sectors from which arise suburban 
industrial development (Wu & Phelps, 2008). Luxury gated communities with a Western 
architectural style became the most popular product on the market in post-reform China, 
as living in such suburban gated communities and owning a car became a status symbol 
(Wu F., 2009). 
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at the gate and asked for her bicycle entrance permission. The woman did not respond to 
him and insisted on cycling into the factory. After giving her a full salute, Small Zhang 
told her that she was breaking the law. The woman used her bicycle to hit Small Zhang’s 
leg and refused to listen to him. The supervisor of the security team came to deal with the 
situation. Small Zhang sent the woman to his office and asked her to fill out a rule-
violation form. Even though the woman became angrier, she had no choice but to sign the 
form and place her bicycle outside the factory under the pressure of a large crowd of 
spectators. The news article on the incident noted that the woman apologised for her 
behaviour the next day in front of her daughter (Jiuwei, 1996). 
In 2009, ten years later, the management office of Wanguocheng MOMA decided 
to enclose their community.34 To change the management regulation, more gates and 
control systems needed to be built. At the main entrance of the southern end, a 40 meters 
wide entrance open to all traffic and pedestrians was changed to a 15 meters wide vehicle 
entrance for the garage. Pedestrians were requested to walk on a narrow road beside the 
main gate. Moreover, residents were asked to show their residence card to the guard 
(Figure 36). All of these modifications are very common in Chinese residential 
communities, but residents at Wanguocheng could not get used to the new system of 
control. Debates and quarrels occurred at the beginning at the gate between the security 
guard and the residents. During the last day of my stay in the MOMA community, the 
new rule was implemented. During my stay in Wanguocheng MOMA, I saw a few 
foreign residents complaining at the gate to the guard about the new system. These  
                                                 
34. At the same time, the Linked Hybrid community was also walled off to prevent 
public access to the complex. 
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Figure 35: Paper mill gate with security in the 1990s. The security guard was standing at 
the gate to control pedestrian and vehicular circulations. (Photo provided by Zhang Lian). 
 
 
Figure 36: Wanguocheng MOMA gate control by a security guard. The security guard in 
the image stopped three people in front of the gate. They worked for a residential 
cleaning company. The security guard was waiting for confirmation from the resident 
through an intra-community telecommunication system. (Photo the author, 13 July, 2009).   
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residents did not bring their residents’ card, so the security guard did not allow them to 
enter. On an internet bulletin board, residents expressed their dissatisfaction with those 
changes to the management office. These modifications also motivated some residents to 
organise a residents’ committee.35 
The local view of gated communities is not so much a critique of capitalism but 
more a discussion about the conflicts between two power systems. On the one hand, the 
issue addresses the influence of the traditional legacy of power to govern and control the 
community (by the management office), and, on the other hand, the issue highlights the 
residents’ newly acquired power as consumers The role of the security guard transformed 
as Chinese society moved from the socialist age to the market-economy age. Currently, 
security guards at residential units act as intermediaries between law-enforcement 
agencies and service-management agencies. The ubiquity of the security unit at the gated 
community was first encouraged by the government when the government tried to move 
some of its social responsibilities to individual communities due to the increase in the 
urban population and to rapid urban development. The architect occupant of Linked 
Hybrid, Liang Jingyu, explained through his own research that the government did not 
have enough labour power to maintain the security of all residences in the city under the 
new policy, so the management and security offices took on that role in individual 
communities.  
                                                 
35. In the online bulletin board, residents called the management office a “rogue manager” 
because the office was not controlled by the residents and the new modifications were 
very inconvenient for them (see, http://house.focus.cn/msgview/122/173797419.html, 
accessed on 5 January, 2010). 
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Chinese contemporary urban design has been widely studied by scholars. Four 
different approaches study Chinese urban form in the contemporary literature: from the 
perspective of history and anthropology (Bjorklund, 1986; Trewartha, 1952), from the 
perspective of planning (Lu D., 2006a; Lu D., 2006b; Miao, 2003; Wu F., 2005; Bray, 
2005 and 2008; Yan & Gao, 2007), from the perspective of gated community crises 
(Blakely & Snyder, 1997; Giroir, 2006) and from the perspective of land transactions 
(Monson, 2008). All these research approaches try to explain the large-scale urban block 
development in China. This phenomenon was also criticised by Steven Holl when he 
designed Linked Hybrid. Gated communities, which are recognized in China as a product 
of capitalist development (Miao, 2003) — that is, the artificial segregation between 
bourgeois and working classes during the age of the industrial revolution (Souza, 2009) 
— is only one of many discussions. Research shows the social structure and the spatial 
organisation of the society has become more heterogeneous in the 2000s than in the 
1980s (Feng, Wu, & Logan, 2008). Gating, policing, governance, and isolating 
communities are the most direct responses to the diversifying social structure in China: 
members of the upper classes attempt to differentiate themselves from the lower classes 
living next to them in the dense city (Soja, 2000). Fulong Wu and Webber (2004) 
understand that the gated-community phenomenon in China is not necessarily related to 
the issue of crime as it often is in the Western world. They first found that the use of the 
wall and the enclosed environment for foreign- immigrant housing in Beijing was due to 
income inequity, differences in social status, the quality of the construction of the 
housing, and the provision of a sense of community. Then, Fulong Wu (2005) in another 
study explained that the need for gates is mainly to assure higher selling prices because 
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the search for prestigious and exclusive areas is always the motivation behind renting and 
owning luxury villa estates. Once again the rapid real-estate market and the consumerist 
mentality triggered the appearance of the gate. But are these two trends really the source 
of the phenomenon of the gated community? 
In the following chapter, I will further explore the notions of dayuan and xiaoqu, 
and the notions of gate and wall, by considering the Chinese idea of guanxi. I will explain 
how, at Beijing First Paper Mill, dayuan style communities were formed on the basis of 
special guanxi networks, and how guanxi adapted to the new social structures and 
communities in contemporary China. 
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CHAPTER II 
GUANXI 
My Guanxi Network in the Research 
Guanxi is a Chinese concept about the social practice of building personal 
relationships with other people. Yang (1994) described the practice of guanxi as 
involving the practices of exchanging gifts, favours, and banquets; the cultivation of 
personal relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and, more importantly, the 
creation of obligations and the avoidance of direct confrontation. Guanxi does not only 
explain many subtle social and cultural phenomena, it can also be an important strategy 
of research (So & Walker, 2006).36 Field research in China always requires special 
fieldwork adaptations to be sensitive to the local culture. For instance, Ole Bruun (1993) 
discussed a bureaucratic obstacle that prevented the researcher from reaching a certain 
                                                 
36. A common reaction when I presented this chapter at conferences was the comparison 
of the Chinese guanxi phenomenon with Western or international interpersonal 
relationships, particularly in the field of business and political studies. Questions were 
often about the uniqueness of the guanxi system given certain similarities with 
international business and political practices. Indeed, many phenomena in the following 
section, including the referral system for this research, the cultural sense of obligation, 
the indirect style of presenting gifts, being superstitious, and presenting uncritical ideas in 
front of senior supervisors can be found in many cultures throughout the world. However, 
this thesis attempts to provide an indigenous explanation of these phenomena in order to 
further develop the field’s knowledge by providing a specifically Chinese perspective. 
Moreover, guanxi is still a complex and ambiguous concept to explain because such 
explanations are a collection of theories from different disciplines, such as social-
exchange theory to explain gift giving, such as power dependence to explain transactions 
of individual agency to others, or transaction cost analysis (TCA) to explain concepts of 
exchange and equality behind guanxi. See Wong & Leung, 2001, Chapter 2 for more 
discussion about Western perspectives on Chinese relationships between organisations. I 
argue that those theories do not consider emotional aspects, the concept of saving face, 
and favouritism. Guanxi theory develops the less rational side of social relations. 
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depth of society. Throughout Chinese history, ordinary people have made use of guanxi 
to bypass the bureaucratic obstacles in both Chinese imperial and socialist societies. 
Businesses have also used it to increase the efficiency of their operations in the market.37 
For scholars to be able to access information from a given community, they also need to 
participate in the guanxi system. 
So and Walker (2006) introduced two methods of achieving guanxi: prescriptive 
sources and achieved sources. The former relates to inborn relationships such as those of 
kinship, hometown or village, and even with people of the same dialect; whereas the 
latter come from relationships with classmates, co-workers, neighbours, and from 
superior-subordinate relations. The objective of both types of guanxi is to achieve a 
‘category of sameness’ with others (Landa, 1981, 1983). There is no prioritisation 
between prescriptive (or kinship) guanxi and achieved guanxi: this means that family 
relations and social relations are considered equally important, which facilitates the 
instrumentalisation process of guanxi.  
Because the art of guanxi is about both appropriately positioning oneself within, 
and manipulating, the dynamics of interpersonal relations, the practice of maintaining this 
dynamic social system is as important as the act of achieving it (for political and social 
positions). To maintain a guanxi relationship, exchanging favours, giving gifts, and 
inviting others to banquets is essential (Yang, 1994). This process should be continuous 
and consistent. Once guanxi is not maintained for a long period, the interpersonal bond 
will break. 
                                                 
37. See Y. Luo (2000) for a discussion about the relation between business and guanxi. 
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My Guanxi in the Research 
Staff members of the old Beijing First Paper Mill were connected to me through 
one of my family members, Shao Xiao, who used to work in Beijing First Paper Mill 
until the early 1990s. In Shao Xiao’s guanxi network, Wang Ji, Zhang Lian and Qiu Lai 
are important members.  
First, Wang Ji used to be a close friend of Shao Xiao. They worked together for 
twenty years in the same team since the 1970s. Wang Ji was an electrician at the paper 
mill. After he was laid off in the late 1990s, he repaired electronic appliances for several 
other factories. In early 2000, he started a new career as a restaurant procurement (Figure 
37). In the 1990s, his flat was a reward for his excellent performance (a model worker 
award) at the paper mill. In 2009, he was asked to rejoin the new paper mill at its new 
location. Wang Ji lives with his wife and his daughter in the workers’ community. 
Second, Zhang Lian is a cadre of the paper mill’s propaganda department (Figure 38). He 
used to serve in the army before he entered the factory in the 1970s. Because of his 
military background and his advanced writing skills, he was assigned to work in the 
propaganda department. He was one of a few old staff members to work at the new 
location. Zhang Lian lives with his wife in the workers’ community. His son has just 
moved away from home. Third, Qiu Lai used to be the human resource department 
supervisor in the paper mill, managing my relative and Wang Ji. Qiu Lai’s original 
responsibility in the paper mill was to assess the performance of the other workers. After 
the industrial reform in the 1990s, he changed positions to the housing management 
department to manage the workers’ dormitory and set up housing policies (Figure 39). 
Eventually, Qiu Lai gave up his apartment in the workers’ community, and currently he  
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Figure 37: The restaurant that Wang Ji is working at. Wang Ji works in this restaurant 
currently. He spends six hours every night to take care of the procurement of raw 
materials for the restaurant. After our first meeting, he invited me to come to his 
restaurant. (Photo the author, 17 June, 2009). 
Figure 38: Zhang Lian’s office at the new paper mill campus. He shares this office room 
with another colleague. In his office, there was a discussion area with sofas and coffee 
table. (Photo the author, 21 June, 2009). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 39: Qiu Lai’s office in the workers’ community. Qiu Lai is the housing manager 
of the workers’ community. His office is located in the basement of one the buildings in 
the workers’ community. (Photo the author, 18 June, 2009). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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lives in an affordable-housing community in Tiantongyuan. He drove every day to the 
workers’ community to work at the management office.  
I mainly obtained information about the workers’ community from these three 
former or current workers from the paper mill. My family connection was the most 
effective way for me to participate in the workers’ community. I conducted interviews 
and home visits with the worker informants to understand their reactions to different 
stages of the spatial development process. Part of Zhang Lian’s work is to record the 
history of the paper mill. Therefore, he is the major source of the historical background of 
the site. Qiu Lai, as the housing manager, is the only person linking the two communities 
together. His information is essential for the analysis of intercommunity dynamics. These 
informants’ interviews helped me to assemble the majority of the information in this 
chapter. 
Archiving and Maintaining Guanxi in Research 
As researchers, how can we facilitate field research in China with the practice of 
guanxi? This question touches a fundamental concept in ethnographic research—being an 
insider in a social circle. This topic was central to this research because one of my 
objectives was to understand how insiders think about their built environment. 
Many ethnographers, such as Solinger (2006), have recognised that guanxi is an 
essential concept in conducting research in China. Even quantitative researchers need to 
go through certain personal referrals or guanxi to obtain reliable and complete datasets. In 
this sense, it is important for me to define my role and relationships with all of the study’s 
informants. As mentioned above, Shao Xiao worked in the factory. Through her guanxi, I 
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was able to connect with Wang Ji (a close family friend and long-time co-worker of my 
relative) and thus the housing manager Qiu Lai (a former supervisor of my relative) and 
the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian. Moreover, through Shao Xiao, I had met all of these 
people during my childhood. With a reference from an insider who had known the 
workers’ community members for a long time, I was immediately considered an insider 
in the community. The propaganda cadre Zhang Lian said, when I first met him in the 
winter of 2008, that a “relative of a former co-worker should be helped.” 
To work within the guanxi system, I had to handle the relationships appropriately. 
As one of the seven features of guanxi suggested by Y. Luo (2000), the concept of 
‘context specialty’ is the most difficult one to handle appropriately. The same action may 
have different meanings in different situations. 38 Because guanxi requires intentional 
intangibility or indirectness, the actual intention of giving a gift is usually manifold, but 
always justified. For example, to maintain my guanxi with my worker informants, I also 
practiced guanxi by purchasing chocolates for them from Belgium to express my thanks 
for providing information for my research and to ask them to continue to help in the 
research process. However, telling them that I intentionally bought the chocolates for 
them would overemphasise the guanxi practice. To be more appropriate and indirect 
about setting up a guanxi relationship with them, I gave them the gifts during the Mid 
Autumn Festival in September and told them that I found the gifts when I was travelling. 
My relative even called me to tell me the strategy of presenting the gift. By doing so, the 
                                                 
38. Y. Luo (2000) used the example of a worker giving a cigarette to his boss. This action 
is acceptable if the boss and spouse just had a baby. The action is important if the worker 
is up for a promotion. However, the action is considered a bribe if, for instance, the 
worker’s shiftless brother-in-law needs a job. 
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meaning of a gift is manifold. First, I was expressing that I wanted to build an intimate 
relationship with them. Second, the gifts were instrumental as an exchange for further 
help. Finally, giving the gift during a festival provided a justification for the action. Their 
acceptance of the gifts meant an agreement to develop a personal relationship with me 
and a confirmation for further help, but these words did not need to be spoken out. 
Another example is that, when I first met Wang Ji for my research project, he paid 
for the coffee at the cafeteria in a hotel for both of us. When I met him again in the 
restaurant where he was working, he paid the bill secretly. The reason why he treated me 
to all these meals was because of his relationship to my relative. For my relative, Wang Ji 
would be seen as an honest and generous person. These two meals gave me a reason to 
meet and talk to him, because I needed to return his kindness. Through the exchange of 
gifts and favours on several occasions, we had more opportunity to communicate and 
thus cultivate a stronger guanxi bond.  
Two Languages in the Field of China 
The implication of fabricating guanxi with informants is linked directly to the 
technique of interviews in the Chinese context. One of the immediate differences made 
for different types of guanxi is the different types of language spoken in conversation. 
For example, the housing manager Qiu Lai always tried to avoid political comments. The 
in-house architect at the development company, Ke Jin, framed every issue of the 
development positively in the interview. How can we assess the true reactions of these 
informants? 
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Thøgersen (2006) discussed two types of language in Chinese society: baixing-
nese and ganbu-nese. Ganbu-nese, comes from the word ganbu, or cadre, and refers to 
language or interpretation that has been modified to achieve the political and ritual 
appropriateness. This type of language is spoken during public occasions or to people 
who are not trusted. Baixing-nese comes from the word baixing, or ordinary people, and 
refers to a language of criticism and wisdom from the very bottom level of society. These 
two language systems are not restricted by who the speaker is, because both ordinary 
people and cadres can choose to speak in either type of language. In Thøgersen’s article 
(2006), his naming of these two language styles may lead to the misunderstanding that 
ganbu-nese only belongs to cadres (ganbu) and baixing-nese only belongs to ordinary 
people (laobaixing). In my research, ex-worker peasants were able to speak in ganbu-
nese if they felt uncomfortable being critical towards a system, and a propaganda official 
could speak in baixing-nese if he felt secure and the audience was trusted. 
The condition of choosing which language system depends on the guanxi between 
the speaker and the audience. A closer informant-researcher guanxi facilitates a stronger 
insider sense for the researcher with the informant’s community. Therefore, the 
conversation can be more informal, and thus closer to the tone of baixing-nese. Usually a 
situation involving more people, especially the public, will end up with a more formal 
tone of conversation, or tends to be closer to the tone of ganbu-nese. Moreover, the 
higher the political position the individual occupies, the more careful the individual is, 
and thus more formal ganbu language is used. 
During one of my interviews with Zhang Lian in the spring of 2009, the manager 
of the factory suddenly stopped by Zhang Lian’s room and joined the conversation. 
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Before the manager came, Zhang Lian was describing the situation and the demographic 
composition of the new factory. The manager might have known that we were talking 
about the reform of the factory. He then interrupted Zhang Lian by telling me how Zhang 
Lian was experienced in the topic of state-owned enterprise reform because he had been 
involved in it for more than forty years. The manager also directed the topic towards how 
difficult it was for them to purchase properties in the city and compete with the wealthier 
national and international newcomers to Beijing. Finally, he touched the relatively 
sensitive topic of layoffs. The following is part of our conversation: 
Researcher: Is it [the high property price in the market] a problem for you? 
Manager: This is not a problem, but I think this is the trend. Survival of 
the fittest. Incomers are hardworking and they work nonstop. I talked to 
some of them. They told me that the locals of Beijing only know how to 
daydream; they always expect to pick up gold from the street. Incomers 
use their sewing machines to earn cent by cent. In the 2002 reform of our 
factory, the average compensation for one year of service at the factory 
was 2,750 yuan. If I have thirty years of service at the factory, I can make 
around thirty thousand yuan.  
Zhang Lian: Take me as an example. If I was ‘distributed (fenliu)’ in 2002, 
and I have served for thirty-three years, I could make ninety-seven 
thousand yuan.  
Manager: That’s right. During that time, it was the hottest time of the year. 
On the street, 90 per cent of the people who wore suits and walked their 
dogs were from the factory. After getting some money, they were too 
excited to even know which side is the north [you dianqian jiu zhaobuzhao 
bei le]. 
[Manager leaves] 
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Zhang Lian: He is the current manager at the marketing department and 
used to be the manager of Beijing First Paper Mill. He’s right, the change 
was dramatic. More than two thousand workers were involved in the 
personnel redistribution movement [renyuan fenliu] at that time. 
Researcher: What is a personnel redistribution movement? 
Zhang Lian: It means to terminate the labour-enterprise relationship 
[jiechu laozi guanxi] by paying you some money, or ‘buying out’ the 
contract [maiduan gongling]. It is forbidden to use this term now. All 
machines were stopped at that time, so we did not need such a big team of 
workers. Only some thirty people were kept as the backbone; all those 
others left after taking the money. They become free agents and controlled 
by the government street office. The overall redistribution movement 
involved more than ten thousand workers. 
When the meaning of renyuan fenliu (personnel redistribution) was mentioned, 
Zhang Lian suggested two other synonyms, jiechu laozi guanxi (contract elimination) and 
maiduan gongling (contract buy-out). Maiduan gongling is baixing-nese because it 
precisely criticises the business monetary notion behind the layoff. Zhang Lian explained 
that it was forbidden to mention the term. Renyuan fenliu or jiechu laozi guanxi are 
ganbu-nese because they sound more neutral. These terms can be found in official 
writings and speech transcripts. Contract buy-out connects monetary compensation to the 
moral idea of serving the enterprise. As a propaganda official, Zhang Lian knows how to 
speak in ganbu-nese. Even in front of other staff members at the factory, he adjusted his 
language and spoke appropriately in certain situations. After the manager left, he could 
talk in the more critical baixing-nese.  
The intention of discussing the difference between the official and informal 
languages here is not simply to articulate the specificity of the distinction of two 
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languages in Chinese society. Rather, I would like to introduce the implications behind 
these two languages and apply these to the interviews. Moreover, the discussion also 
implies a certain research strategy, that of being, to some extent, an insider to the 
community.  
Becoming an Insider 
My family member’s connection to Zhang Lian, as well as to all other worker 
informants, facilitated shifting their language from the neutral ganbu-nese to the more 
critical baixing-nese because it was the language in which my family member and the 
other workers spoke to each other. The intimacy or the strong guanxi between my family 
member and the workers was transferred to the relations between the workers and to me. 
To conduct research in China, participation in the guanxi system is very important 
because it is one of the most efficient ways to allow people to speak in baixing-nese. 
What is the mechanism behind this referral system, which immediately transferred the 
workers’ trust of my family member to me? In this case, a personal reference is a 
fundamental way to achieve guanxi. In this referral system, Person A can establish some 
guanxi relations with Person B through X. X as the middleman takes all the responsibility 
of A for B, which means if the guanxi dynamic between A and B is bad, X will be 
blamed. However, the accountability of X also facilitates the transfer of the strong guanxi 
between X and B to the relationship between A and B.  
This guanxi transaction system has two implications for conducting research in 
China. First, X’s referral in the guanxi system is both constrained and enabled by the 
Confucian culture. The responsibility of B is reinforced by the Confucian teachings of 
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righteousness and sincerity. Therefore, a poor reference is a sign that X cannot handle his 
interpersonal relations properly. The blame comes not only from a moralist point of view, 
but also from a realist point of view—that X  is not a complete human being to work with. 
Therefore, this moral reading of guanxi differentiates from simple nepotism. The referral 
system is also enabled by the Confucian teachings that the capacity of referring (as in X’s 
case) is a representation of X’s more powerful agency. X is referring A to B, probably at 
the request of A. In this sense, the better interpersonal connection of X represents a more 
complete human being than A, and this directly adds value to the agency of X. If we 
examine the situation closely and consider guanxi as a power system, the power of B is 
transmitted implicitly to X and is devolved on A. In short, the connection of X to B 
comes from X’s social capital,39 which it is possible to transform to economic (monetary) 
or political (power) capital. This implies that the more connections one has, especially 
with the upper levels of the power system, the more social capital one will have. 
Understanding Baixing-nese 
When I was conducting fieldwork at the workers’ community in 2010 summer, a 
40-year-old man, who made his living hawking fruits illegally at the gate of the 
community with his family, spoke to me. Perhaps he did this because I had some foreign 
friends walking with me. I told him my friends were tourists visiting the city and I was 
                                                 
39. The idea of 'social capital' was proposed by Bourdieu as an expansion of 'capital' from 
the economic sense (see Bourdieu, 1986). Smart suggested that ‘capital’ included 
economic capital, symbolic capital, social capital and cultural capital. Among them social 
capital is defined as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition … a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the 
various senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986, 249; quoted by Smart, 1993, 393). 
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showing them some local communities to understand Chinese society. The hawker then 
spontaneously launched into his story. He used to work in the paper mill factory. After 
the reform, he was laid off. He could not find a job, so he started to sell fruits at the 
entrance gate to other units. He described his type of job as a self-sought profession, or 
zimo zhiye in his own words. 
Zimo zhiye is not a formal language, although it sounds like it. The illegal 
hawker’s use of this term carried an ironic connotation. In the Chinese language, a four-
character idiom or set phrase usually expresses something profound. Following this logic, 
the four-character terms zimo zhiye (自谋职业) meant something beyond simply a 
description of his freelance profession. One thing is clear about this ironic phrase: the 
hawker was not content with his current situation after the transformation of society, but 
he felt helpless about his situation. In this thesis, I will also examine the meanings that 
hide between the lines of the residents’ speech, and in this way I seek to explain the 
emergence of some important ideas in contemporary China, such as ‘consumerism’, 
‘market’, and ‘modernity’. These ideas actively interact with and shape the built 
environment. 
The two fieldwork languages I mentioned before, ganbu-nese and baixing-nese, 
represent the strategy of how the public reacts to governmental politics. Ganbu-nese 
tends to hide unwanted phenomena. Even in the majority of Chinese academic essays, 
ganbu-nese is the mainstream and appropriate language to use. However, if we attempt to 
read between the lines of the ganbu-nese, the concept of harmony (hexie) become more 
ironic, because it represents the appearance but not the reality of society. I will discuss 
 114 
 
this in detail in chapter 3. The other implication of baixing-nese is that this daily language 
contributes to the making of some specifically Chinese concepts. 
Dayuan Style Guanxi 
Qiu Lai, the housing manager at the workers’ community, met with the 
representative from the Linked Hybrid development company several times to coordinate 
between the two gated communities of the paper mill and Linked Hybrid. These two 
communities were separated by a brick wall, which used to separate the residential zone 
and the manufacture zone of the socialist paper mill. Qiu Lai was also invited to a 
banquet at the clubhouse of the new development, which was the only time Qiu Lai 
entered the new community adjacent to his lower-class workers’ community. Due to his 
special position as the only mediator for the workers’ community and the development 
company, he was given special treatment by the development company. Qiu Lai 
mentioned many times to me that he was close to many staff members from the 
development company, especially the construction department manager, because they 
needed to work together to coordinate many issues during the construction period. 
Previous tasks that brought them together included fixing the plumbing system of the 
workers’ community, which had been damaged by the construction of Linked Hybrid, 
and borrowing a piece of land from the workers’ community to allow trucks to enter the 
construction site.  
Qiu Lai described that his guanxi with these staff members used to be very good. 
Qiu Lai did not receive favouritism personally per se; rather, he was treated specially 
because of his guanxi with the management office. The development company paid for 
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the replacement of all of the steel gates of the building entrances at the workers’ 
community. The development company also helped the workers’ community renovate the 
bicycle parking canopy and the storage structure (Figure 40 and Figure 41). The wall 
between the new and workers’ community was also repainted by the development 
company. This extra support helped Qiu Lai’s management office save a large amount of 
money to improve the workers’ community. The development company restructured after 
the successful development of Linked Hybrid, and new-generation leaders, usually with 
international backgrounds, replaced the old-generation leaders. Qiu Lai mentioned that 
his guanxi with the new-generation leaders at the development company was not as 
friendly as before. Why? 
Qiu Lai blamed the worsening guanxi on the lack of a state-owned danwei 
background among the new leaders in the development company. Specifically, the new 
set of social dynamics by young professionals caused the guanxi communication system 
between Qiu Lai and the development company to break down. This somewhat subtle 
transformation raises several important questions about the construction of contemporary 
Chinese communities and urbanism in general. First, how was this interpersonal dynamic 
of guanxi formed in and between communities in the socialist period? Second, how does  
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Figure 40: Bicycle canopy before renovation. The old bicycle storage structure is 
highlighted in the image. Only part of it had a roof. (Photo the author, 16 June, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 41: Bicycle canopy after renovation. The new bicycle storage structure, in the 
highlighted area, was renovated and painted, and has a complete roof. (Photo the author, 
15 September, 2009). 
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the guanxi system transform and influence the urban-development process in the 
contemporary period? 
Let us start with the first question: how was this interpersonal dynamic of guanxi 
formed in and between workers’ communities in the socialist period? With the mixture of 
institutional organisation and community neighbourhood in the workers’ community 
before the 1990s, I will suggest beneath that dayuan (big compound), instead of danwei 
(work unit), more precisely contextualises the atmosphere in which guanxi was formed 
between workers. I would also like to argue that these two concepts are closely related to 
the ‘community’ and ‘society’ concepts proposed by Tönnies (2004). In Tönnies’s word, 
community or dayuan refers to the natural will of the worker residents, and society or 
danwei refers to the rational will of the state. To further elaborate, dayuan consists of the 
collective of many everyday and neighbourhood and neighbouring activities; danwei 
system was based on how a society should operate instrumentally. 
I have discussed the relationship between the concept of dayuan and the workers’ 
community in Chapter 1. In short, dayuan puts more emphasis on community everyday 
life, whereas danwei emphasises the institutional system or the society. To further 
develop the idea of dayuan with the research on guanxi, below I discuss how a particular 
kind of guanxi relations formed within the paper mill’s dayuan community spatially, 
socially, and ideologically. The specific guanxi relations also contributed to further 
define the concept of dayuan. These three notions include a mixture of private and public 
space, institutional and neighbourhood relations, and patriotism and neighbourhood 
affection, respectively. 
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Mixture of Private and Public Space 
Political scientist Xiaobo Lü (1995) suggested the concept of ‘minor public’ 
worked within the macroscopic environment of ‘large publics’ in China. A ‘minor public’ 
is a unique realm created by the Chinese government to support the central planning of 
society (Lü, 1995). Within minor publics, collective identity and community were 
established. Moreover, the concept of privacy was not in the minds of the workers at that 
time.  
Wang Ji described his life in the factory as “extremely simple” because it only 
involved sleeping and working. However, every detail of his daily interactions was 
marked by a larger, complex collectivist culture. Almost all of Wang Ji’s daily activities 
required him to interact with other people in public spaces. When he was living in the 
row-house dormitory, privacy was out of the question. Many public facilities were 
provided by the factory for these workers. The reason for constructing numerous public 
facilities was twofold. From a utilitarian perspective, the lack of domestic infrastructure 
was a common problem in this kind of row-house dormitory designed in the 1980s 
(Veeck, 2007). The core idea of socialism in early-1980s China put a great deal of 
emphasis on collectivism, or simply sharing. Wang Ji spent twenty years in the row house. 
He explained that because his family apartment did not have enough space, he decided to 
live at the paper mill’s dormitory. For single workers, they shared a room, but for married 
workers, the whole family lived in one room. Wang Ji shared his 20 square meters room 
with a migrant worker who did not have family in the city. Workers constructed informal 
kitchens in the walkways around the row houses. Two public lavatories were built at the 
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two northern entrances of the property. The community also had public water taps and 
hot drinking-water supply points. 
Public facilities were not constrained to the living zone. Wang Ji also mentioned 
the facilities in the manufacturing zone. He described that he usually woke up at 7:30 a.m. 
in the morning. He walked to the factory across the street. Usually, his tasks could be 
finished before 5:00 p. m. He seldom cooked, instead eating at the public dining hall with 
his co-workers. He mentioned two places he would use in the night. One of them was the 
entertainment hall, which he called a club. It was a place for events, including dancing 
competitions, performances, and ceremonies (Figure 42). Wang Ji usually watched 
movies with his co-workers before going back to his dormitory. The other notable facility 
was the public bath. Public baths were one of the most important facilities in the dayuan 
communities of northern China, whereas hot-water systems were not popular at that time. 
At Beijing First Paper Mill, the public bath was originally located in the southern 
industrial zone. In 1994, the bath was demolished and a new one was built at the northern 
zone. Workers modified an industrial boiler from the paper mill’s manufacturing facility 
for the public bath. The bath provided 24-hour service, and it was famous for its 
consistent hot water around the whole area, even in other dayuan communities. Workers 
were allowed to bring friends and relatives from other dayuan communities to enjoy the 
hot bath. So it was not only a place for people from the same dayuan to interact, but also 
a place to open up the otherwise closed dayuan social circle. A new worker described in 
an article published in the internal newspaper of the factory that the public bath is “not 
only a place to take bath, but also a place for  
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Figure 42: Dancing competition in the workers’ community. Zhang Lian showed me an 
album consisting of pictures of events organised by the Propaganda Department. The 
image shows a dancing competition, which was organised every year. (Photo provided by 
Zhang Lian, the photo was taken in 1996). 
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socialising and relaxation” (Li L. & Ke, Z., 1994). In the article, the author related 
dialogues from the public bath about how “People discussed business, sang songs and 
had daily conversations” (Li L. & Ke, Z., 1994). He pointed out that the atmosphere in 
the public bath represented a harmony of the interpersonal relationships in the factory. 
After the public bath at the northern zone was demolished due to the private housing 
development project, workers constructed a temporary small one by themselves at the 
factory’s southern zone. 
Mixture of Institutional and Community Bonds 
Thus, public facilities created the physical environment in which guanxi could 
evolve. A special social bond between community members also contributed to the 
formation of guanxi, not just between supervisors and workers or among neighbourhood 
residents but a mixture of the two. The closed and constrained environment of working 
and living in a dayuan community facilitated this development. The mixed relationships 
were also created by the mingling of two identities: being part of a work unit and being 
part of a community. The internal newspaper of the paper mill published two stories on 
this issue in the late 1990s.  
In 1997, while Zong Huaicheng, a staff from the factory’s marketing department, 
was waiting for his client outside the Sanchan Hostel on the east side of the factory, he 
saw three teenagers follow a woman and attempt to steal her purse. At first the woman 
did not realise her purse was stolen. Zong Huaicheng immediately ran after the teenagers. 
He caught one of them, but the other two came to help. Zong Huaicheng understood that 
it was impossible to win a fight against all three of them, so he tried to push everyone 
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towards the gate of the factory to attract the attention of the other workers. The other 
workers recognised Zong Huaicheng, and many of them came to help him. The three 
teenagers eventually ran away. Zong Huaicheng found a note in the purse with a 
telephone number to contact the woman. 
On 2 April, 1999, a factory worker, Wang Linfang, was knocked down by a 
motorcycle at 1 a.m. when she was riding her bicycle to work the overnight shift. The 
motorcyclist ran away after realising that Wang Linfang was unconscious. The accident 
occurred on Dongzhimen Street, several kilometres south of the factory. A pedestrian 
found Wang Linfang lying on the ground. He immediately called Wang Linfang’s 
supervisor, Yang, with a number he found in her handbag. Yang sent Wang Linfang to a 
hospital. He asked his sister’s husband to bring cash to pay for the medical treatment and 
two other co-workers to look after Wang Linfang at the hospital. Wang Linfang’s injury 
presented a serious problem for her family. Her father, who used to work at the same 
danwei, had retired due to sickness, and her mother had quit her job to look after him. 
Wang Linfang’s husband was laid off by another company, so Wang Linfang was the 
only source of income for her home. Furthermore, the family also had to take care of their 
two-year old son. Factory managers and other workers visited Wang Linfang in the 
following days and recognised the difficulty of her situation. Some of Wang Linfang’s 
co-workers posted a notice to ask for help, and the self-organised fundraising activity 
collected donations from 89 people and raised 2,860 yuan. Some of the people who 
contributed did not even know Wang Linfang personally (Zhang & Li, 1999). 
Zong Huaicheng tried to push the teenagers towards the gate of the factory 
because he believed other workers from the same dayuan community would stand up for 
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him, even though he might not know all of them. The first person informed about Wang 
Linfang’s tragedy was her supervisor, not her family, because danwei is responsible for 
the personal affairs of their members. These two cases suggest two sides to the living 
environment of the workers. In Zong Huaicheng’s case, he saw himself as belonging to a 
community that shared the same identity, and in Wang Linfang’s case, she belonged to an 
institution that would help her. This institutional and community space constructed the 
complex notion of dayuan, connecting social agents with a special social bond. Wang 
Linfang’s supervisor Yang was high up in the bureaucratic system (an institutional 
relationship with the workers), but he was also a neighbour in the workers’ residential 
community (a personal relationship with the workers). Therefore, Yang’s social role was 
constantly shifting. In response to Wang Linfang’s tragedy, as a supervisor, Yang ordered 
two other workers to take care of her, and as a neighbour, he borrowed money from his 
wife’s brother to pay for the medical treatment.  
Mixture of Patriotism and Neighbourhood Affection 
The mixture of private and public space provided the venue for daily programs, 
such as the public bath and public dining hall, which facilitated guanxi relations between 
workers. The mixture of institutional and community bonds between workers suggests 
the balance between disciplinary control and community response. Ideologically, the 
patriotism education propagated by the state also contributed to the establishment of the 
interpersonal relations between workers and the strong sense of belonging to the 
community. The government attempted to form a guanxi network between workers and 
companies’ central management by organising public events (Kipnis, 1997). Once 
 124 
 
workers were affiliated with a danwei, the relationship would be considered a permanent 
one (Verma, Kochan, & Lansbury, 1995). As was the case with Wang Linfang, the public 
sees an individual as being more tightly connected to the danwei than to the family. An 
individual’s identity was tied to a collective institution. 
From an institutional perspective, personnel documents, including household 
registrations, would be transferred from the individual street office to the collective 
archive of the factory. The reason for doing this was to increase the efficiency of 
transferring public resources from the state to the individual through an intermediary, the 
collective identify of the danwei. For such a system to work, the public had to have a 
strong sense of belonging to their danwei. To facilitate this thinking, the government 
required that workers live in worker communities, thereby heightening the mixing of 
work and personal relationships. The government also propagated an ethics of patriotism 
to the state and loyalty to the danwei, inculcating the belief that the two were the same. 
Communities of danwei were viewed as part of the state (Lü & Perry, 1997). 
Many propaganda essays in the internal publications of the paper mill provide evidence 
for this position. For instance, during the Chinese New Year celebration of 1990, one of 
the programs was a lecture series entitled ‘Four Loves’. The Beijing Daily reported that 
the lectures included the teaching of ‘love the state, love socialism, love the danwei, and 
love the job’ (Yu, 1990). The lecture series explicated the idea that the danwei was a 
socialist mechanism that served the overall operation of the state. Another essay, which 
related professionalism to patriotism, stated that “to emphasise professionalism does not 
mean workers should take professionalism as the ultimate goal of working in our 
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enterprise because professionalism should come from our patriotism. These two concepts 
cannot be separated (Yu, 1990)”. 
This interpretation of professionalism connects the workspace of the danwei to 
the political space of the state. Together with the community space of dayuan mixed with 
the workspace of the danwei, loyalty to a community and commitment to the job connect 
with a fundamental value of Confucianism unchallengeable in Chinese society: patriotism.  
Guanxi Efficiency 
The fourth notion of guanxi organisation in the workers’ community, which 
balances governmental politics against ordinary people’s desires, provided high 
efficiency to solve unexpected problems at the community level. With Wang Linfang’s 
tragedy, I discussed how her supervisor helped her by making use of the bureaucratic 
system on the one hand, and on the other hand, how her co-workers organised fundraising 
programs for her. Some of the contributors might have seen her as a co-worker, friend, 
neighbour, or any combination of the three. Donating to her can also be understood as an 
expression of sense of belonging to a community, an expression of loyalty to the danwei 
institute, or an expression of patriotism to the state. For those donors who did not know 
Wang Linfang personally, their contribution may have been driven by the latter two 
sentiments. 
The fundraising activity was not unique to Wang Linfang’s tragedy. On 17 
February, 1998, there was a fire at one of the workers’ homes. The following day, the 
factory asked the paper mill’s housing management department and the Jianyu Company 
to clean up and repair all damaged parts of the building. Several families lost their 
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property and some of them needed to find other accommodations during the restoration. 
To help the residents affected by the fire, other workers from the same dayuan organised 
fundraising activities. In the end, a total of 13,000 yuan was collected and distributed to 
the affected families. 
Special social bonds between workers produced support in self-organised 
community events. The emergence of these events was to compensate the inefficiency 
caused by the centralised-power system and the bureaucratic-governance system of the 
state. The mixed nature of space, social bonds and ideologies echoes the obligation and 
indirectness of the nature of governmental agency—guanxi—in Chinese society.  
Qiu Lai Becoming an Agent of Guanxi 
Factory worker Li Long wrote an article about using his private bath and 
published it in the internal newspaper Beijing Yiqing Bao: 
Perhaps in the future, every family can move into the new tower housing, 
and every family can have their own bathroom. After work, you can 
choose to take the bath here or at home. But frankly speaking, even though 
that will happen very soon, I think taking a bath at my home may be too 
boring for me (Li & Ke, 1994). 
Factory worker Li Long’s was struggling between the ideal modern life style in 
other more developed cities in China, which he knew about through the media, and the 
collective dayuan life, which the Chinese government had propagated to him as the ideal 
lifestyle when he was young. Li Long’s concern about taking a private bath raised big 
questions about the dayuan lifestyle in reformed China.  
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The new towers in the workers’ community were finally finished in 1995, and 
some of the workers, including Wang Ji, moved from the row housing to the tower 
housing. As a common urban phenomenon in China, welfare housing was severely 
insufficient to fill society’s need. One problem was that only senior staff members and 
workers with outstanding work performance were allowed to move. Wang Ji belonged to 
the latter group. He stated that the selection process involved many conflicts and 
arguments in the workers’ community:  
I had some daily conversation with my neighbours when I was living in 
the row-housing dormitory. But, since moving to the tower housing, I 
seldom do that. I do not like to do that personally. I barely connect with 
them [my neighbours]. But sometimes in the summer, we play card games 
in the garden. Certainly, I know everyone, but I just greet them on the 
street (Wang Ji, personal communication, 14 January, 2009). 
When I asked Wang Ji about his guanxi with other workers in the workers’ 
community, he gave me an unexpected answer. He maintains close guanxi relationships 
with his neighbours in the workers’ committee because the majority of them still live in 
the close-knit guanxi way. However, Wang Ji noted that the neighbourly affection is 
definitely fading from the past decade.40 He also realised that people are more indifferent 
to the collective dayuan lifestyle. He did not know why others were so disinterested in 
the lifestyle, but he explained that his indifference was due to his introverted personality. 
                                                 
40. In Forrest and Yip’s research (2007), they also found out that there is more of a sense 
of neighbourhood and neighbouring activities in older communities than in newer 
communities. 
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On the interpersonal level, guanxi involves visiting, exchanging favours, and 
helping others (Kipnis, 1997). However, in contemporary Chinese society, these daily 
practices have become either unnecessary or inappropriate.41 Tower housing has provided 
independent apartments with private utilities, which has changed the collective lifestyle. 
The institutional reform of the danwei triggered massive layoffs and broke the strong 
institutional bonds between workers. Finally, the decentralization of the state’s political 
power created new common values in society: the construction of self-identity and a 
desire for private space. The ease of accessing services in the market also diminished the 
necessity of helping others. Wang Ji’s indifference to neighbours he knew shows how the 
guanxi from the dayuan community became a legacy of socialist history. 
Transforming Urbanism 
Both Wang Ji and Li Long recognised the disappearing of guanxi in contemporary 
community. However, the fact that guanxi may have disappeared from residential 
communities does not mean that the old relationship style has vanished from Chinese 
society; indeed, guanxi relations continue to be a presence in the area of business 
management and administration.42 So I would like to answer the second question that I 
                                                 
41. In Forrest and Yip’s study (2007) on Guangzhou communities, they found out there is 
less neighbourly contact and mutual assistance in commodified communities, compared 
to danwei communities. 
42. Yang (1994) suggests that the system of guanxi declined somewhat in everyday life 
in ancient Confucian China and the period of the Cultural Revolution but rapidly 
flourished in the areas of business and government in the post-Deng era. Yang (2002, 469) 
also states that, after the Cultural Revolution, guanxixue reversed the government control 
of everyday life, which essentially was a way to subvert state power. 
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asked in the previous section: how does the guanxi system transform and influence the 
urban-development process in contemporary times? 
Spatially, Wang Ji noticed that socialist dayuan (large-compound) communities 
became privatised into market-oriented xiaoqu (small-zone) communities. Xiaoqu 
development usually takes the place of an entire dayuan compound for private housing, 
so instead of forming small communities, xiaoqu compounds have become the major 
component in the superblock urbanism of contemporary China. Xiaoqu communities, as 
new real-estate products of superblocks, broke through the institutional constraints in 
dayuan urbanism by allowing residents to choose their own private community. However, 
these new superblocks are more introverted and enclosed than the dayuan communities. I 
attempt to identify guanxi in both the intra-community and inter-community scales. The 
reason for doing so is twofold. First, the privatisation of individual space in closed large-
scale community separates residents and thus makes the residential sphere disconnected 
and apolitical. Second, the emergent real estate practices has created competition among 
residential developments. Neither of these phenomena existed in the socialist danwei 
social system or dayuan community. 
The most dramatic transformation around the workers’ community is the 
construction of the new Linked Hybrid community, including the adjacent developments 
of Linked Hybrid.43 Modern Group Development purchased the entire paper mill 
industrial zone for its housing development in 2000. The two communities that the 
company developed, located at the southern zone (Wanguocheng MOMA and POP 
                                                 
43. Linked Hybrid is the last phase of the MOMA community (see Figure 1). 
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MOMA) and the northern zone (Grand MOMA or Linked Hybrid, see Figure 1 and 
Figure 2) of the old paper mill, were isolated from the surrounding areas to separate them 
from the lower-class communities. Within the same development project, residents from 
the southern zone have been prohibited from entering the northern zone. The developer 
has attempted to create a socially superior community at the Linked Hybrid site. 
Certainly, the existing workers’ community is also separated from the rest of the new 
communities. The limitation between communities was clearly defined by a ‘red line’ 
(property line) in the blueprint.44 
Limits and Linkages in Chinese Urbanism 
The closed community and the red line (property territory definition) mentality 
tend to emphasise the intra-community planning and design process but cannot fully 
respond to the desire for interaction between communities. The Chinese word of ‘red line’ 
used to be a planning technical term to describe property territory in planning drawings. 
The line in the planning drawings is red in colour. China’s planning departments evaluate 
the size of the area within the ‘red line’ to calculate the cost of the land. ‘Red line’ also 
defines who is responsible for the space. Because of the importance of this idea, ‘red line’ 
became an everyday word for developers, architects and residents to communicate. By 
‘red line’ mentality, I mean the mentality of practitioners or users to only be responsible 
for the space within their own territory, and to neglect the importance of interacting with 
other owners. 
                                                 
44. Responding to the red line, the Chinese architect of Linked Hybrid, Li Hu, proposed a 
paper project called Red Line Park, to challenge this closed community mentality. This 
project will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
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Indeed, problems have surfaced given that the social and demographic structure of 
urban China is no longer as monolithic as it was in the danwei period. In the case of 
Beijing, research has found that the city’s social structure has become more 
heterogeneous from the 1980s to the new millennium due to the new system of 
commodities and land leasing, a more relaxed registration system, greater residential 
mobility, and more migrants (Feng, Wu & Logan, 2008). Moreover, other research has 
shown that communities have become more homogenised in terms of social classes (Wu 
F., 2005). The combination of these two findings illustrates the dynamic of spatial 
segregation. The paper mill redevelopment project exemplifies these findings, as the 
workers’ community belongs to the lower social class and the residents in the new 
development belong to the higher social class.45 Qiu Lai explained that, 
We have such a big conflict. Their towers blocked our sunlight. . . . After 
they finished their towers… Due to the loss of sunlight, some apartments 
in our towers immediately depreciated in value. Our residents did not 
recognise it at first, but once someone wanted to sell their apartment, they 
found that their apartment was worth less money. . . . They are just too 
close to us (Qiu Lai, personal communication, 19 March, 2009). 
The twenty-two story towers of Beijing Linked Hybrid are located on the south 
side of the workers’ community. The transformation of the building density, from an 
average of two- or three-story factory buildings to tall towers, influences the built 
                                                 
45. In 2009, the propaganda department director estimated that the monthly salary for a 
common worker who was still working at the factory’s new site was around 3,000 yuan. 
At this time, a two-bedroom apartment at the new development cost 3 million yuan, 
which is equivalent to almost 84 years of the common worker’s salary. 
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environment not only within the site but also in the surrounding area. During the most of 
the day, especially in the winter period, the lower floors of three towers in the workers’ 
community lose their sunlight because they are blocked by Towers 7, 8, 9, and 10 in the 
Linked Hybrid community (Figure 43). Zhang Lian, the paper mill’s propaganda cadre, 
lives in one of the obstructed flats (Figure 44). Because the whole west side of the east-
west oriented linear building was designed as public corridors, all windows are facing 
east, towards the Linked Hybrid tower. Zhang Lian complained that originally he could 
only enjoy two hours of sunlight in the morning, but now the Linked Hybrid towers block 
the small bit of sacred sunlight. Around two hundred households were involved in this 
conflict, and the housing management office helped to negotiate with the developer to 
resolve the conflict. The most recent outcome of the negotiation was that the developer 
proposed compensating each person in the affected units with 5,000 yuan.46 However, the 
residents refused to accept the offer, and the two communities are still in the negotiation 
process, which has lasted for more than two years. 
The biggest difficulty of the negotiation is the large number of households in the 
workers’ community whose sunlight has been blocked. The developer did not anticipate 
this conflict because in the original development scheme, the affected building was  
                                                 
46. 5,000 yuan = 460 GBP = 730 USD. 
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Figure 43: Workers’ housings at the northwest corner of Linked Hybrid. The building in 
the image is severely blocked by Linked Hybrid. Zhang Lian is one of the tenants living 
in the building (highlighted area). He told me that because the building is facing east, 
Linked Hybrid at its east will block the only two hours sunlight of their apartment. (Photo 
the author, 14 June, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 44: View from Zhang Lian’s apartment (Photo the author, 16 September, 2009). 
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planned to be torn down.47 The negotiation between the developers and the residents 
failed. The worker residents did not agree to the monetary compensation proposed by the 
developer; instead, they requested the relocation of the entire workers' community to the 
new residential development of Linked Hybrid. The developer argued that he could not 
afford to move everyone and remain competitive in the real-estate market. 
This case shows three consequences of the current large-scale development model 
in China. Firstly, the developer economised within his site to maximise the market return 
and compete with other closed communities. This led to one of the most direct 
consequences of Chinese residential developments in modern China: the lack of inter-
community planning and strategy. Secondly, the residents from the worker's community 
became more aware of their own space. This awareness was generated by the history of 
being a closed dayuan community. As a social consequence, close community perception 
tends to polarise members from different communities. Finally, the current failure of the 
negotiations represents the lack of a mature system to deal with inter-community affairs. 
The residents of the workers’ community complained that the compensation was 
insufficient to cover the losses they suffered from the depreciation of their property, 
whereas the development company argued that it could only afford 5,000 yuan per 
apartment unit, as too many units were involved in the conflict. In the end, the paper 
mill’s housing management office needed to bridge the two communities and acted as a 
mediator in the negotiation process. 
                                                 
47. The propaganda department cadre Zhang Lian, who is still living in the affected 
building, recalled the story on 15 September, 2009. 
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Discovering Guanxi  
The link that the housing manager provided between the developer and the 
residents at the workers’ community was based on the informal social networking system 
of guanxi. In the era of the market economy in China (1978-present), guanxi relations 
have resurfaced, only this time they are creating a link between two communities instead 
of within one community. Using guanxi relations in the market and in management 
strategies is not a new scholarly finding, but in this case, it seems that the notion of 
guanxi has also changed following the heterogeneous organisation of different social 
groups (Wong & Chan, 1999). 
I discussed how Qiu Lai had opportunities to enter the luxury community, join the 
banquet at the clubhouse, and was invited to visit the bridges at Linked Hybrid. I also 
discussed why he felt uncomfortable with the gunaxi style with the young generation of 
leaders at the development company. Qiu Lai’s practice of guanxi compensates for the 
limitations of the intercommunity planning system. A more precise explanation is that the 
traditional guanxi relations and the institutional urban planning strategies work together 
to construct the urban system in contemporary China. The rediscovery of guanxi in urban 
China reveals a new way to envision Chinese urban space. Due to the combination of 
enclosed communities, social segregation, and marketisation of community governance, 
superblocks of different communities become different business entities or enterprises. 
The movement of enterprising communities changes the dynamics between communities 
from purely neighbourhood relationships to business relationships. Therefore, traditional 
urban planning mechanisms are no longer valid for responding to the modern social and 
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spatial interactions. Between businesses, guanxi can be understood as an instrument to 
gain organisational competency (Luo, Y., 2000).  
Learning from Linked Hybrid Guanxi 
Guanxi can be translated literally as ‘personal relations’, but this translation is not 
really able to capture the essence of the Chinese concept and indeed would oversimplify 
its complexity (Lee, 2003, 146). So and Walker (2006) attempted to translate this term 
more precisely as a “personalistic and particularistic relation”. They suggested that the 
concept is based on “emotions and affections” of social agents but operates as ”the 
utilitarian” side of the society. In Yang’s (1994) fieldwork from the early 1980s and 
1990s, she discovered that many people defined guanxi differently in their daily language, 
especially people with different regional dialects. In this chapter, I showed how factory 
workers, especially Qiu Lai, defined the concept of guanxi. Learning from his definition, 
I would like to propose three implications of guanxi in the making of contemporary 
Chinese communities. 
The Survival of Confucianism 
Firstly and most straightforwardly, the discovery of guanxi in both socialist 
workers’ communities and modern communities in China suggests the continuation of 
Confucian ideology in the contemporary age. Guanxi is believed to have originated in 
part from the teachings of Confucius in the Spring-and-Autumn Dynasty (722BC to 
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479BC) (Luo, Y., 2000).48 Confucius did not specifically mention the term guanxi in his 
teachings; however, his teachings contributed to the establishment of the concept in 
Chinese culture. The overarching philosophy of Confucianism is the question of how to 
achieve humanity, or the character of ren (仁). This character can be translated literally as 
mankind or the good quality of humanity, and the Confucian belief is that the good 
quality of humanity is embedded in mankind. So and Walker (2006) concluded that the 
quality of ren very much depends on the behaviour of interpersonal transactions. Kinship 
is the starting point of the interpersonal relationship, and a set of relational rules with 
other social agents and structures develops from that. Confucianism also advocates 
pushing those kinship-oriented practices towards social-oriented practices. By mimicking 
the family kinship structure, a moral society can then be constructed.49 
                                                 
48. Other Chinese scholars have argued about the origins of guanxi, preferring modern 
origins. One idea is that the practice of guanxi originated from the unique political 
ecology of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s. Individuals with this point of view are 
usually orthodox, native-born Chinese scholars. These local scholars generally believe 
that the emergence of guanxi is directly connected to the appearance of the ‘gang of four’, 
whose interpersonal manipulation strategies destroyed the harmony of Chinese society 
during the Cultural Revolution. The local scholars also argue that through the re-
institutionalization of the state power system, the practice of guanxi will diminish and 
society will return to harmony. However, despite the re-institutionalization of the state 
after the Cultural Revolution, guanxi still seems to be operating as one of the main social 
practices in contemporary China. A viewpoint held by other scholars is that guanxi 
originated from the economic transformation period in the post-reform period of 
the1980s. This line of thinking understands guanxi as a new way of everyday interaction 
learnt from the rest of the world, especially the capitalist West (for a detailed discussion 
of the origins of guanxi, see Yang, 1994, Chapter 4).  
49. “Treat your family’s elders with reverence so that the elders in other families shall be 
similarly treated; treat the youth in your family with kindness so that the youth in other 
families shall be similarly treated. Do this, and the kingdom may be made to go round in 
your palm”(Book of Mencius, Liang Hui Wang I.) Scholars believe that this kinship-
oriented Confucian relationship doctrine fused with other theories of interpersonal 
tactical intentions, such as the politically unorthodox Chinese scholar Li Zongwu’s theory 
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Guanxi is instrumentalised by Confucians to mimic kinship structures in society. 
Even though the origin of guanxi is about following an ancient and ideal model of society, 
the practice of guanxi can be used for manipulation. Indeed, specific guanxi can be 
fabricated to achieve a particular goal. The wulun idea (five orders) in Confucianism 
explicates the relations between ruler and subject, parent and child, siblings, husband and 
wife, and friends as righteousness (yi), order (xu), affection (qin), distinction (bie), and 
sincerity (xin).50 M. Chen (1994) puts these five relations into two categories: 
predetermined relations and voluntary relations. Parent-child, siblings, and husband-wife 
are predetermined relationships. M. Chen (1994) suggested that within the predetermined 
category, the concept of ‘self’ in China is severely undeveloped because individual 
behaviour is dictated by fixed status and responsibilities. The influence of this category of 
relations enmeshes Chinese people within a social network from birth. Ruler-ruled and 
friendships belong to the voluntary category. In this category, the self takes an active role 
because agents can choose how to treat their rulers and connect with friends. Individuals 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the historical formation of guanxi. Li Zongwu suggested three periods of this 
formation process: in the Yao-shun period (the 23rd to the 22nd Century B.C.) to the 
Confucius-Mencius period, the ideology behind society was about the pure and simple 
goodness of humanity. In the Three-Kingdom Dynasty (220 to 280 A.D.), the ideology 
was about tactics and interpersonal actions, epitomised by two competing politicians, Cao 
Cao and Liu Bei. In the period after the Three-Kingdom dynasty, tactics and 
machinations continued to develop. However, Li Zongwu argued that the development of 
the concept of guanxi in the third period assimilated ideas from the first two periods: the 
tactical side of guanxi needed to be replaced by the principle of Confucian-Mencian 
ethics. Li Zongwu’s explanation of the tactic-humanity mixture of the guanxi practice in 
contemporary China suggests another perspective of the realism-moralism hybridization 
in the Chinese social structure discussed in chapters 1 and 2.  
50. Wulun also teaches that we have to treat our ruler with zhong (regality or royalty), 
treat our parents with xiao (filial piety), treat our brothers with ti (respect), treat our wives 
and husbands with ren (patience), and treat our friends with shan (kindness). This ren (忍 
or patience) is different from ren (仁 or compete human being).  
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are capable of defining their own role by placing themselves at the centre of a social 
network system. Finally, in the wulun order, predetermined and voluntary categories of 
guanxi are equally important because the society is portrayed as an image of the family in 
Confucian teaching. Therefore, researchers should consider the specific kinship-oriented 
social networks in Chinese communities and urban studies. 
‘Oily' Position in Guanxi System 
Secondly, the objective of guanxi is to construct a more efficient and stable 
society amidst bureaucracy and totalitarianism. In other words, guanxi is able to create 
shortcuts in the inefficient bureaucratic governance and balance the politics of a 
totalitarian government. However, one needs to pay the cost of creating shortcuts. This 
also means that one will gain by providing shortcuts. Those who are situated in this 
position, which Chinese people describe as ‘oily’, are ones to gain extra benefits. 
The housing manager of the paper mill’s workers’ community, Qiu Lai, and the 
ex-worker, Wang Ji, both described the housing-allocation system as prioritising the 
merit-based conditions of length of service in the factory and honours received more than 
the need-based conditions of family size and financial status. These criteria ended up 
creating a very monolithic demography of the community members in the workers’ 
community because almost all of them had served the factory for more than twenty years. 
Wang Ji was an exceptional case. He was granted his apartment when he was in his late 
thirties, an age considered too young to obtain such private welfare housing, because he 
had received the Beijing municipal honour of model worker in the early 1990s. Wang Ji 
had no choice other than joining the paper mill danwei under the socialist planned-
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economy framework. To obtain a more prestigious social status (being allocated welfare 
housing), he was requested to demonstrate his loyalty to the political system, either by 
serving his danwei for a long period or working extraordinarily hard to receive honours. 
Yang (1994, 181) also used an example to analyse the ideology behind the preconditions 
for the allocation of welfare housing in the 1980s. She found that the notion of ‘neediness’ 
is always intertwined with the normative category of ‘deserving’. Moreover, in the 
socialist planned-economy framework, the way that disciplinary power controlled 
workers and assigned workers to danwei was a kind of normalizing technique. State 
politics were directly executed to the workers through the danwei production system and 
urban control system.  
In the case of Qiu Lai, his use of guanxi suggests the alternative route of 
constantly challenging the normative guanxi practiced by Wang Ji. Guanxi relations in 
danwei were able to increase the likelihood of upward job mobility, the opportunity to go 
abroad, and most important, the receipt of welfare housing (Luo Y., 2000). As the 
person-in-charge of the housing-allocation affairs, Qiu Lai obtained benefits from this 
position. His position was described by other community members as one with many 
extra benefits, or ‘oily’ in Chinese (you youshui’r),51 including both tangible benefits 
such as money and gifts and intangible benefits such as fame and respect. The source of 
these extra benefits was his position at the meeting point of the centralised politics and 
the grassroot guanxi. Wang Ji’s hardwork, which fulfilled the techniques of socialist 
                                                 
51. Youshui’r is a Chinese expression, literally translated as fatty and oily. In this 
situation, it means the position of Qiu Lai is profitable. Also see Ledeneva (2008, 121). 
This expression was used by another ex-worker, Shao Xiao. 
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politics, was not the only way to receive special treatment.52 Workers can also use guanxi 
to go around the complicated bureaucratic or technocratic political structure and obtain 
exceptions to the rules. As a mediator between the social resource and workers, Qiu Lai 
was able to facilitate such a shortcut from the grassroots. This is what Yang (1994) called 
the gift-economy and counter-politics. Most important, the power of the guanxi system is 
that it is an open system. This means that facilitators such as Qiu Lai and others who 
share guanxi with him are able to execute power without having a formal political or 
other high-level position in society. 
However, Qiu Lai’s ‘oily’ guanxi position made the interpersonal relationships in 
the Chinese community more complicated. On the one hand, the members of the workers’ 
community respect Qiu Lai due to his capacity to facilitate short-cuts in the bureaucratic 
system, but on the other hand, the community members feel that it is unfair when they 
know that Qiu Lai is able to obtain ‘oily’ benefits. Yang (1994) also found out that the 
notion of guanxi is usually associated with a sense of badness, deception, and 
                                                 
52. Yang (1994) argued that guanxi has been an oppositional force to the socialist state 
power of China from the 1980s. The sources of state power come from techniques of 
discipline and normalization (such as the working and living environments at socialist 
danwei). However, against these state techniques, another kind of power system, 
primarily constructed by the concept of guanxi, operates on the grassroots level of society 
to compensate for the limitations of governance techniques. Yang explained the 
opposition between centralised power governance and decentralised guanxi system as a 
duality. While the state power system only provides fixed class categories (such as the 
ranking of workers) and universal ethics (such as nationalism and patriotism) to obtain 
maximum productivity, guanxi provides another system based on Confucian relational 
ethics, which provides alternative methods for individuals to operate within the state 
power system. Moreover, the importance of the guanxi system in Chinese society is that 
it always balances total governance against community reactions. This is typical of the 
vertically democratic society of China, as it is commonly described by economists and 
political observers (Naisbitt & Naisbitt, 2010, especially see Chapter 2). 
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instrumental manipulation and  is considered to be the dark side of society and a 
symptom of the declining moral standard in contemporary society. This is mainly 
because guanxi is closely associated with nepotism, which is a serious source of 
corruption in Chinese society (Tian, 2007). Exchanging gifts, favours, and banquet 
invitations can be taken as acts of bribery, and the privileges gained through certain 
personal connections can be viewed as social injustice. Y. Luo (2000) explained the 
difference between guanxi and corruption in two ways. First, guanxi is a social norm in 
Chinese society, whereas corruption deviates from the norm. Second, guanxi is in general 
legal, whereas corruption is illegal.53 Therefore, the practice of guanxi makes it difficult 
to differentiate between illegal corruption and legal relationship-making.54 
Guanxi in Architectural Practice and Business 
Thirdly, the Chinese architect of Linked Hybrid, Li Hu, mentioned to me that part 
of his job was to handle all the guanxi in the project. He used a hand signal to make a fish 
to illustrate how he manoeuvred among the many guanxi networks in the community: 
I was like a fish swimming through the guanxi gaps to get by (Li Hu, 
Personal communication, 1 January, 2009). 
                                                 
53. Also see Y. Luo (2000, Chapter 7). 
54. A full discussion of corruption is beyond the scope of this thesis. Indeed, I found no 
evidence of corruption in the guanxi in my case study, and some other behaviours 
discussed in this thesis are arguably informal social practices and not corruption per se. I 
try not to judge these informal practices; instead, I search for the productive side of those 
practices and understand how they contribute to or reveal architectural practices. On 
corruption in China, see Lü (2000) and Kwong (1997). 
 143 
 
Given that guanxi relations grew out of a complex mixture of Confucian thought 
and socialist practices, in Yang’s (1994) words, he would be handling cultural factors 
such as people’s sense of obligation and indirectness in their social behaviour. However, 
scholars found that guanxi in the transforming society of China created an exclusive 
system, operates behind the social-reform process in China and raises critical questions 
about the equality of society under the new open system (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2002). 
I submit that this is a fundamental reason for the current widening of the economic gap 
and the emerging social segregation and spatial demarcation in urban China two decades 
after the social reforms in the early 1990s. These dynamics are particularly apparent in 
the case of Linked Hybrid’s development.  
Thus the architectural practices around Linked Hybrid can be considered as 
general business activities in China, rather than strictly architectural activities. Guanxi 
practice moved from the focus on everyday need in socialist society (e.g. the need for 
welfare housing by Wang Ji and Qiu Lai) to the focus on business transactions between 
entrepreneurs and businessmen (Li Hu’s guanxi practice to design Linked Hybrid).55 One 
can easily relate this idea to business relationships that take place all around the world. 
However, Y. Luo (2000) informs us that we should not view guanxi simply as a 
commercial activity, but also social activity that involves an exchange of social 
obligations. To further develop this definition, guanxi is the personal network and 
everyday practices for particular interpersonal transactions of members of society. The 
                                                 
55. Ledeneva (2008, 136) also explained that the neediness in socialist times, due to the 
scarcity of everyday items, does not exist in contemporary society, because they can be 
supplied by the market. Therefore, guanxi is no longer needed in order to obtain those 
items. 
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usefulness of guanxi is to simplify and seek shortcuts in the complexity of the 
bureaucratic social structure established by both the Confucian and the modern state-
governance order. The informality of the guanxi social organisational system, influenced 
by its social norms of obligation and indirectness, provides more power to act in the 
existing social structure of China. In other words, guanxi is an informal practice to 
compensate the inefficient bureaucratic system based on Chinese Confucianism and 
socialism.  
Much business management research has also found the notion of Chinese guanxi 
is far more complex than Western interpersonal relationships (e.g., Chung & Hamilton, 
2001; Davids et el, 2003; Richter, 2002).56 In the business relationship research, we can 
easily relate Chinese guanxi to the social exchange theory from the West. However, 
Wong and Leung (2001) pointed out that there are differences between Western 
perspectives and Chinese perspectives about business relationship. The Western 
perspectives emphasise the issues of social exchange and power dependence, transaction 
cost and interaction, but Chinese business emphasises more affection, personal relation 
and face-saving. Chinese businessmen also attempt to develop a new concept of inter-
firm adaptation based on the indigenous Chinese concept, and departing from the 
Western model of social exchange theory. In my words, the concept of personal affection, 
or renqing in Chinese, which contributes to the core value of guanxi, invalidates social 
exchange theory because renqing is a concept unable to be measured and quantified. 
                                                 
56. The seven facets suggested by Y. Luo (2000)—transferability, reciprocity, 
intangibility, utilitarianism, context specialty, long-term futurity, and personality—
further differentiate this Chinese concept from the simple conception of interpersonal 
relations. 
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Therefore, the decision-making process in guanxi, which mainly depends on this concept, 
becomes difficult to understand if we do not take affection into account. As Y. Luo (2000) 
suggested, the context specific nature of guanxi, the value of favour, banquet or gift can 
be extremely high in one context, but the same thing can be totally meaningless or even 
harmful in another context. Therefore, to understand guanxi, we have to understand how 
interpersonal networks were created. 
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CHAPTER III 
MIANZI 
Architecture and Mianzi  
The goal of guanxi is to achieve relational harmony between people, and thus 
stability and productivity in society. In the previous section, I introduced some 
implications of guanxi based on archival materials and interviews in the communities of 
Beijing First Paper Mill and Linked Hybrid. In this section, I extend the discussion to 
another native concept – mianzi, which directly relates to guanxi, in order to discuss the 
formal, spatial organisation of Linked Hybrid.  
In order to understand this Chinese concept of mianzi (a direct translation would 
be ‘face’), we should first understand the idea of li (ritual appropriateness), which forms 
the core of the mianzi concept. Li refers to the constraining of the social behaviour of an 
individual to maintain correct relationships with other individuals and society.57 Mianzi 
refers to protecting an individual’s ‘face’ (i.e., image) or one’s dignity, self-respect and 
prestige (Chen M., 1994). Li and mianzi are two important social norms for a harmonious 
society. These two concepts institutionalise and normalise the abstract and intangible 
relationships in guanxi, because li and mianzi provide solid and rigid guidance to what 
people should, or should not do, to maintain better interpersonal relationships, or guanxi. 
Li and mianzi will help to explain, and provide evidence for, the spatial practices  that 
were observed during fieldwork for  my research. 
                                                 
57. Another concept of correct relations is the Confucian wulun idea that I have discussed 
previously in Chapter 2. 
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Urbanism Based on Li 
The most well-known historical example of applying li to architectural space is 
Kaogongji  (Figure 45 and Figure 46, see Sit & Xue, 2010, 94-101 for more discussion) 
from the late Spring and Autumn Period of the Zhou Dynasty (722BC – 479 BC), which 
set up a guide for architectural design, urban design and construction methods, according 
to the socially accepted guanxi between agents with different social or political status.58 
The tradition of representing guanxi spatially continues today. As I discussed in the last 
two chapters, the intention of constructing the community wall was to maintain the 
privacy and secrecy of the upper-class community. In this way, their social prestige could 
be distanced from the poor, thus maintaining appropriate relationships between different 
social classes according to li guidelines and the mianzi notions. Indeed, in Chinese ways 
of thinking, the mixing of classes makes the higher- level social class lose their dignity, or 
mianzi. For the lower-level social class, it is inappropriate to mix with the higher- level 
social class, because the social order set up by li is challenged. 
Now, when Linked Hybrid started to attract more and more attention, a 
paradoxical situation arose. On the one hand, the developers and the politicians were 
happy about the publicity that was brought by the international architect; but, on the other 
hand, they were also afraid that the building’s increasing popularity (resulting in 
architectural tours and media coverage) would displease the upper-class residents and  
                                                 
58. Kaogongji is a book showing classic works of science and technology in ancient 
China. Architecture and urban design strategies are only part of the contents. The ideal 
city form showed in Figure 45 was described in a few ancient books, including 
Kaogongji and Li Ji (the Book of Ritual). Sit and Xue (2010) understood that the majority 
of the descriptions were about ritual and symbolic significances of the urban structure.  
 148 
 
 
Figure 45: Wangcheng (Imperial City) drawing in Kaogongji. The drawing showed how 
to construct a city in ancient China. The original description of the drawing in Kaogongji 
is: 匠人營國，方九里，旁三門。國中九經九緯，經途九軌，左祖右社，面朝后市，
市朝一夫。 (考工記:匠人營國). Or, in English, “the craftsman constructs the state 
capitals, with a square nine li [a Chinese unit of length] on each side. Each side has three 
gates. Inside the capital city, there are nine north-south and nine east-west streets. The 
north-south streets should fit nine carriages in width, with Ancestral Temples on the left, 
and Altars on the right. In the front is the Hall of Audience and behind the markets 
(Image captured from Kaogongji, Chapter Jiangrenyingguo). 
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Figure 46: Interpretation of the ‘Wangcheng’ ideal city from Kaogongji and Li Ji by Sit 
and Xue (2010). (Diagram captured from Sit & Xue, 2010, 97).  
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would expose problematical spaces in Linked Hybrid to visitors. Before going into this 
paradox, I would first like to explain how Linked Hybrid was exposed to the public. 
Exposure of Linked Hybrid 
Located at the north-eastern corner of the Second Ring Road, the former city wall 
of imperial Beijing, Linked Hybrid occupies one of the last pieces of land in Beijing with 
a view of the entire imperial city. Estate agents always try to tell potential buyers that it is 
possible to see the Forbidden City from the Linked Hybrid residences if the sky is clear. 
In Holl’s public presentations, the relationship between the Linked Hybrid site and the 
Forbidden City is always in the first few slides.59 Holl also commented on the location in 
my interview with him: 
The site is an important site. On Second Ring Road, you can see the 
Forbidden City from a distance, which is equivalent to a site at Fifth 
Avenue at Central Park. And it also connects to the airport, so you are on 
the main link (Figure 47; Steven Holl, personal communication, 12 
October, 2009). 
The importance of the Linked Hybrid site is due to its visibility from many places 
in the city. In Beijing, buildings in the inner city (inside the Second Ring Road) are 
strictly regulated in terms of height for security reasons. So, located just outside the 
Second Ring Road, which used to be the imperial city wall, Linked Hybrid can be easily 
seen from inside the Second Ring Road.  
                                                 
59. Steven Holl presented Linked Hybrid at Columbia University in 2008. In the very 
first slide, he showed the location of Linked Hybrid and stressed the geographical 
significance of the building. 
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Figure 47: Linked Hybrid location in Beijing. The circle is the location of Linked Hybrid 
at the north-eastern corner of the Second Ring Road. At the left bottom corner of the 
image, is the Forbidden City, which is the centre of Beijing. (Photo captured from Steven 
Holl Architects Website). 
 
 
Figure 48: Linked Hybrid from the North Second Ring Road. In the highlighted area is 
the Linked Hybrid complex. (Photo the author, 06 July, 2010). 
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Figure 49: Airport expressway in front of Linked Hybrid. (Photo the author, 06 July, 
2010). 
 
 
Figure 50: Airport express highway in front of Linked Hybrid. (Photo the author, 17 
December, 2008.) 
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There are two main perspectives along which Linked Hybrid can be observed. 
The first one is from the west side of the North Second Ring Road. Linked Hybrid is 
located exactly at the vanishing point of this perspective. The long and busy North 
Second Ring Road forces more than one hundred thousand vehicles to look at it every 
day (Figure 48). From this perspective, the typological distinctiveness of the building is 
clear. Compared to buildings with similar heights and mass, the bridges connecting the 
towers in Linked Hybrid show that a distinctive and different product of real estate 
development or architectural design is present. The second perspective is from the 
elevated highway linking Second Ring Road to the Airport Expressway (Figure 49). This 
elevated highway separates Linked Hybrid from the southern zone of the development 
(MOMA developments). Since the construction of the wall, this is the only angle from 
which people can see what is happening inside the Linked Hybrid community.60 
The new elevated highway, which connects the Second Ring Road and the airport 
expressway, was completed in 2005 (Figure 50) to prepare for the Beijing Olympics in 
2008. This infrastructural construction changed the relationship of the Linked Hybrid site 
and its surroundings by exposing the site to a wide international audience. Moreover, this 
noticeable architectural design by a high-profile architect attracted popular and 
widespread attention as well as attention from professionals in architectural design and 
planning. To start, the success of the project gained a substantial reputation for the 
developer. And the government was happy about the placement of the building at this 
important point in the city, as a gateway to Beijing, especially during the period of the 
                                                 
60. This view could also be experienced from the ground level until the wall was built to 
enclose the community in July, 2009. 
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Olympics. However, once the Linked Hybrid site began to attract attention, the continued 
existence of the poor workers’ community around the site also attracted attention and 
became problematic..  
The construction of the highway and of Linked Hybrid transformed the intangible 
guanxi of different areas in the site. During the urban redevelopment process, two 
political signs were printed on the walls of the buildings on and around the Linked 
Hybrid site, ‘hexie’ and ‘chai’. These two signs played very important roles in terms of 
the guanxi of the development processes, given that some of the results around the 
Linked Hybrid site were considered inappropriate. These signs were an indication of the 
political agendas behind the scenes of redevelopment projects in China. The discussion of 
these two signs, which follows beneath, reveals the paradoxes of li and mianzi that I 
mentioned before. The following two fieldwork accounts will help to explain these 
paradoxes and the concepts of li and mianzi in urbanism. 
Wang Qishan’s Decision in His Car 
In 2007, a story was widely told in the workers’ community about the sudden 
demolition of the workers’ dormitory located at the southern end of the MOMA sites. I 
heard this story from Qiu Lai during my interview with him on 14 March, 2009. This 
story is the same type of community gossip that I introduced in Chapter 2 (about Wang Ji 
telling that the government chairman, Jiang Zemin, did not drink the tea served to him in 
the manager’s room during his visit). Both stories have no supporting evidence but, 
instead, they show the history constructed by the local community members. These 
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community stories can therefore help to reveal how they think about the redevelopment 
of their old communities and the impact of the new communities on them. 
The story widely told in the workers’ community is that, during the Olympics, the 
Beijing government attempted to project a new image of the city as one of modernity and 
civility. In early 2007, two Beijing mayors, Wang Qishan and Liu Qi, were in a car on 
their way to the airport.61 When they passed the area of Dongzhimenwai, on the newly 
constructed highway, the whole area was completely exposed to the two mayors. They 
were delighted about the modern and contemporary style of Linked Hybrid and the rest of 
MOMA’s developments at this particular location in the city. However, they also saw the 
single-story workers’ dormitory (pingfang, see Conclusion Chapter) to the south. They 
issued the immediate order to clear the area and convert it into a park to provide an 
appropriate scene for visitors to Beijing. In the interview, Qiu Lai said, 
The area was demolished in 2007. They started in November, and 
basically emptied the whole site by the end of December. It was really fast 
(Qiu Lai, personal communication, 14 March, 2009). 
The housing manager of the workers’ community, who was in charge of the 
demolition process, described the demolition as ‘dazhishang hexie’ (generally 
harmonious) in Chinese. Over two hundred households from the paper mill were 
relocated, and their houses were demolished within two months (Figure 51). The 
compensation amount was raised dramatically to shorten the negotiation period. The 
                                                 
61. When the story was told by Qiu Lai, he stressed the political influence of these two 
people. He said that during the demolition, there were rumours that Wang Qishan was 
going to have an opportunity to be promoted from the local city government to the central 
government. 
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community members believed that the urgency and high compensation rate were due to 
the arrival of the Olympics in 2008: 
The Olympics brought them luck. It was very urgent. The government 
needed to empty this piece of land. If not, the Olympics [were coming], 
and [cars] would drive by, so the area should be a nice park. So, many 
extra requests from the former residents were agreed to. Some of them 
used to be prisoners. If you came out from a prison, an extra 10,000 yuan 
were added as an incentive. Street office officials would have an extra 
8,000 yuan added.[62] There were some other special incentives. The most 
important thing is that the government was afraid of any disturbance. 
Therefore, they tried to give certain kinds of people more money, if they 
showed agreement. From this point of view, it shows how urgent it was. 
The government needed to fulfil the agenda of a ‘harmonious Olympics 
[hexie aoyun]’. Disturbance was not acceptable (Wang Ji, personal 
communication, 14 January, 2009). 
The political rhetoric of a ‘hexie aoyun’ (harmonious Olympics) follows the 
general political instructions from the central government of China. The Chinese sign of 
‘hexie’ (harmony) in the Chinese context connects to very profound and complex 
political, cultural, and historical meanings. The origin of its recent use in politics was 
                                                 
62. A street office is a government unit that controls the day-to-day activities of urban 
China. It operates at the grassroots level of the government’s bureaucratic system. Each 
street office controls several streets and housing complexes. It also acts as a registration 
office to collect information on the local residents. Street office administrators are usually 
from the area. The worker here suggested that the staff members from the local street 
office received more compensation for relocation. 
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Figure 51: The first demolition notice for the workers’ community issued on 25 October 
2007. The highlighted area states the demolition period, from 25 October 2007 to 23 
December 2007. If residents leave their place before 3 December 2007, they will get 
extra compensation fee. (Document accessed from Qiu Lai’s housing management office).  
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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from the 2005 China National People’s Congress. During that meeting, China’s 
Communist Party leader, Hu Jintao, first introduced the state’s new guidelines and socio-
economic ideology: “constructing a harmonious society”. The government claimed that 
the concept addressed the “mounting contradiction between the increasing desire for 
material culture of the Chinese people and the primitive production system” (China State 
Council, 2006). But this policy change was more of a reaction to the “inharmonious 
factors…[caused by the] open and reforming ideology, which had led to uneven 
economic development and unequal distribution of the public resources in terms of social 
welfare and land-resource allocation” (China State Council, 2006). After the Chinese 
Communist Party’s announcement of this new ideology, varying interpretations 
circulated among politicians, Chinese conservative scholars, cultural and political critics, 
and others. 
It would seem that the idea of a ‘hexie shehui’ (harmonious society) operated in 
three different ways. Politically, the factory worker Wang Ji believed that the housing 
demolition was a result of the need for a “harmonious Olympics”, thereby revealing the 
effectiveness of the notion of ‘harmony’ as a strategy to transmit political directives from 
central government to local authorities and individuals. Socially Wang Ji talked about the 
mechanisms employed by the Beijing municipal government to avoid social disturbances 
in order to ensure a ‘hexie aoyun’ (harmonious Olympics) by avoiding inevitable 
exposure of the site to foreigners, given its location next to the airport highway. 
Financially, Wang Ji suggested that the two tactics of the government to achieve 
‘harmony’ were high compensation amounts with extra incentives for those relocated 
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residents who could cause trouble because they held political power or, at the opposite 
end of the spectrum, were potential trouble-shooters because they held criminal records. 
Hexie as a Rhetorical Practice 
Rhetorical practice as one of the strategies of governance in China is a legacy of 
both Confucianism and socialism, and this point echoes with my previous argument in 
the guanxi chapter. Xiang Lu (2004) divides the contemporary literature on rhetoric in 
China into two groups. The first group emphasizes Confucianism in China’s 
contemporary rhetoric. The second group focuses on the impact of rhetoric on the 
country’s social and economic conditions.63 These two groups of literature reflect two 
approaches to the origins of the rhetorical tradition in China: the former makes a 
connection with the distant literary legacy of Confucian China, while the latter makes a 
connection with recent socialist (or communist) political propaganda during Maoist 
China and the Cultural Revolution. The former argues that, in terms of the Confucian 
legacy, the rhetoric of moralism and loyalty ensured the strong institutional structure of 
the state, as well as the stability of society. The advantage of this imperial utilization of 
moral rhetoric allowed leaders to implement reforms without worrying about losing the 
support of their constituents. It is argued that this tradition of moral rhetoric extended to 
Mao’s ideological control. In terms of Maoism, politicians legitimatised power by two 
means: narratives about Mao’s acts of sacrifice, and moral justifications of communist 
ideology (Lu X., 2004). In contemporary China, rhetorical power is still controlled 
mostly by the party-state. Rhetoric, in propaganda programs and in the mass media, are 
                                                 
63. For full bibliographical references, see X. Lu (2004). 
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still the most powerful political instruments of governance in China. Xiang Lu (2004, 
160-161) concludes that there are several features of Chinese political rhetoric: 
ambiguousness and abstraction, openness to interpretation, and the use of numbers to 
present policies and articulate programmes. Because urban and architectural development 
projects are some of the most strategic, and visually dominant, means to disseminate 
political ideologies, the rhetorical tradition of the political sphere extends to planning 
discourse. The empirical evidence about these dynamics is lacking, however, because the 
study of Chinese political rhetoric as it applies to urbanism and urban development is a 
relatively new and undeveloped field of research.64 
Open interpretation plays an important role in the politics of China because it can 
actively determine the upward or downward mobility of an individual in the political 
arena. Hexie (harmony) thus becomes a highly critical word in Chinese politics.65 Even 
Chinese architectural historians and architects always use this concept to justify their 
design proposals and academic critiques. Therefore, the hexie sign symbolises a form of 
political appropriateness. The popular and widespread interpretation of this notion has 
                                                 
64. In the current literature, there are two main types of research into rhetorical practices 
in urban planning and development. The first is the study of how the change in 
architectural rhetoric in post-reform China influenced the appearance of urbanism 
(Arkaraprasertkul, 2008; Wu F., 2004). The second is the study of how the tradition of 
political rhetoric influenced processes of urban planning and development after their 
appearance (Ng & Tang, 2004). The former type of analysis, mainly conducted by 
architectural theory, contributes to an understanding of the change in language of Chinese 
urbanism after the reform. The latter type of analysis, mainly conducted by planners and 
geographers, helps to understand the political agenda behind planning schemes and 
strategies.  
65. Ideas such as harmony and efficiency may be considered the economic consequence 
of large-scale marketisation in China. There are, however, different key cultural notions 
in China, which are ignored or misunderstood in the West, of which ‘harmony’ is one . 
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further developed ‘harmony’ beyond its initial meaning in the political sphere to 
eventually become a cliché.  
Harmonious Society and Sustainability 
Its open interpretation has further muddied the initial definition of hexie. ‘Hexie 
shehui (harmonious society)’ relates to, and appropriates, every corner of society to 
central politics, including interpersonal politeness, public education and even the control 
of private parking lots. In the Linked Hybrid case, the billboard on one of its towers reads 
“Contributing to clean energy; constructing a harmonious society” (Figure 52).66 This 
billboard on a Linked Hybrid tower attempted to market the concept of green architecture 
to the public. Both the architect and the developer insisted on this point in their 
presentations of the project. Holl, in his presentation, emphasised the importance of the 
geothermal pipes and the importance of ecological considerations in modern architectural 
design. The in-house chief architect of the development company, Ke Jin, also mentioned 
the importance of all the energy-saving features: 
On the architectural level, we have paid extra attention to the design of a 
low-energy and eco-friendly system since the second phase of the 
development. We learnt from some other architectural technological 
systems and finally applied the system of slab heating and cooling, 
centralised ventilation, and exterior façade design to minimise the loss of 
energy. Our solar-shading device has this objective. Our design is far 
                                                 
66.  Because the English and the Chinese versions on the billboard are slightly different, I 
translate the Chinese version into English in my own words. 
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beyond the standard in modern architecture, as well as the regulation of 
the state (Ke Jin, personal communication, 15 September, 2008). 
This connection at Linked Hybrid between ecological sustainability and 
‘harmonious society’ shows two important aspects of architectural and planning practices 
in China. First, hexie is an expression of the docility of the developer in relation to the 
larger power system. The use of this sign on the billboard may not attract more buyers, 
but it diminishes the sense of commercialism by presenting a politically appropriate 
intention. Secondly, it justifies the ecological endeavour by referring to a Confucian 
tradition of being in harmony. According to the argument, which I made early in this 
section, that the political rhetoric of ‘harmony’ is to deactivate any ‘disharmony’ in 
society, where is the ‘disharmony’ in Linked Hybrid? 
The Old Woman with her Deaf Boy in the Ruins 
During the urban redevelopment process, some of the workers’ community was 
demolished (Figure 53) and tensions arose between the urban developers and the workers. 
Tensions in many other urban redevelopments, demolitions and relocation projects have 
been recognised also in other research (Wu F., 2002). Scholars have focused on the 
ethical, political, and legal issues of demolition practices. Among them, Fulong Wu 
(2004) explains the demolitions and relocations that are caused by urban redevelopment 
as a process through which socialist tenancy is commoditised differently according to  
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Figure 52: Harmonious society billboard on Linked Hybrid during construction (see the 
highlighted area).The billboard was placed on the west side of the building. It translates 
as ‘contributing clean energy and constructing a harmonious society’. By clean energy, 
the sign might have been referring to the sustainable technologies applied in the 
architectural design. (Photo provided by Matthew Niederhauser). 
 
 
Figure 53: Demolition of the workers’ community with linked Hybrid in the background. 
(Photo Cressica Brazier, 14 June, 2008). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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households’ positions in a complex system of housing tenure.67 This, as will be seen, fits 
the case of Linked Hybrid. 
Indeed, in response, the chai character, which I found on the demolition site of the 
workers’ community, expresses the authoritarianism that is involved in the practice of 
‘harmonious society’ (Figure 54). Chai also exposes the presence of disharmony in 
society. The character was inscribed on the walls of buildings ready to be demolished. 
Characters usually function as a classification system, an icon, and a symbol to indicate 
to the demolition workers which parts of the structure to destroy. These are iconic due to 
the hieroglyphic nature of the Chinese character, and they also symbolise political 
positions, historical incidents, and the hegemony of the government. Unlike the hexie 
character, putting the chai character on a building indicates political inappropriateness or 
incorrectness. This label also puts their residents in a difficult situation because they are 
then seen as living in buildings that go against social norms such that they are essentially 
in violation of social morals.  
The Violence of a Chinese Sign 
During a fieldtrip to the demolition site, a residential building marked with chai 
caught everyone’s attention when they were passing. The residents, a family, became the 
subject of discussion. The family consisted of an elderly couple and a teenager. The 
                                                 
67. Fulong Wu (2004) also explains Beijing’s urban redevelopment projects as involving 
historical preservation issues of traditional urban fabrics and hutong (alleyways of 
courtyard houses in English) urbanism: the demolition projects are usually focused on the 
redevelopment of danwei housing units or traditional hutong areas into private housing so 
that this transformation has triggered social inequity in urban China, and ‘harmonious 
society’ therefore becomes an implicit mechanism to resolve the conflicts and tensions 
that surface in the redevelopment process. 
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teenager was deaf. He often sculpted warrior figures with mud, probably taken from his 
neighbour’s abandoned house. Their building was one of the few remaining structures on 
the abandoned site (Figure 55). When I asked the old woman why she was still here, she 
replied: 
We are not satisfied with the compensation amount. We are still 
negotiating with them. Because we have no other place to live, we need to 
live here… There is still no agreement. But we will leave, once the 
conditions are agreed upon (old woman at demolition site, personal 
communication, 14 June, 2007). 
The most important aspects of this woman’s remarks were the emphasis and tone 
she used to assert her decision to leave (see underlined words in the quotation). Other 
than the function as an index to tell workers what to demolish, having the chai character 
on one’s wall creates a strong political pressure on the resident. Chau (2003) called this 
the ‘symbolic violence’ of Chinese public writing. His explanation about the violence of 
this word is from the imperial legacy of literocracy.68 
Other than the imperial legacy of literocracy, the origin of ‘written violence’ also 
relates to media broadcasts about other demolition protests and incidents. Urban 
redevelopment projects have ballooned since the early 1990s. And these usually involve 
the demolition of old urban structures, such as traditional hutong and old danwei housing. 
                                                 
68. In his research on the chai character, Chau discovered that the sign functions to avoid 
residents renting or selling their apartment to others, in addition to indicating to the 
demolition crews which structures need to be knocked down. However, the sign also 
exacts accommodating behaviour from those subjects (Chau, 2003). Chau continued that 
this behaviour can be traced back to the literocracy of ancient China, that is a society, 
governed by scholars. Writing was the instrument of the ruling class and of the 
authorities, so writing itself represented political power. 
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Figure 54: The sign of chai on a ready-to-be-demolished structure in the workers’ 
community. The structure is a restaurant at the entrance of the workers’ single-story 
dormitory at the south-western end of the development property shared by Linked Hybrid. 
After an interview with Li Hu, he recommended that we see the demolition site. (Photo 
the author, 14 June, 2008). 
 
Figure 55: The old woman and her deaf boy living on the site during our fieldwork. 
(Photo the author, 14 June, 2008). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Some residents attempt to resist and to express their disagreement with the government’s 
decision to demolish their communities. These actions usually have involved physical 
and legal violence as responses to the political violence of the government. Therefore, 
living in a building with the chai sign can easily be associated with an anti-government 
position. This is why the elder woman clarified her intention to leave once a mutually 
acceptable deal was reached between her family and the government. 
Implications of Li and Mianzi 
Based on Chinese perspectives, the construction of Linked Hybrid at the gateway 
to Beijing respects the social order suggested by li, because hosts should always show 
respect to visitors by presenting their best aspects; thus, the exposure of the old and 
messy workers’ dormitory to a visitor would make the host lose mianzi, or dignity.  The 
workers’ dormitory should therefore be torn down. Hexie was the strategy to manipulate 
people’s ideology and chai was the strategy to transform reality. What more, therefore, 
do we learn from these Chinese perspectives? 
Confucian Moralism and Social Control 
The discussion of guanxi in the last chapter emphasised the continuation of 
Confucianism in contemporary Chinese society. The discoveries of li and mianzi in my 
case study also support this. To achieve socially acceptable relationships with others in 
society, one should understand the art of li, or ritual appropriateness. Such ritual 
appropriateness is related to the guidelines provided by Confucianism about behaviour in 
society. Thus, li shapes the everyday social structure of everyday people. 
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Confucius’s teaching of li prescribes the concept of harmony—never going to the 
extreme, forgiveness, loyalty and trustworthiness—and the emphasis on deeds rather than 
words (Li & Wu, 1996). Or, from another perspective, and in reverse, harmony defines 
the conduct of li (Jacobs, Guopei, & Herbig, 1995). A harmonious state of society is a 
means towards the Confucian objective of constructing a utopian society (Tyng, 1934).69 
At the societal level, the Confucian ideal is that everyone behaves according to li, and 
therefore no punishments are needed (Greer & Lim, 1998).70 If li affects the social 
structure, can we compare Chinese li to the Western concept of law, or fa in Chinese? It 
has been argued that, while fa is an external and categorical element in society, li is a 
form of personal practice in everyday life (Sitaraman, 2008). Indeed, in Chinese history, 
the moralism and Confucianism oriented social control system of li and the totalitarian 
legal system of fa intermingled with each other: the Confucianisation of law and the 
legalisation of Confucianism.71 
                                                 
69. Confucianism (Rujia) and Legalism (Fajia) are two major ancient ideologies in China. 
A state of harmony also facilitates the ideal of Chinese Legalism of achieving efficient 
and effective governance (Ip, 2009). I will further discuss the presence of these two 
Chinese ideologies in contemporary Chinese culture in the next chapter. 
70. The concepts of Confucianism and li were widely disseminated throughout imperial 
China by the Confucian-oriented examination syllabus, or the keju system. These 
concepts were essential knowledge for the examination (Jacobs, Guopei, & Herbig, 1995). 
Additionally, because the only purpose of the examination was to select government 
officials, the concept of li infiltrated the entire administrative system of China; still today, 
without a Confucian-oriented education system, loyalty and political correctness remain 
the most important behaviours if one plans to enter government (Shenkar, 1984). 
71. This moralism-oriented social control system was devised as early as the Han dynasty 
(206BC to AD220), when the emperor Wu of Han (141BC – 87 BC) decided to endorse 
the Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu’s suggestion to Confucianise his country’s 
governance. This Confucianisation process was massive and reached every corner of 
society. Modern scholars disagree about whether the social control system in modern 
China is the Confucianisation of a legal system, that is, the incorporation of the legal 
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In the Linked Hybrid case, the discovery of hexie and chai in the field helps to 
understand this complex social control system in contemporary China. For the explicit 
intention, people always try to display the moralist image (the expression of hexie); for 
the implicit intention, people always try to control or eliminate the unwanted parts (the 
practice of chai). With the first intention, the Confucian concept of harmony enhanced 
social control; with the second intention, the legal system was to regulate the 
disharmonious urban conditions. The discovery of both ideas in the field tends to show 
that the Confucianisation of law and the legalization of Confucianism operate at the same 
time. The former intended to archive dignity of the political leader and the latter intended 
to maximise efficiency. This double-layered social control system results in mianzi 
culture (a culture with two different expressions, both external and internal).  
Two Notions of ‘Face’ 
The direct translation of mianzi is face. But there is another Chinese word, lian, 
also meaning face, which carries slightly different meanings. Mianzi is an achievable 
value. It is associated more with some attributive concepts, such as social status, political 
power and individual wealth. So one needs to pretend to have higher social status, more 
political power and greater wealth. Lian is associated more with personal behaviour and 
individual ethical standards, and basic compliance with the social order of li (Chen M., 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulations of totalitarianism, bureaucracy and ethical standards within Confucianism; or, 
on the contrary, the legalisation of Confucianism, that is a mechanism to institutionalise 
appropriate acts and ensure the subordination of the individual to the collective (for more 
discussion about these two concepts, see Sitaraman, 2008).  
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1994). Usually, if an individual is subject to social criticism, the person has no lian and is 
thus considered to be morally shamed.  
In my case study, to demolish the workers’ dormitory was the strategy of the city 
government to avoid being socially criticised, having no lian and being morally shamed. 
Mianzi can be given as social currency to someone as a strategy to establish a positive 
guanxi relation; so giving mianzi becomes an everyday transaction in Chinese society. At 
Linked Hybrid, the hexie billboard was the social offering of the developer to the political 
leaders, in exchange of more efficient and effective management of the construction. 
At Linked Hybrid, the two Chinese notions of ‘face’ can explain several events.  
The reverse side of the coin of the demolition tensions is the glowing story of Linked 
Hybrid. Linked Hybrid is the flagship project of Modern Green Development. This 
project has not only brought the development company international fame, but it has also 
provided them with an advantageous marketing niche for their future products. Steven 
Holl was originally hired to design the exterior of the building, but this request from the 
developer was refused. Then, Holl also realised that the value for the developer in 
collaborating with him was in having his name on the project (Steven Holl, personal 
communication, 12 October, 2010). Having an internationally recognised name on the 
project gave a lot of lian (appropriateness of individuals) to the developer. However, 
refusing to construct the wall to enclose Linked Hybrid, Steven Holl did not participate in 
Chinese social norms in order to give the development mianzi. The project became 
superficial because the design concept and its materialisation were at odds with each 
other.  
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Mianzi Urban Paradigm 
There is a Chinese way to criticise this type of superficial urban development: 
‘xingxiang gongcheng’ (image engineering). In everyday usage, people also call it 
‘mianzi gongcheng’ (face engineering). The concept, which is seldom discussed in 
Western studies of Chinese urbanism, is one of the most popular topics in Chinese 
academic circles on this topic.  
The Chinese notion of ‘mianzi gongcheng’ has at least two origins.72 The first is 
rooted in architectural and planning theory and the second more in management strategy. 
The Chinese planning scholars Leng and Yuan (2003) suggested that Kevin A. Lynch’s 
book, The Image of the City (1960), was reminiscent of ‘mianzi gongcheng’ practices in 
China. In his book, Lynch studied how people perceived urban space using materials 
from his five-year research in Los Anglos, Boston and Jersey City. He argued that people 
perceived the image of the city through five fundamental elements in their mental map: 
paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks: 
There seems to be a public image of any given city which is the overlap of 
many individual images. Or perhaps there is a series of public images, 
each held by some significant number of citizens. Such group images are 
necessary if an individual is to operate successfully within his 
environment and to cooperate with his fellows. Each individual picture is 
unique, with some contents that is rarely or never communicated, yet it 
approximates the public image, which, in different environments, is more 
or less compelling, more or less embracing. … The contents of the city 
                                                 
72. I will rely on Chinese academic papers as secondary sources for the argument of this 
part of the thesis as they provide the only analyses available. 
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images so far studied, which are referable to physical forms, can 
conveniently be classified into five elements: paths, edges, districts, nodes, 
and landmarks (Lynch K. A., 1960, 46-47). 
Leng and Yuan (2003) further suggested the application of Lynch’s concept to planning 
theory in China in order to construct identity, structure and meaning to the city. In this 
perspective, identity refers to recognizable forms and features of buildings or urbanism; 
structure refers to the spatial organisation and logic; and meaning is the interpretation of 
the observers. In this way, planners can approach urban design by using landmark 
architecture, green spaces, roads, plazas, urban blocks and scenes within those street 
blocks.  
The second origin of ‘mianzi gongcheng’ (face engineering) came from the 
marketing identity design firm, Corporate Identity, commonly referred as ‘CI’ by Chinese 
urban scholars.73  Chinese planners then borrowed the term from marketing and applied it 
to urban planning and design. Chinese scholars Li, An, and Yu (2009) argue that the 
practice of CI involves integrating different individual’s perception of urbanism to form a 
coherent image of the city, and, through the communication of that image via multiple 
media, establishing the identity of the city. In that process, ideology is required to shape 
the direction of a city’s development, while behaviour is required to conform to accepted 
norms such as sincerity and politeness, while, finally, perceptions are moulded by natural 
                                                 
73. Chinese scholars commonly use the term CI to describe the process of designing the 
image of the city. Only a few of these scholars explicitly make the connection between CI 
or Corporate Identity.  The German architect Peter Behrens first advocated the idea of CI 
when designing the logo for AEG (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft) in the early 
20th century.  
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artificial scenes in the city.74 Chinese scholars Song and Wang (2003) argued that the 
advantages of CI’s urban-design strategies come from its quick return-on-investment and 
its development process than that of economic or societal development strategies. The 
strategy can also be easily disseminated through publicity, so it is a very effective 
propaganda device.75 
Government officials are keen on the xingxiang gongcheng strategy because it 
helps them to achieve upward mobility in the government bureaucracy. At the same time, 
criticisms of the superficial image-making of CI urbanism is wide spread in the academic 
world in China. Chinese scholars Wang and Tian (2008) voiced three criticisms: first, CI 
is a very superficial planning strategy because it focuses only on ideological strategies 
and not on actual social problems. This relates to Wang and Tian’s (2008) second point 
that CI looks at the appearances and ignores the contents. Thirdly, scholars argue that CI 
fails to use historical analyses or comparative studies to define the image of the city.76 
                                                 
74. Scholars from different fields refer to these three elements by other terms. Chinese 
planners Wang and Tian (2008) called them the software and hardware of urbanism; 
government officials He and Chen (1997) called them structural, intermediate, and 
surface layers, respectively. 
75. Still, Song and Wang (2003) distinguished the application of CI for businesses and 
government agencies. For businesses, CI focuses on the branding of products to obtain 
economic benefits; for government, CI constructs a city identity and improves the 
citizens’ quality of life. 
76. Some other criticisms have been voiced of large-scale image-engineering projects 
with limited practical meaning. The Chinese saying jiadakong, or ‘big empty fake’ in 
English, has been coined to describe such projects (Li, An & Yu, 2009). Other arguments 
include regional critiques about disappearing traditional identities (Cheng & Li, 2007), 
and political critiques about the preference of Chinese officials for ‘mianzi gongcheng’ 
(face engineering) and ‘zhengji gongcheng’ (politician’s career engineering; Zhang F., 
2005). 
 174 
 
Mianzi gongcheng is a Chinese planning theory, which combines local culture and 
Western urban theory. Mianzi gongcheng is the basis of a criticism of Chinese culture as 
being speculative, superficial and hypocritical, and of a criticism of those urban 
development projects that only emphasise or show fake external expression, and neglect 
or hide the internal problems. Describing Linked Hybrid as a mianzi gongcheng project 
might be the biggest criticism of the project, because this suggests that the project is 
superficial, speculative and hypocritical, which, of course, is not any one individual’s 
fault but, instead, the result of the structure and culture of architectural and urban 
development practices in contemporary China.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SHI 
Zhang Lian’s Personal Archive  
Almost all archival materials that I discuss in this chapter were found at the paper 
mill factory. The archive was under the control of the Propaganda Department because it 
was responsible for the management of historical publications. When I visited the 
propaganda cadre Zhang Lian in 2009, he was editing a paper about the history of the 
paper mill for a publication on the thirtieth anniversary celebration of the ‘Reform and 
Open Policy’. Unlike other larger and more important state-owned enterprises, the paper 
mill does not have an institutionalised process to manage historical materials. Zhang Lian 
explained how all the materials were personally collected by the propaganda staff, 
especially himself. He also explained that the archiving process was never given serious 
attention.  
Even though all of the materials were located in the paper mill’s office, the 
majority of them were actually personal belongings of Zhang Lian. The new paper mill 
factory site at the Shunyi Airport Development Zone has two propaganda office spaces. 
One is Zhang Lian’s private office, and the other is an open office for three to four other 
staff members. Steel cabinets are installed in both rooms. The open office’s cabinets 
contain many old pictures of the paper mill community. Zhang Lian has organised the 
documents into different folders, which he arranged chronologically. Some materials, 
such as old movies and video clips about those political leaders’ visits I introduced in 
Chapter 1, are digitalised and stored on computer hard-drives,. These materials serve as 
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no more than a database for the graphic design of the paper mill’s publications. In the 
steel cabinets in Zhang Lian’s private office, I found a collection of old newspapers and 
documents that was more complete than that in the open office. All of these documents 
were part of Zhang Lian’s personal collection (Figure 56). While working for the 
propaganda department at the paper mill for more than thirty years, Zhang Lian had 
carefully collected internal materials from, and outside materials about, the paper mill . In 
this newspaper collection, reports are organised in chronological order from 1989 until 
1999 (Figure 57). Many of the news articles were his personal essays and poems. He was 
also proud to show me a special poem he had written in the form of a circle in 1997 
(Figure 58). He told me that the newspaper at that time provided a small space for him to 
develop his writing interests. Other than newspapers, he also collected many other 
publications and documents released by the enterprise. These materials helped him to 
write about the paper mill. He kept many publications at his home rather than in the 
cabinets, which again shows that many materials constituted a personal collection rather 
than the company’s official archives. 
This personal archiving practice raises three implications for archival research in 
China. First, the archival materials are not selected politically; rather, Zhang Lian is in 
total control of the materials. Zhang Lian actually stood behind me for the whole archival 
research process to ensure that I did not see any particularly sensitive documents. 
Secondly, as the archiving is not undertaken professionally, the organisation of the 
materials is very personal. In other words, only Zhang Lian knows where to find what 
kind of materials, and even that system has its limitations—he wished to show me some 
documents but he forgot where to find them. Finally, the accessibility of this kind of  
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Figure 56: Sensitive article covered by hand. When I was reading Zhang Lian’s personal 
archive about the factory, he stood behind me and attempted to explain individual pieces 
of material to me. When I flipped to the above page, Zhang Lian stopped me from 
reading and documenting one article. He told me the article was very sensitive and, after 
many years, there are still aftershocks about the article. I agreed to cover the article with 
my hand when other articles were being recorded. The article told the story of a 
Communist Party member in the paper mill. When just reading the story, I could not see 
anything unusual about it. (Photo the author, 29 July, 2009). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 57: The newspaper articles collection of Zhang Lian. (Photo the author, 29 July, 
2009). 
 
Figure 58: Round-shaped poem by Zhang Lian. Zhang Lian introduced this round-shaped 
poem to me when I was reading the rest of his personal archive. The poem consists of 
four seven-word sentences. The last four word of the first sentence are the first four 
words of the next sentence. Therefore, the whole poem only uses 14 words and it can be 
read in its circular form. Zhang Lian was proud of his writing. Other than this piece, there 
are many small writings by Zhang Lian published in the internal newspaper. Zhang Lian 
thought the internal newspaper provided a space for him to write and publish. (Photo the 
author, 29 July, 2009). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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archive is seriously limited to personal relationships, or guanxi, between the researcher 
and the archivist. He told me that I was just the second person in thirty years to see his 
materials. The first was a Chinese Ph.D. student majoring in Business Administration, 
who was also a relative of one of the company’s staff members. 
Archive Materials 
The reconstruction of the paper mill history in this chapter depends on many 
newspaper articles. These newspapers can be separated into three categories, including 
party-organisation newspapers, ministerial level professional newspapers, and local 
enterprise community newspapers.77 It should be noted that the three types of newspapers 
I used in this thesis were all considered to be part of the government’s propaganda 
practices. All newspaper publishers were obliged to be linked to government- licensed 
organisations (Wu G., 2000). The newspaper industry was both sponsored and regulated 
by these organisations. The publishing industry was danwei-based, so newspaper contents 
would be consistent with function and location. First, the party-organisation newspapers 
directly brought political and ideological instruction to the society. This type of 
newspaper dominated the printing media of China up to the 1980s. However, the 
economic reforms and the larger-scale marketisation of China in the early 1990s also 
                                                 
77. The first type includes Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], Beijing Wanbao [Beijing 
Evening], and Xianchuan Shouce [Propaganda Handbook, an internal publication of the 
Beijing Paper Mill]. The second type includes Beijing Qingnian Bao [Beijing Youth 
Daily], Gongren Ribao [The Workers’ Daily], Jingji Ribao [Economy Daily], Keji Ribao 
[Technology Daily], Shoudu Jingji Xinxi Bao [Capital Economics and Information Post], 
Xiaofei Shibao [Consumer Times], and Zhongguo Qiyebao [China Enterprise News] . The 
third type includes Beijing Yiqing Bao [Beijing First Light Industry Bureau News] . 
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weakened the power of the party-organisations’ print media and led to the proliferation of 
the second and the third types of newspapers.  
The second and third newspaper groups targeted more specific professional and 
geographic audiences. For example, many articles used in this thesis were from 
Consumer Times and China Enterprise News, which were only distributed to consumers 
and company staff, and the Beijing First Light Industry Bureau News, which only 
circulated within the Light Industry Bureau and professional community. The amount of 
articles from the second and third newspaper groups ballooned in the mid-1990s during 
the transformation of the newspaper industry. Guoguang Wu (2000) understands the 
industry’s transformation as a three-faceted process: socialisation, decentralisation, and 
marketisation. For Guoguang Wu, socialisation was the breakup of the party-state’s 
monopoly of the social structure and the increasing significance of non-party participants. 
This created many professional societies and institutes whose printing media were 
oriented specifically to professionals. In addition to the increasing significance of non-
party professional societies, ministries and bureaucracies also developed their own 
agencies through the decentralisation process. After the reform of the media, all 
ministerial and semi-ministerial levels of bureaucracy had their own newspapers (Wu G., 
2000). These newspapers were more community oriented, and the news reports focused 
on their internal and community affairs. 
The appearance of the second and third types of newspapers was not a threat to 
the party-organisation newspapers; indeed, the new newspapers strengthened the political 
power of the party-state. By regulating the second and third types of newspapers, the 
party-state’s propaganda could easily penetrate the community and professional-practice 
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levels of society. Ministerial- and semi-ministerial level institutes became local 
authorities, and political policies were implemented by them. The content of these types 
of newspapers was strictly regulated and only allowed party committee members to 
publish articles of general interest (Zhao Y. Z., 2000), such as Zhang Lian, Li Long and 
other workers who published in the newspapers. 
Workers ‘Jumping into the Sea’ 
In this chapter, I focus on the historical development of the Linked Hybrid site 
through the newspapers in the factory archives. At the same time, I also make use of a 
Chinese philosophical idea, shi, to explain the different ways in which the workers 
adapted to the transformations in their lives. I will start by examining how ordinary 
Chinese people handled the transformations in their living environment. These people are 
the workers at the paper mill who originally worked at the site where Linked Hybrid is 
now located. Their lives changed in the early 1990s, when the state owned paper mill was 
reformed and eventually the factory was redeveloped by private developers.  
Among many facets of the area’s history, a small occurrence from 1992 was the 
seed of the development of Beijing Linked Hybrid. In the summer of 1992, a set of 
industrial boilers broke down. Because the demand for paper had decreased dramatically, 
the management of the paper mill decided not to repair the boilers and demolish its 
structure (Figure 59). After that, a series of effects followed. The paper mill’s department 
of electric generation and supply was also closed. Electricians with professional licenses 
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left the factory for other jobs in the newly established open career market.78 This may 
seem like small news in the workers’ community, but it was an important moment in a 
larger movement of workers who would quit the company in the following years. In 1993, 
a news article was published about the paper mill: 
Today the term xiahai is indeed the most popular term. Usually we can 
hear someone jumps into the sea. However, compared to these kinds of 
individual stories, workers in one of the Beijing 100 strongest enterprises, 
Beijing First Paper Mill, jump into the sea together. This phenomenon 
goes beyond what is happening in other enterprises (Beijing First Paper 
Mill, 1993). 
Xiahai was a common expression used by the workers to describe their decision 
to leave a relatively stable job in a state-owned enterprise under a planned economy and 
social structure to seek new, more profitable but riskier job opportunities in the free 
market. The term xiahai uses the image of ‘jumping into the sea’. This was the most 
direct reaction of the workers towards the marketisation of their society. The ‘sea’ 
symbolises the uncertainty and risk involved in the free market. However, people 
believed there was wealth, power, happiness and a better life on the opposite side of the 
‘sea’.79 
                                                 
78. The majority of positions in the paper mill were assigned by the government to 
workers after they graduated from school or returned from military service. My research 
informants, including the electrician Wang Ji, propaganda cadre Zhang Lian, manager 
Qiu Lai and worker Zhao Xiao, all followed this practice in the socialist system. Since 
then, one fundamental change from the planned economy to the market economy is that 
workers can choose their employer.  
79. There are many studies on the topic of xiahai, including Jeffery (2001), Efrd (2001), 
X. R. Liu (2001, especially chapter 2 to 5), Guo (2010, chapter 6), and D. D. Li (1998). 
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Figure 59: The demolition of the chimney of the old boiler structure. The image was 
taken by the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian in 1992. During the interview, he showed me 
this picture and explained to me that this photograph presents the end of one era and the 
start of another era in the paper mill. He told me the demolition of the chimney and the 
boiler symbolised the start of the decline of the factory in 1992. (Photo provided by 
Zhang Lian). 
 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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First Experience of the ‘Sea’ 
Before the large xiahai movement, the factory had already stopped paying salaries 
to some workers who did not have assigned positions and duties. The workers’ first 
reaction was to run personal businesses in the factory community in addition to their 
official duties. Three stories were found in the internal newspapers of the workers’ 
community at that time (Ji W., 1993). The people involved in those stories were praised 
as creative and hardworking and considered to be role models for other workers.  
First, a group of women organised a small team to sell hand-woven wool sweaters 
to their co-workers. These women were not assigned any factory duties and were not 
being paid salaries at that time. Their service was welcomed by the majority of the 
workers’ community. The extra income helped these women meet their basic needs. 
Secondly, some other workers started their own shops in the factory to sell snacks 
and foods in the official dininghall. One of the owners was Yu Zongli, who used to be a 
staff member of the deputy-affairs department (xingzhengke), which was responsible for 
managing the cleaning and maintenance duties in the factory. Because his salary was not 
sufficient to meet his daily needs, he quit his official position and started his private food 
store in the dining hall. Yu Zongli and the paper mill came to an agreement, which 
required that he pay a 1,000 yuan contracting fee to the factory every month. This was the 
starting point of a larger scale of decentralisation and privatisation in the paper mill by 
contracting out some parts of the factory’s business from the central management. I will 
discuss more extreme cases of how workers contracted the whole manufacturing 
department of the factory for their own businesses in the next section of this chapter. 
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The third story in the internal newspapers of the workers’ community was 
triggered by the closing of an entire production line in 1993. Two hundred workers from 
that production line were transferred to a newly established company. This new company, 
the Beijing Paper Supplying Union Company, required the transferred employees to work 
on certain manufacturing processes that were planned to be outsourced to other 
companies.80 This strategy solved the problem of laid-off workers by providing 200 extra 
working positions. 
These small stories from the internal newspapers of the workers’ community were 
the prelude to a general layoff and relocation of workers in China’s transformation from 
socialist planned economy to new market economy. We can see that the scale of the 
‘jumping into the sea’ movement increased from small-scale businesses (e.g., the 
knitwear business) to larger-scale businesses (e.g., the contracting of a small snack bar) to 
the total privatisation of a part of the factory. The concepts of ‘private’ and ‘ownership’ 
had entered the paper mill. Xiahai meant not only the retreat of the public welfare system 
of the factory management, but, more importantly, the beginning of the private market. 
This movement separated the urban population into two halves: those who still lived in 
the public welfare system (e.g., the residents of the paper mill’s worker community) and 
those who lived in the newly emerging private market (e.g., those residents who 
eventually earned enough money to move to Linked Hybrid). 
                                                 
80. The Chinese name for this new company was北京纸联物资供应公司. 
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From the layoffs in the decade between 1993 and 2003, more than 90 per cent of 
the workers from Beijing First Paper Mill were forced to leave their jobs (Wang W., 
1991).The factory president Guo Chunguang (Figure 60) recognised this situation in 1992: 
The enterprise is facing the tremendous challenge of leaving government 
support and entering the private market. So we have to build up the 
concept of ‘market’ among our workers and emphasise the importance of 
‘customer’ and ‘marketing’ in our management. Even though the factory’s 
famous brand – Sanyi copier machine paper – was still dominating 22 per 
cent of the national market, the financial situation of the factory was not 
optimistic. The main reason for this was believed to be the inefficiency of 
using state-owned resources (Speech by Guo Chunguang, recorded in 
Zhang L. G., 1994). 
Overcoming Conjunctures 
‘Jumping into the sea’ was not the phenomenon that the management liked to see. 
Therefore, there were some strategies for the paper mill management to save itself. The 
paper mill reached its peak in the 1980s. In 1989, Consumer Times, a Beijing industrial 
newspaper, reported that the amount of tax paid by the factory had been increasing by 
more than 11 per cent for several consecutive years (Lin L., 1989). The amount of tax 
paid peaked in 1988, when the factory paid 20 million yuan to the government. However, 
following the heyday of the paper mill came the general economic recession in China in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this time, the management began to worry about 
the financial situation of the factory. In just a few years, by 1990, the paper mill had 
accumulated 19 million yuan in external debt (Wang W., 1991). In the same year, the 
slogan of the Chinese New Year ceremony in the workers’ community was to ask 
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Figure 60: Introduction of the factory president Guo Chunguang. President Guo 
Chunguang was one of the board committee members of Beijing Daily. In the 
introduction, it explains that Guo Chunguang was trained as an economist in the Beijing 
Light Industry Institute. He was assigned to be the president of Beijing First Paper Mill in 
1988, when he was 43 years old. (Image captured from Xiaofei Shibao, Zhang L. G., 
1994). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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workers to prepare for tremendous challenges in the coming years: “Dance to celebrate 
happy New Year and be ready to overcome difficulties” (Zhenfen Jingshen, 1990).81 In 
the slogan, the management used the expression chuangguan, which means ‘breaking 
through barriers’. Afterwards, this expression reappeared in numerous articles and 
speeches in the workers’ community. 
Evidence of the decline of Beijing First Paper Mill can be found in 1989, when 
the Beijing paper market declined and Beijing First Paper Mill accumulated a debt of 
over 19 million yuan (Wang W., 1991). The entire Beijing paper-manufacturing industry 
suffered a severe blow with this budget deficit. Then finally the abandonment of the 
boiler brought the problem to the surface in 1992. Another reason for the decline was a 
mistake in the instructions from the Beijing Bureau of Commerce, which was still 
operating under the old planned-economy system. In the 1986, the Bureau of Commerce 
instructed the factory to produce 120 thousand rolls of printing paper. However, the 
market did not have such a large demand. Eventually the factory needed to lower its 
prices. At the end of the same year, the paper mill had lost hundreds of thousands of yuan 
because the product distributors of the factory could not find any buyers (Du, 1991). 
This situation improved slightly in the early 1990s. Following the recovery of the 
economy as a whole, the demand for paper increased. In 1991, demand even surpassed 
the manufacturing capacity of the paper mill (Du, 1991). The management therefore were 
led to believe that they had succeeded in breaking through the barriers brought by the 
social transformation. However, until 1994, the morale in the workers’ community was 
                                                 
81. The Chinese was “Zaige zaiwu chuangnanguan, zhenfen jingshen chuangnanguan” or 
“载歌载舞闯年关，振奋精神创年关”. 
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reported as still extremely unstable (Shi, 1994). This situation alerted the management to 
the fundamental problem behind the ‘chuangguan’ (breaking through the barriers) 
rhetorical movement (Zhenfen Jingshen, 1990). 
Guo Chunguang’s Reform 
The management of Beijing First Paper Mill believed that changing their 
company model was the only solution to respond to the structural transformation of 
Chinese society, particularly during the reform age in the 1990s. In the late 1980s, the 
paper mill president Guo Chunguang recognised the problems of the old management 
model. First, he did not agree to blindly follow the instructions of the senior bureaucracy, 
who generally adhered to the planned economy legacy. Secondly, he thought that 
depending only on assigned distributors to market their products was too passive. Instead 
he independently began to develop a research unit in the company to uncover new 
marketing strategies and management models. 
Not surprisingly, Guo Chunguang’s reform campaign was criticised by groups of 
conservative leaders and Communist Party members in the paper mill. These groups 
believed that the production model should still follow the centralised instructions from 
the government. They resisted increasing production levels even though research 
predicted a potential increase in demand.82 It seems that Guo Chunguang won the 
political debate because many critical comments are to be found in the internal paper-mill 
newspaper about the conservative campaign, which also described the eventual demise of 
                                                 
82. This research was conducted by an internal research team in the paper mill, focused 
on the strategic plan for Beijing First Paper Mill in 1987. 
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this conservative campaign. These conservatives were described as cadres with an old 
‘bureaucratic-business mentality’, or guanshang sixiang in Chinese (Lin L., 1989). 
In 1991, Beijing First Paper Mill president Guo Chunguang introduced a 
radical idea with his reform campaign: 
 
On the one hand, state-owned enterprises are responsible for protecting the 
planned-economy system set up by the government, but enterprises should 
not depend on it (Speech of Guo Chunguang, recorded in Wang Y., 1991). 
His vision for the paper mill initiated a wave of reforms. In his reform campaign, 
he used the political rhetoric, yibao erbukao, or literally ‘first to support [the state] and 
second to free [from the state]’. This attitude to the government mixed concepts during 
the reform age (especially in the early 1990s)— moralism mixed with pragmatism. In the 
past, these two concepts were hierarchical: being loyal to the party-state was more 
important than being pragmatic for one’s business. However, the new rhetoric was 
critical of the old model, citing the ineffectiveness of being blindly loyal to the 
government . 
The expression chuangguan also rippled out from the ideological and managerial 
levels of the paper mill to the community’s everyday life. The rhetorical power was fully 
utilised by the government in its propaganda strategy. Many workers were involved in 
Beijing First Paper Mill’s discussions of how to make breakthroughs during the reform 
period. A conservative worker wrote an article in Beijing Daily entitled ‘Hearts We Align 
with our Party, Guarantees We Promise to Break through Barriers’ (Zhenfen Zhigong, 
1990). In his article, the worker criticised the mentality of workers who blindly followed 
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the Western business model but did not recognise the specificity of the local environment 
of China; moreover, some other workers spent too much time thinking and talking instead 
of working. Undoubtedly, the counterattack from the reform side took the position that 
learning from the modernity of the West would bring efficiency to China’s development. 
Having this kind of debate during the reform period was inevitable. One thing was clear: 
the society’s transformation was spreading from the topmost political layers right down 
to the lowest social classes. 
Three Private Bosses in the Paper Mill 
The workers developed strategies to attempt to adapt to the totally new societal 
structure of the market economy in even more radical ways than the small-scale 
businesses that I described above. During the overall economic downturn in the 1990s, 
some of the paper mill’s production lines, especially those for the high-end paper 
products, were stopped to minimise daily operating costs. Consequently, three hundred 
workers belonging to those production lines had to seek other available tasks in the paper 
mill. It was reported that these workers were encouraged to submit their own proposals 
for new tasks (Changlingdao Caiman, 1990). Many proposals were submitted, and fifty-
four were approved by the management. These proposals comprised three new areas: 
tasks originally belonging to outsourced companies (e.g. the packaging of the paper 
products); the construction and repair of facilities, such as a new public bath; and the 
creation of steel and wood workshops to service the community. These innovative ideas 
was highly praised by the media; however, these new projects only helped a relatively 
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small amount of people—most of the three hundred workers had to leave the paper mill 
and find other ways to survive. 
What did people think about these new developments and about these drastic 
changes to their lives and working conditions? In the Chinese perspective, the term xiahai 
has a negative connotation, referring to someone who gives up his or her moral standards 
and acts materialistically.83 In a more practical sense, the term also implies giving up a 
relatively easy situation and entering an area of uncertainty. It is interesting that the 
description of this practice can also be perceived as creative. The opposite of xiahai is 
daguofan (giant wok fire) or tiefanwan (iron rice bowl). The former is a metaphor for a 
system of collective responsibility and the latter is a metaphor for the stability and 
security of the job. The concepts of daguofan and tiefanwan both imply a lack of 
motivation to work. Workers believed that the lack of motivation was a legacy from 
socialist collectivism, because resources were distributed on the basis of collective, and 
not individual, effort, so no one wanted to contribute more than was necessary.84 
Siren Laoban 
The large-scale xiahai movement in the paper mill did not start until several 
stories of successes in the private market were disseminated throughout the community. 
These stories proved that xiahai was more favourable than daguofan. In other words, 
                                                 
83. Timothy Brook (1999, 28-29) also suggested that there is a moral ambiguity about 
wealth in the Confucian ethical system; thus working for wealth was questionable in 
Confucian times. He also pointed out that even in the reform age, Confucianism’s 
critique of wealth was applicable, especially for the elites. 
84. For more research about the culture of China’s state-owned enterprises and the 
concept of daguofan, see Chiu & Lewis (2006, Chapter 1 and 2) and A. K. Ho (2004, 
Chapter 5). 
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through the spreading of successful stories of some pioneers ‘jumping into the sea’, the 
notion of individual inventiveness was developed. 
The Capital Economic Information Post and Beijing Evening Post reported three 
stories about the paper mill community in 1993 (Baxian Guohai, 1993; Beijing First 
Paper Mill, 1993). The first story was about the head of the marketing department of the 
paper mill, Yu Zaixian. Zaixian transformed his department to a private marketing firm. 
Instead of only working for the paper mill, he also obtained external projects from other 
paper mills. His own private business immediately expanded nationwide. In 1992, he had 
a 170,000 yuan quota to meet at the factory. In 1993, his private company planned to 
make 5,000,000 yuan in addition to the required quota from the paper mill. 
The second story was about the manager of the supply department, Zhao Jinxing. 
In 1993, Jinxing also established his own business using existing personal connections 
from the paper mill and his experience and expertise. He hired a team of new staff and 
expanded the original business of the department from only supplying raw materials to 
the paper mill to supplying all factories in Beijing. Jinxing realised the constraints of the 
planned economy and of the centralised-instruction business model. In the past, Beijing 
First Paper Mill had only asked him to trade with selected companies, but in his private 
business he could choose among many other companies to locate the best materials at the 
lowest prices. For Jinxing, this change was not only about autonomy in decision-making 
but also about efficiency and profitability. He did not disappoint other people. The first 
month’s profits were already able to cover the start-up costs of the company. After the 
second month, he invested all the profits to purchase his own minivans for business use. 
In the interview, he claimed he achieved his next milestone—paying back the 360,000 
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yuan he had borrowed from the paper mill—a goal he achieved within three months. 
Then the company could truly become his property. As one of the first innovators of the 
market economy, Jinxing not only earned his own diyitong jin (first bucket of gold), a 
popular idiom describing initial business success in China, but his company also helped 
the paper mill save 220,000 yuan per month due to his efficient management (Ji W., 1993; 
Xiaohecailu Jianjian, 1993). 
The third story is about the most successful case. The starting point was almost 
the same as the first two. Chang Jiantai, the manager of the transportation department of 
the paper mill, contracted from the paper mill his own department and started his own 
transportation company, which he named after himself.85 He and his business partner, 
Wang Shaojun, invested 50,000 yuan to contract the transportation department from the 
paper mill. The transportation department originally lost 40,000 to 50,000 yuan a month. 
The transportation department used to have a serious deficit because the paper mill’s 
manufacturing activities were slowing down. Sixty per cent of the work in the 
transportation department was lost due to this reason. However, the tiefanwan (iron rice 
bowl) management model required the enterprise to take care of the workers even though 
there was not enough business. Therefore, workers in the transportation department 
became the burdens of the enterprise. 
At the beginning, Jiantai and his partner rented all twenty-five trucks and the three 
3,000 square meters space from the paper mill. In the contract, they also promised to 
                                                 
85. By contracting, the workers needed to contribute an agreed amount of profit to the 
paper mill. This management model, but on a smaller scale, was already introduced in the 
earlier part of this chapter about the worker who ran his own business at the restaurant in 
the early 1990s. 
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contribute 4,000 yuan annually to the paper mill. In an interview, Jiantai described his 
decision as xiashenhai (jumping into the deepest sea). This expression showed his 
commitment to his decision. On 18 February, 1993, his application to privatise the 
transportation firm was approved by the Beijing Bureau of Commerce. He then set to 
work on his business. Immediately after Jintai’s success, his business model and his story 
spread to the workers’ community. He was reported to be a businessman as famous as the 
paper mill’s president, Guo Chunguang. He was the first successful business operator to 
be called ‘siren laoban’ (private boss) by the community members in the paper mill 
(Zhang L. G., 1994). 
In his private company, another level of business existed further down the line 
because trucks were also rented out by individual drivers. These workers needed to 
maintain the vehicles and seek out their own tasks. By his estimate, according to the 
condition of the vehicles, the monthly contracting payment varied from 2,700 to 3,200 
yuan. Other than that, drivers also needed to take responsibility for fuel, maintenance fees 
and taxes. The remaining profit belonged to the individual drivers (Wang Y. X., 1994).86 
Forced to Jump into the Sea 
The privatisation movements led by the three department managers were 
surrounded by voices of praise, but they also had their critics. Many workers at the 
beginning could not adapt to the new, self-motivated system. The reason was explained 
by the local newspaper: they perceived the contracting idea as a risky and long-term 
                                                 
86. Other stories about China’s state enterprise reform and individual adaptation can also 
be found in You (1998, especially chapter 11); Xiao (2004, 92-134); Lin, Cai and Li 
(2001) and Hassard (2007, especially Part Three). 
 196 
 
adaptation to the new life. They also complained about the heavier pressures resulting 
from the new work responsibilities (Zhang L. G., 1994). An article at that time reported 
this in the China Youth Post: 
Although the model of ‘state owned, privately operated’ is not new to our 
society, workers still need to change their attitude. They have to shift from 
only working for the socialist party-state to serving a ‘private boss’. Some 
of the workers cannot change their psychology to adapt to the new 
pressures. Moreover, other than facing heavier workloads and more tiring 
tasks, it is also possible for workers to lose their secure iron rice bowl. 
Therefore, many of them have expressed their concerns. For those drivers 
belonging to the original transportation department, if they have not joined 
the new private company, they would need to change their profession. One 
can interpret this as rehiring, but one can also say that these people were 
forced to jump on board (Zhang L. G.,1994). 
The case of the transportation department was the most thorough privatisation of 
the paper mill. The first siren laoban (private boss) I introduced above, Jintai, also 
expressed his concerns in an interview with China Youth Post (Zhang L. G., 1994). The 
origin of his pressures was different from that of the workers; whereas the workers 
thought they were forced to jump on board, Jintai still needed to face the harsh reality of 
managing one hundred workers, twenty-five trucks, and the 100,000 yuan per month of 
rental fees for the paper mill. He also mentioned that, to survive, pressures needed to be 
overcome, and all possible resources to be exploited. 
At the end of the first month of the new transportation company, the workers’ 
concerns were eliminated as they saw their monthly salary triple, from 300 to 1,000 yuan. 
A particularly hardworking worker even earned as much as 4,000 yuan in one month. The 
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complaints and criticisms ceased. A community newspaper editor explained that the 
workers had finally found their “psychological balance point” (Zhang L. G., 1994). The 
opportunity to join the private transportation company was envied by the rest of the 
worker community, many of whom would like to take on more risk to transform their 
lives. So, any newly created vacancies in the private company were quickly filled up by 
others from the factory community. 
Competition was introduced by the new management model; the contracting 
system helped to raise the motivation of the workers to better maintain company 
equipment; by the end of 1993, almost one year after the establishment of the company, 
Jintai contributed a 400,000 yuan contracting fee to the paper mill, made a profit of 
50,000 yuan, and purchased a crane costing 220,000 yuan. On top of all of this, the 
company managed to pay salaries of an average of 60 per cent above their previous 
wages to 140 workers.  
Xiahai of the Communist Party 
The movement of xiahai was also irresistible to the party-state. The concept of 
xiahai applied not only to individuals but also to entire government departments. The 
government’s propaganda department also needed to change its working model. 
Originally, the propaganda department’s only responsibilities were to run the 
communism- and patriotism-education programs in the workers’ community. One 
propaganda cadre of the paper mill explained that the responsibility of the propaganda 
department of the paper mill was to create a bridge between the grassroots workers and 
the company. This process included collecting information from the workers’ community 
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for the company’s decision-makers, molding the psychology of the workers, transmitting 
ideological instructions to the workers, and other related tasks (Wang Y. X., 1994). 
Representing the party-state, the propaganda department was the invisible second core of 
the power in the organisation. 
While workers were struggling to adapt to the new social system, the paper mill’s 
own propaganda department also announced its plans to change its role within the 
company. Beginning in the early 1990s, the propaganda department started to handle the 
paper mill’s public relations as well as advertising and marketing the company’s products. 
In 1992, the department organised the first client-company comment exchange forum, in 
which the customers of the paper mill were invited to talk to the enterprise leadership. 
The event’s aim was to maintain positive relationships with old clients while also 
approaching new clients (Liu S. Y., 1993). To fulfil the new demands of the market, staff 
members in the propaganda department were asked to learn new skills, including graphic 
design, photography and journalism. Today, the propaganda department still incorporates 
the political agenda of the party-state and the marketing activity of the paper mill.87 
Operated by People 
An article about the transformations of the paper mill community entitled ‘Bigger 
Boats Are Harder to Turn Around’ explained the general attitude towards enterprises like 
the paper mill (Gao W., 1993).Workers generally believed that larger enterprises would 
                                                 
87. The emergence of those contracting and privatisation mechanisms was not only a 
reaction from the workers’ community, but also a larger-scale reform movement called 
‘Learning from Shougang’. I will discuss this political movement and its implications for 
the role model following practice of the Chinese in the next chapter.  
 199 
 
face more severe challenges during the social transformation. The three successful stories 
above, which illustrated how privatisation of parts of the enterprise improved the life of 
workers, were exceptional cases. In general, the management of the paper mill suffered 
from the new social system. Moreover, Beijing First Paper Mill was only one of the cases 
in Beijing’s Light Industry Bureau (Liang Y., 1993). The vice-president of the paper mill, 
Wang Xi, explained the attempt in a newspaper interview: 
The mechanism we are operating with is called ‘owned by and operated by 
the people [guoyou minying]’. This means that if we are able to contribute 
sufficient taxation to our senior- level enterprise, the Beijing Light Industry 
Bureau, we can keep the remaining profit. We can use the resources from 
the state, but we are responsible for all its expenses. If we can put this new 
concept into practice, our society will make a big jump. After 
implementing this system, two-thirds of our labour power, which was 
originally idle, is fully utilised. So, on the one hand, the state’s income can 
be guaranteed; on the other hand, private firms and those drivers can 
legally earn their own money with their hardwork. Why would we not do 
this (Liang Y., 1993)? 
The president of the paper mill, Guo Chunguang, also agreed with the attitude of 
his staff. He used Deng Xiaoping’s idea of economic special zones as a metaphor for the 
situation at the paper mill. In a newspaper interview, he explained how privatised units in 
the paper mill were like special zones in China (Si, 1993).88 These administrative regimes 
were benefiting from special and beneficial policies. Autonomy in economic special 
zones provided the advantages of such special policies to speed up regional development. 
                                                 
88. The privatisation phenomenon was described as breaking down of the large-scale 
management model of the factory to micro ‘tequ’ (special zones). 
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Just as with policy changes within the paper mill, good and timely policy reform, 
generally from the autonomous management, could help to bring hopes to the industry as 
a whole. In addition, Guo Chunguang also found that, before the reform, workers had 
already worked on their own to earn extra money toutou-momo (under the table) (Si, 
1993). So the reform was not a purely managerial policy but also a response to a desire 
from the workers. Guo Chungguang mentioned in the same interview that the new policy 
therefore allowed workers to gongkaide (openly) establish their second careers through 
their own hardwork (So, 1993). 
The case of Beijing First Paper Mill was recognised by Beijing’s Light Industry 
Bureau. Beijing First Paper Mill was also touted as a model for other enterprises to 
follow (Liang Y., 1993). Beijing’s municipal government, including the Bureau of 
Commerce and the Bureau of Transportation, all expressed their encouragement of the 
kind of transformation that had taken place at Beijing First Paper Mill (Shi, 1993). 
Mentioned in the interview with the vice chairman, this model was named gouyou 
minying (Figure 61), or literally ‘state owned, privately operated’. Soon after the Beijing 
First Paper Mill’s changes in 1993, the stories in the paper mill became the model and 
were disseminated to other enterprises (Zhang L. G., 1994).89 
The popularisation of privatisation brought dramatic changes to the lives of many 
workers. However, just like the tequ  (special economic zone) metaphor used by Guo  
                                                 
89. This slogan was ‘国有资产，私人经营；交足资金，多收归己；内外结合，灵活
经营；财产抵押，风险自负’ in Chinese, which means “Operating state’s asset by 
private entities; obtaining extra income after paying the rent; integrating internal and 
external resource for flexible management; mortgaging properties and being responsible 
for investment risk.” 
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Figure 61: Article on the new business model in China (Liang Y., 1993).’Owned by the 
state, operated by the people, the birth of a new enterprise reform model’. (Image 
captured from Shi, 1993). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Chunguang, the transformation only benefited a selected minority of people who used to 
have more power in the paper mill. 
Guoyou minying (owned by the state and operated by the people) reveals the 
mechanisms of the decentralisation: (a) property is owned by the state but the individual 
is allowed to utilise the property for business; (b) the individual is responsible for the 
contracting fee and is allowed to keep the remaining profit; (c) private units are allowed 
to work on both internal, state-owned enterprise tasks as well as external projects; and (d) 
private property should be insured to compensate the risks of private businesses. 
The aim behind this system was to further decentralise the control of social 
resources to the people. With a less centralised administrative influence, contractors 
gained more autonomy and freedom to modify their business models, which helped them 
adapt to a rapidly transforming social and market structure. An annual or monthly 
contracting fee guaranteed the income of the state-owned enterprises and also generated 
motivation among workers because of the higher salaries. In 1993, the highest monthly 
salary in a privatised unit in the paper-mill community was recorded to be as much as 
4,000 yuan, which was more than ten times a regular worker’s salary. In Capital 
Economic Information Post and China Youth Post, it was explained respectively that 
The main body of economic activity has been shifted from the government 
to private enterprises, and the method of distributing resources has been 
shifted from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy. But there 
are still a number of enterprises handicapped by the old ideas and habits. 
They only talk about their ideals with old dictums. This is why there are 
still many large-scale enterprises unable to carry on an in-depth reform (Si, 
1993). 
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The social-welfare system has been threatened. . . . In China, commercial 
policy, the banking system, and the taxation system were still immature. 
But more importantly, a value-appraisal system of state-owned properties 
was absent…Therefore, the consequences of such institutional changes 
will be that the real value of state-owned property, amount of mortgage, 
and amount of deposit cannot be judged fairly…The control of personal 
salaries will become problematic in the future as well (Liang Y., 1993). 
Debates emerged again in the workers’ community. The reform side criticised 
what they called the closed-mind mentality of the conservatives. The conservative side 
was concerned about the influence of the privatisation of the social-welfare system. 
Again, considering the overall societal trend of the reform atmosphere in China at that 
time; the reform campaign won the debate. However, privatisation could not help many 
workers. The majority of them were laid off from the paper mill during the reform 
process. They could not find new jobs in the more competitive and knowledge-based 
free-market society.  
The development of the real estate market also contributed to the decline of the 
enterprise. In 2000, the management of Beijing First Paper Mill decided to sell its 
industrial land to a private developer for 800 million yuan (Zhang Lian, personal 
communication, 29 July, 2009). The value of the land was seriously underestimated due 
to the immature real estate market at that time.  
Alongside what was once an historically glorious enterprise, a new internationally 
prominent architectural project was to be constructed: the future Linked Hybrid. We can 
now clearly see how the entire social and economic situation, and many of the old 
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surviving Chinese concepts and notions and traditions, as well as all the new concepts 
and notions that were being developed and disseminated at the time, are all highly 
relevant to the future project of Linked Hybrid, whose production, development, 
inhabitation and use this thesis explores. Its fortunes, which are intertwined with its 
contexts, cannot be understood without those contexts, which form the topic of this 
research and shape its methods of research. 
Xingshi in an Internal Article of the Paper Mill 
An internal document of Beijing First Paper Mill (2009), entitled ‘Research to 
Respond to the Current Transforming Xingshi’ (developmental trend), analysed directions 
for the future development of the enterprise (Figure 62). This internal article was written 
in 2009 as an open letter from the paper mill to all of the workers in the paper mill. 
During that time, the paper mill was facing serious problems due to its insufficient 
competitiveness in the market economy. Moreover, after leaving the original site in the 
Dongzhimenwai area, Beijing First Paper Mill moved to an industrial development zone 
in Beijing’ suburbs in Shunyi. The company’s business also shrank to only processing 
some semi-finished products. The number of workers decreased from approximately 
3000 people in the late 1990s to around 300 people.  
About all these facts, the author of ‘Research to Respond to the Current 
Transforming Xingshi’ argued that the factory’s decline was related to the transformation 
of China’s market environment triggered by the global financial crisis. Moreover, 
reforming the factory was the only way to keep up with the larger societal trend. 
According to the article, the enterprise tried to first understand the large-scale 
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Figure 62: The internal article of the paper mill. The highlighted characters are xingshi. 
(Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009).  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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developments in society and then to adjust its own position to them. This specific way of 
thinking is called xingshi, or simply shi, which suggests a culture of compliance and 
manipulation in both ancient and contemporary China. The internal article continued to 
explain the xingshi of the factory: 
From the third quarter of last year until now, the unpredictable hurricane 
of the financial crisis dispersed rapidly throughout the world, and it 
triggered increasing uncertainty about the global economy. Because of the 
new financial policies, the economic development of our country is 
influenced by the global financial crisis seriously. Compared to the rest of 
the world, the development of China’s economic system is rapid and the 
mechanism behind the market becomes more complicated. Especially for 
those grassroots enterprises in the new competitive market, the rapid 
changes may influence their potential and sustainability. Learning from 
scientific development [kexuefazhan guan], factors from both the macro 
level of society and the local scale of individual enterprise should be 
understood. Thus, problems can be discovered, corresponding measures 
can be taken, and opportunities can be found in crises. The most important 
task is to maintain the development tendency [xingshi] of the enterprise. 
To do that, the management of the paper mill conducted research to 
understand our current situation and potential problems and predict the 
future development. The research is based on scientific development and 
the central government’s instructions. By synthesising the implications of 
this research and the historical development trends of the enterprise, the 
management reached a consensus about the new model of business, new 
model of development, and new model of management (Beijing First 
Paper Mill, 2009, 1). 
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Two pieces of evidence were provided to convince the public that Chinese society 
as a whole was transforming as a result of global dynamics, namely the international 
financial crisis and the national change in China’s market structure. The former dynamic 
was new and unpredictable, so it was beyond the control of the factory management; the 
latter trend was a problem that the factory had faced since the early 1990s but had yet to 
solve. Both trends suggested an urgent need to re-evaluate the current business model at 
the paper mill. The internal article suggested that the strategy to mend the situation was to 
make the best of the factory’s current development potential and maintain its ability to 
adapt to changes in the future. Therefore, the letter’s strategy directly responded to the 
challenge of the increasing complexity of the market. Losing the potentiality or 
dynamism to change the enterprise’s structure would have meant an incapability to adapt 
to any further change in the larger environment of the market.  
From the above excerpt of the internal article from the newspaper of the paper 
mill, we can further analyse the Chinese way of thinking. A few important ideas can be 
found in the internal article in this regard. First, the environment is always dynamic and 
transforming. Secondly, the way to survive in such environment is to adapt to the changes. 
Thirdly, being unable to adapt to changes in the larger-scale environment has been a 
fundamental challenge for businesses as they try to adapt to China’s new market 
economy. In the next section, I explain how these ideas construct a particular way of 
thinking in China. 
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Shi Philosophy 
I will use the Chinese philosophy of shi to further understand these 
transformations and adaptations. The Chinese philosophy of shi will, later on in the thesis, 
help to also explain many contemporary community actions and reactions, thus proving 
evidence of its relevance. François Jullien (1995) explored native Chinese philosophies. 
His study is a central reference in my study of Linked Hybrid. Therefore, I will discuss 
his work at some length. Jullien analysed the character shi, or 势, to understand the 
Chinese conceptualization of the relationship between social structure and individuals. 
The meaning of the shi character is manifold and includes ideas of position, 
circumstances, power, and potential. Jullien (1995, 17) describes the ambiguous, 
ambivalent, and transformative characters of Chinese culture as “a configuration or 
disposition of things operating through opposition and correlation”. His description 
suggests that Chinese culture is a process of transformation and implies a strategy to 
manipulate the process. This method becomes a guide for understanding the daily 
practices of Chinese people in different levels of society. Zhu (2004) applied this idea to 
explain the spatial organization of imperial Chinese urbanism. In Zhu’s study, he used the 
philosophy of shi to explain the intangible power behind different type of spaces in the 
imperial Chinese city. But Zhu’s study only connected the ideas in the shi philosophy 
with the imperial spatial organisation. I will apply Jullien’s ideas about this important 
Chinese philosophy to the design of urban spaces in our contemporary age. 
It is important to know that shi originated from ancient Chinese military and 
strategic philosophy. Jullien synthesized arguments from different scholars and 
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concluded that this way of thinking is different from the strategic philosophy of the West. 
Jullien compared styles of wars between ancient China  and ancient Greece:  
[The Chinese strategy] aimed to use every possible means to influence the 
potential inherent in the forces to its own advantage, even before the 
actual engagement, so that the engagement would never constitute a 
decisive moment, whereas the Greeks took an ‘all or nothing’ strategy of 
pitched battle (Jullien, 1995, 35). 
In other words, the Chinese perspective emphasised what comes before the action, that is, 
its context, whereas the Greek perspective emphasised the action itself. The case of 
Linked Hybrid, as we will see, shows that Jullien’s idea can help us to understand the 
sources of the desire for speed in urban developments, the production of massive and 
visionary plans, and why the Chinese do not care to evaluate the results of urban 
developments.  
The Origin of the Shi Philosophy 
Jullien (1995) searched for the origins of the shi philosophy. He suggested that 
this warfare philosophy was introduced in the fourth-century B.C. by the military 
strategist Sunzi. Extending from a purely military strategy, shi also operated on the 
political and social levels afterwards. The definitions of the shi character discussed 
above—position and circumstances, power and potential—indicate two different ways of 
conceptualizing the environment. In the environmental or cosmological sense, the 
Chinese believe that the existence of objects and individuals is based on their relations to 
other objects or individuals or to collectives of objects or individuals. Thus we can 
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understand that the Chinese concept of human agency involves relationships to others and 
to collectives of individuals. Jullien’s analysis of shi is supported by the guanxi and 
mianzi social practices of individuals in the making of Linked Hybrid, which I introduced 
in the previous chapters.  
Legalism (Fajia) and Confucianism (Rujia) were two main philosophical 
institutes in ancient China. They, however, held very different interpretations of the 
concept of shi and of the relationships between large-scale social structures and 
individual agency. As Jullien (1995, 44-45) argued, Confucianism believed that the 
authority and power of rulers were heavenly mandates, whereas Legalism believed that 
authority and power were assigned by rulers to  themselves. Due to the effectiveness of 
the Legalist’s governance, Confucianism, which projected a moral utopia constructed 
only with loyalty, love and ethics, underwent several compromises.90 One compromise 
was the acceptance of shi to create a smoother and more efficient hierarchical system, 
while maintaining the superiority of the wisdom of shi. 
Extension of the Shi Discussion 
The unification of China as one cultural system and sovereign entity required 
totalitarian control from the Legalist strategy; but the management of this unified but 
complex entity required the sophisticated bureaucratic system of the Confucian moralist 
tradition. Once these two philosophical traditions combined to work together, the shi 
notion of foreseeing tendencies of development formed a complex social system in China. 
                                                 
90. This supports my argument that mianzi has two layers of intentions: a superficial 
layer about moralism and harmony, and an implicit layer about strategy and practicality. 
 211 
 
Thus shi is a mixture of the compliance that is characteristic of Confucianism and the 
tactical approach of the Legalist perspective. Jullien (1995) used three metaphors to 
illustrate the difference between the early Confucian moralist perspective, the early 
Legalist tactical perspective, and a hybrid of the two. In a purely Confucian perspective, 
how fast the chariot, representing sovereignty or society, runs depends more on how good 
the driver is, hence the morality of the authority, than on how good the horse is, that is 
the political position and shi. In a purely Legalist perspective, if a horse-team is good, it 
is pointless to wait for a supremely gifted driver. However, the integration of the two 
perspectives would requires a good driver with moral standards who also knows how to 
handle the reins and the horses.  
Jullien’s translation of shi is ‘situation-tendency’ (Jullien, 1995, 117). This 
translation suggests two important elements in shi: the actual situation and its tendency. 
These two elements echo the term, xingshi, used in the internal article from the paper mill 
(Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009): xing refers to a real situation, while shi means the 
possible tendency of the situation. But before further analysing shi in relation to Linked 
Hybrid, I will summarise some important points from Jullian’s writing about shi, mainly 
from his book Propensity and Things (1995). 
First, Jullien argues that the Chinese believe that there is an irresistible tendency 
in events, called shi. Secondly, on the one hand, Confucianism asserts the irresistibility of 
this developing tendency by suggesting the concept of ‘heavenly mandate’. On the other 
hand, Legalism asserts that individual wisdom can manipulate the developing tendency. 
So, in other words, Confucianism prevents the individual agency, but Legalism advocates 
it. Thirdly, the ultimate goal of individuals and society is to obtain both efficiency and 
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effectiveness by following shi, or shunshi in Chinese. Fourthly, the dynamic view of 
society negates the concept of human agency, or in Jullien’s words, the shi concept 
‘dehumanises’ power in society (Jullien, 1995, 54). To elaborate, power according to shi 
does not belong to agents but to positions in the power system. Fifthly, this position of 
power is relational. This means that an official political position does not necessarily give 
power. Power does not require an official political position. The Chinese concept of 
guanxi, which I introduced in Chapter 2, explains the relational idea behind this power 
system. In Chapter 2, the housing manager Qiu Lai obtained power due to his personal 
relationships with people that were more powerful. His power did not come inherently 
from his position as the housing manager but through those relationships. This means that 
a new housing manager would have to cultivate relational power instead of automatically 
obtaining power by working as the manager. Finally, the Legalist perspective constructs 
shi philosophy as the art of manipulation or a philosophy of tactics.  
In the discussion above, shi, or in Jullian’s words the situation-tendency, also 
conceptualises the social system in everyday living. There are always two levels to this 
structure, local and global. For the paper mill, the business environment is global and the 
structure of the enterprise is local. The local scale for a manager is the enterprise but the 
local scale for a worker is his family or himself. Global-scale shi is uncontrollable, but 
local-scale shi is controllable through mechanisms that control less-powerful individuals. 
In other words, the use of the collective is the most effective way to manipulate local shi.  
Because power depends on positions with a higher potential to adapt to the 
tendencies in the social structure, the concept of agency in the Chinese context refers to a 
set of strategies and tactics to obtain certain positions in the imaginary social structure 
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and to predict the next best position following the shi tendency. In this sense means, one 
improves survival by manipulating and following tendencies. 
Shi for Persuasion, Justification and Manipulation 
In this section, I will show how an internal research report document published by 
Beijing First Paper Mill (2009) uses shi as rhetoric to convey persuasive ideas and 
arguments. The target readers of this research report were a specific group of 
management staff. In the document, the author first identified the shi in the global 
environment because it was always the driving force for the transformation of shi on the 
local scale. The document’s contents involved speculation of the future development 
tendency in Chinese society and suggestions of ways to transform the factory to adapt to 
this trend. I will conclude with three uses of shi. 
In 2002, three significant events took place in the workers’ community. The first 
event occurred when the factory gave up its production component and turned its focus to 
processing, packaging and marketing. The second event happened when the factory 
eliminated all of the production- line machines. The third occurred when the factory 
moved its industrial site to the new airport development zone to allow for the 
development of the Linked Hybrid private estate. The transformation process from the 
old to the new factory sites and the change in the operational model was described by the 
Beijing First Paper Mill’s internal document (2009) as “smooth” and “encouraging”.91 
                                                 
91. During the transformation, it was reported that the overall income of the factory was 
72 million yuan in 2004 and the figure doubled in 2005. In 2006 and 2007, it reached its 
apex at 400 million yuan. In 2008, this figure dropped slightly to 330 million yuan. The 
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The success of the transformation of the factory was justified by new policies that were 
well adapted to the development tendency of the overall transformation of Chinese 
society. The advantages of coping with the society’s transformation tendencies did not 
only bring an increase of income but also better-qualified personnel and staff. This 
included dealing with the low morale of existing workers and attracting a team of staff 
with higher educational backgrounds. How was shi used in these circumstances, because 
shi is not limited to the philosophical justification of ancient Chinese strategists? It can 
also be applied to commonly used rhetoric in everyday communications. 
Shi for Persuasion 
In the internal document, the paper mill considered that its size was one of the 
most important youshi (advantages) to be exploited. The author tried to persuade the 
readers that the factory could expand along with the market: this idea was called ‘da 
shichang da wuye’ (big market, big enterprise property) (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 
2). By big market, the author was referring to the factory exploiting the expanding 
tendency of the demand for new and special paper products and their classic Sanyi 
copier-machine paper. By big enterprise property, the author was referring to the ability 
of the new factory site to exploit the potential of the new economic zone’s proximity to 
the airport and to the new National Exhibition Centre. Following this thinking, the 
factory management decided to construct a new tower on their new campus for business 
related to the National Exhibition Centre.  
                                                                                                                                                 
slight decrease of the overall income was explained in the article by the poor general 
economic atmosphere brought by the global financial crisis (Beijing First Paper Mill, 
2009, 3).  
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The practice of shi involves foreseeing emergent developments and rapidly 
responding to those anticipated trends. Therefore, actions should be taken before 
situations actually occur. In this sense, the concept of youshi is the anticipation of the 
global environment and an instrument to persuade changes at the local level. The reason 
behind the predictions for the future development of the site was threefold.  
First, even though the economic benefit from the proximity to the airport had not 
yet been realised and the exhibition centre was still under construction, the management 
believed that the area had good potential for development.  
Secondly, according to the dynamic understanding of shi, once maximum 
dynamism has been achieved (in this case, the full development of the area triggered by 
the airport and the completion of the exhibition centre), the potential for development 
will already have been missed. Consequently, it would be too late to make use of the 
global-scale development trend to influence local-scale development.  
Thirdly, the best time to make changes at the local level is before the global 
development trend has actually formed. This was why the factory management decided to 
construct the new building. However, before reaching the top of the development trend, 
the management should also have had an idea about where the next-to-be developmental 
trend was heading. By so doing, managements can always gear their approaches to the 
next-to-be development trends. 
Shi for Justification 
In another section of the same internal document (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009), 
the author wrote about the ‘hopes and vision’ of the paper mill. He argued that many 
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measures were needed to realise some jieduanxing mubiao (interim objectives) of the 
sustainable development of the enterprise. For timely objective, the author used the term 
shi to justify the problems in the paper mill’s management. Given that shi practice never 
follows a straight route to solve problems of inadaptability, sacrifice of small benefits to 
facilitate a comprehensive and common good is generally viewed as a reasonable strategy. 
In the document, the author describes three issues that could potentially limit the further 
development of the paper mill: (a) the inadaptability of older workers and the 
inexperience of the newer generation of managers, (b) an out-dated management model, 
and (c) under-qualified staff for the new stage. 
The first problem was the inadaptability of the mentality and the attitude of the 
current workers. The document explained that it was not only the old-generation 
personnel who could not fully adapt to the new market system, but also the young staff 
who occupied important positions in the management. The old generation was criticised 
for continuing to hold out-dated working attitudes and mentalities from before China’s 
social and economic transformation. They were considered inert, lacking in ambition in 
their work at the paper mill, limited to following instructions from the senior 
management, and not actively seeking out new opportunities on their own.92 In contrast, 
the young generation of management staff were criticised for lacking real-life experience 
in society. These workers only knew about theories from textbooks. They were also 
                                                 
92. The document exemplified the argument by research conducted by the management 
to show how old-generation managers were ignorant of the new market system. Old-
generation management were asked to differentiate the concept of xiaoshou (selling)—a 
conventional passive process to promote the product—and yingxiao (marketing)—an 
interactive and active program to promote the product. Unfortunately, many of them 
could not differentiate these two ideas. 
 217 
 
relatively idealistic about their workplace. However, when their ideas collided with the 
reality of the competitive market, their ideas became useless and inadaptable, even 
though they showed more initiative than those from the older generation. The author of 
the report used another example to illustrate his argument. Some of these young staff 
members were asked to conduct research on the situation of the market. Instead of the 
accepted way of going out to observe and understand the reality, their whole research 
report was done on the internet. Strategies were also proposed that were based on 
knowledge from their textbooks and their ideas. The second problem was the old-
fashioned management model, which was unable to keep up with the overall 
development trend in the larger society. The document stated that even though the 
management of the paper mill had already anticipated the necessity to upgrade the quality 
of the staff to keep up with the transformation of the society, many of the measures to 
achieve this goal only existed on paper. These measures included reforms of the staff 
evaluation system, a target-oriented management system, and a performance-based 
rewards system. The last problem was caused by the loss of elites due to shrinking 
personnel and the relocation of the factory to the countryside. Newly hired staff lacked 
suitable talents and qualifications, and some experienced old workers were on the verge 
of retirement. 
Shi suggests the idea of xunxu jianjin: the emphasis on a gradual, step-by-step 
strategy, instead of one-off total change. This also echoes the Confucian ideology against 
being too extreme and radical. The three problems mentioned above were caused by the 
inadaptability of the factory management to the larger social and economic environments. 
Shi rhetoric attempts to persuade critically from a pure instrumental perspective and is 
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often prioritised over other arguments. For example, in the author’s discussion of the lack 
of motivation in the old generation and the unpractical ideas of the new generation, the 
mistakes of both generations were not justified by professionalism or other ethical 
standards; instead, the author pointed out that these behaviours were simply not 
compatible with the overall development trend in society. 
Shi for Manipulation 
The inability to follow the development tendency of the larger society is an 
important problem. If the paper mill’s management could not solve this problem 
immediately or prevent the factory’s deterioration, the gap between the local and the 
global tendencies would become wider. In addition, because the global tendency is 
always transforming, staying the same at the local level also means straying further from 
the global trend. As the Beijing First Paper Mill internal document mentioned, the ideas 
of kuai (speed) and shi (concreteness) (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 4) are very 
important.93 The articles suggested several solutions for achieving speed and 
concreteness. 
On the individual level, management cadres, especially those with a Communist 
Party background, were asked to further liberalise their thinking. More symposiums and 
discussion panels had to be organised to understand and zhangwo (manipulate) the 
conditions and mind-set of the workers towards the development tendency. The proposal 
for events was diverse. First, the events would provide a platform for those with 
                                                 
93. This shi (实) is a different Chinese character than Jullien’s research about shi (势). 
The two characters share the same pronunciation in Chinese. 
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management backgrounds to discuss the new ideology behind developing the paper mill 
with the younger generation. Secondly, the events could also provide suggestions to 
overcome challenges in the new development tendencies of the larger society. Finally, 
through communication between the management and the workers, there would be a 
unified effort towards future development. 
At the company level, a more complete institutional system needed to be 
introduced and more resources had to be invested in the education of the staff. This could 
help all workers adapt to the new development trend in China. In terms of the 
institutional system, a mechanism of dissemination of central instruction had to be 
developed. Once the management released new policies or measures to different 
departments, department staff needed to interpret the ideas into text and disseminate them 
to workers. A new evaluation system would help to assess the quality of all staff to 
reorganise their roles and duties in the paper mill, and a new reward system could help 
motivate workers (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 4). In terms of education investment, a 
large survey was conducted to understand the quality of marketing personnel and to 
prepare suitable training for the workers. The education program was considered good for 
both individual workers and the enterprise as a whole (Beijing First Paper Mill, 2009, 4). 
The key of the training program was to teach the workers how to adapt to the new ‘big 
market, big enterprise’ development tendency in the larger society.  
In general, the training solutions focused on a single idea: forming a unified 
behaviour within the factory’s labour force to adapt to the global scale of transformation 
in the country. The shi rhetoric emphasises the art of control because the Chinese believe 
that only through creating a massive collective consensus in society can the 
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developmental tendency, or shi, be controlled. The global-scale collective behaviour of 
Chinese society was beyond the control of the paper mill’s management; however, the 
local workers’ community was able to be manipulated by the management. The practice 
of control included communications with the workers, efficient dissemination of central 
decisions, a reward system to motivate participation, and training for personnel. All of 
these efforts were intended to build a strong vertical bond between the management and a 
skilled team of staff and bring the lower-level employees’ actions in line with the 
directions dictated by the management. 
Following shi is a common belief of Chinese people, so the concept can be used 
for persuasion, justification and manipulation by politicians and entrepreneurs. This 
chapter introduced this idea during the paper mill’s reform from the 1990s to the early 
2000s. In the next chapter, I will further examine people’s reaction to shi, using the life 
histories of two different individuals. One of them is a factory worker who is considered 
as a model worker for others to follow, and the other one is an entrepreneur who 
established a model factory for Beijing First Paper Mill to follow. When closely 
analysing their life histories, I discovered that following or acting against shi is a very 
relative concept. 
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CHAPTERV 
MOFAN 
Model Worker Zhou Guangquan 
Mofan is short for laodong mofan, and literally translates in English as ‘worker’s 
role model’. It is an honour for a worker to be considered as a role model. For an 
organisation, it is a political strategy to have role models in place as a method of control 
(Bakken, 2000). Therefore, this Chinese concept involves both compliance and 
manipulation. Unlike the first generation of private managers who emerged in 1993 and 
1994 whom I introduced in the last chapter, the mofan case studies at Beijing First Paper 
Mill, which I explore in this chapter, concern workers, in order to suggest an alternative 
model for workers to become different from the rest of the community. 
I reconstructed the story of a role model couple of the paper mill from mainly two 
sources of print media. One is the Propaganda Handbook of the ministerial level 
Propaganda Department and the other is the internally circulating ministry newspaper, 
Beijing First Light Industry Bureau (BFLIB) News. The nature of this type of newspaper 
is having a small circulation with typically compulsory subscriptions for offices under the 
ministry (Zhao Y. Z., 2000). News shapes ideologies and constructs the social knowledge 
and worldviews of Chinese people (Chang, Wang, & Chen, 1994). This is not restricted 
to the national sources, such as CCTV (China Central Television) and the party-
organisation newspapers, such as People’s Daily I used in other part of the thesis. The 
use of the ministerial newspaper to disseminate ideological instructions from the central 
government is more effective, because its contents can be more customised to specific 
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audiences about particular political movements. For example, the role model couple I 
introduce in this chapter were very popular with many other community members in the 
light- industry ministry and Beijing First Paper Mill. Given that news articles are also a 
standard of propaganda, the reports of the model worker and his wife’s daily anecdotes 
were to establish an ideological reference for others to follow.  
A worker from the paper mill, Zhou Guangquan, and his wife, Wei Jianzhong, 
received the model-worker award in 1994 (Figure 63; Zhou G., 1995a). Guangquan was 
forty-four years old at that time, and he was a team leader in the mechanical-maintenance 
department in the paper mill. When he received this honour, he had been working at the 
paper mill for twenty-six years. He had already been awarded the Excellent Communist 
Party Member and the Advanced Worker Award by the paper mill. He had also received 
two other awards, Patriotic Merit and Competitive Soldier of Beijing, for four 
consecutive years. His wife, Jiangzhong, served in the Military Construction Bureau in 
Inner Mongolia until 1973. After that, she was transferred to a transportation company 
under the Beijing Transportation Bureau (Liu Y., 1995). Jianzhong was also the recipient 
of numerous awards from her danwei and the government. In the newspaper article (Liu 
Y., 1995), this couple was called a mofan fuqi (model couple). Their stories were very 
well known in the workers’ community at the paper mill. 
A poem was written by the propaganda cadre Yu Lianxiang to praise the couple. 
It was published in the internal circulation newspaper of Beijing First Bureau of Light 
Industry. The poem showed how Zhou Guangquan’s image was related to both ancient 
moralist teaching and socialist teaching (Figure 64). 
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Two medals flash, 
A couple of labour models they are. 
Even though in their years without bewilderment, 
In their heart, state and home are both there. 
For home, they work hard, 
For work, they dedicate themselves together. 
Real elites they are in our generation, 
How valuable two flowers bloom together. (Yu L., 1995)94 
Yu’s description of ‘year without bewilderment’ was related to the classic 
Confucian book, Analects of Confucius.95 With this phrase, Yu meant that Zhou 
Guangquan was literally in his forties and also that he could have easily given in to the 
temptations around him. This line praised the steadfastness of Zhou Guangquan’s moral 
standard, his loyalty to his work unit, and his resistance to materialistic life. This line in 
the poem may also mean that temptation is more difficult to refuse for people in their 
forties because they have enough work experience and technical training, so it is very 
easy for them to quit their companies and serve other private firms to earn higher 
incomes. In Zhou Guangquan’s case, he was indeed asked by his friends and his parents 
to quit for a better career. I will discuss his reaction to that later in this chapter. Secondly, 
the poem emphasised the connection between state and family. The image of the role 
model was poised between both. In the poem, the ‘state’ refers to the state-owned paper  
                                                 
94. The Chinese of the poem is, “两枚奖章闪烁，一对夫妻劳模。已是不惑之年，心
中有家有国。为家同心操劳，敬业比肩拼搏。真正吾辈精英，难得花开两朵。” 
95. Confucius described different phases of his growth. When he was fifteen, he aspired 
to obtain knowledge; when he was thirty, he could be independent and have his own life; 
when he was forty, he was sensible and not bewildered; when he was fifty, he understood 
his destiny; when he was sixty, he could accept any praise or criticism; and when he was 
seventy, his body could fully follow his heart without deviance in etiquette. 
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Figure 63: Zhou Guangquan’s story was widely reported in many newspapers. This 
article is from a newsletter of the Chinese Communist Party  (Liu Y., 1995). The title 
translates as ‘model couple’. The article described a few everyday stories about Zhou 
Guangquan. The image in the right top corner shows Zhou Guangquan and his wife 
cooking together and the image in the middle left shows Zhou Guangquan’s family 
(Image captured from Liu Y., 1995). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 64: L. Yu’s poem about the model worker couple (Image captured from Yu L., 
1995). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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mill. Dedicating oneself to the enterprise relates to the moral standards of loyalty and 
patriotism, and working hard for family taps into the Confucian ethic of creating good 
kinship relations.  
The Image in the Media 
The poem only reflects what Yu thought of Guangquan. However, how did the 
community perceive his story? In the media, many of the writings were not about the 
working performance of Guangquan but about his private life. Both private and public 
performances contributed to the image. Before Guangquan and Jianzhong received role 
model recognitions, they were living together with their only daughter and with 
Guangquan’s parents at the dormitory provided by the paper mill. Guangquan would 
wake up very early in the morning to buy food at the market before he went to the paper 
mill. Guangquan also needed to come back home during his lunch break to prepare food 
for his daughter and his parents. At night, he usually bought back some food from the 
public dining hall at the factory. Because both he and his wife needed to work long hours 
during the day at their own companies, they shared the housework between them. 
Sometimes, when Jianzhong had to drive a truck route that kept her out of town for days, 
Guangquan also needed to take care of his wife’s responsibilities. These included buying 
the grocery and foods, taking care of their daughter, and go sightseeing with her during 
the weekends. 
In an interview, Zhou Guangquan expressed his esteem for his wife. He also 
recognised that his wife had a strong character and that she received numerous awards 
from her work unit (Liu Y., 1995). Zhou Guangquan appreciated her strong motivation 
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and decisiveness when she was working and also understood how tired she was when she 
was driving days and nights. Therefore, he was happy to help with the family care duties 
that a mother would usually be responsible for: “She is a truck driver. She needs to work 
from early in the morning until late at night. Her job is more tiring than mine” (Zhou G., 
1995b). 
Guangquan’s Sacrifice 
In 1992, both of Guangquan’s parents were sick at the same time: 
Compared to work, family is a heavier and more tiring burden for me. My 
old father suffered from acute appendicitis and had to stay in a hospital for 
surgery. Every afternoon, I had to run to the hospital after work and had 
no time for my dinner. The next morning, I needed to leave the hospital at 
5 a.m. and run back to the factory to help with the equipment-modification 
project (Zhou G., 1995b). 
Unfortunately, he was also working on an emergency mechanical-modification 
project for his work unit. His wife had just been assigned a new job to transport some 
materials from Beijing’s suburban area to the city. Facing this situation, Jianzhong was 
very nervous. However, Guangquan comforted her and suggested that if she could take 
care of the family after she got back home from her work in the night, he could focus on 
taking care of his parents. The author of the article helped Guangquan to explain his plan: 
“Zhou knew how important finishing the company’s task was to his wife’s heart, and he 
made arrangements so that it would not interrupt his wife’s schedule” (Zhou G., 1995b). 
In those days, Guangquan participated in the equipment-modification project 
during the day and went to the hospital directly from the factory to take care of his 
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parents at night. Because the hospital was far from where he lived, he decided to sleep in 
the hospital with his parents. In the morning, he woke up at 5 a.m. to rush back to the 
factory and continued his modification work. He continued this routine for a month.  
In April, 1993, when Guangquan was working at the paper mill repairing 
machines, his colleague told him that his wife was looking for him. Jianzhong told him 
that a man who was working as a loader on her transportation team was injured and 
needed 2,000 Yuan for a hospital-deposit fee to be able to receive medical treatment 
immediately. She wanted Guangquan to help the worker, so Guangquan borrowed money 
from his friends and his colleagues. Guangquan’s colleagues asked him why he did not 
worry about borrowing money for an unknown migrant family. Guangquan responded 
that this was something that his wife wanted, and he trusted her.  
Between Family and State 
Guangquan’s perfect image was modelled by the media in several ways. 
Responsibility was definitely his first priority; in this way, he was able to maintain his job. 
Private life was also important to him; however, neglecting family is considered an 
acceptable sacrifice if it is done for work. Guangquan also recognised the dilemma 
between keeping both the company and the family happy. Oneself is obviously the least 
important consideration for a model worker. The story of borrowing money for an 
unknown migrant family illustrated Guangquan’s generosity and selflessness. In the story 
about taking care of his parents, he even sacrificed his own health to balance work and 
family. 
 229 
 
On 26 July, 1994, Guangquan’s wife had to take a five-hour train ride for work. 
The day before she left, Guangquan promised that he would prepare something for her to 
eat on the ride. However, the night before, he had to stay late at work to provide some 
emergency repairs on machines that suddenly broke down. His wife had visited him that 
night, but when she found out that her husband was working hard, she left quietly without 
telling him. Guangquan did not arrive home until midnight. He did not want to wake up 
his wife but still wanted to say goodbye the next morning. Unfortunately, Guangquan 
could not wake up in time the next morning to prepare the food and say goodbye to his 
wife. His wife left a note on the dining table telling him that she had made lunch for him 
instead. 
Putting personal and family life behind the interests of the public was common to 
model workers. Because he focused on work so much, Guangquan did not realise that his 
daughter had health problems. The rhetoric of role models thus needed to justify all the 
negative aspects of life that were involved. Justifications directly from the mouths of 
model workers were of course the most convincing. In an interview, Guangquan said: 
My daughter told me she had had back pain since primary school, and I 
did not bring her to the hospital until the problem became serious in her 
middle-school years. Because her back problems influenced her leg 
muscles, I had to help her walk. It pained my heart. Although my daughter 
told me that she did not blame me, in my heart I felt guilty. My colleagues 
asked me why my wife was not helping me. She was a driver, so she 
always needed to leave home for a long time. I told them, she was also a 
national model worker; therefore, as her husband, I needed to be 
considerate of that (Zhou G., 1995b). 
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Being a model worker, Guangquan faced serious conflicts between the 
responsibilities of his family and his work unit. Obviously, he chose to contribute to the 
work unit, but he suffered from guilt when he discovered that his daughter’s health 
problem had worsened because of his carelessness. His guilt was also evident from the 
story above, when he could not wake up in the morning to prepare food for his wife and 
say goodbye to her. 
So, why did the media also report the negative side of being a model worker? The 
portrayal of the negative side of Guangquan as a bad father and a bad husband was 
actually the media’s intention—it was part of a strategy to justify those negative 
impressions. Forgiveness was the key part of the story. Guangquan’s daughter did not 
blame him, and his wife continually expressed her understanding as well. In this sense, 
the negative effects were moralised by the positive and supportive reactions by his family 
members.  
In 1993, for a machine-modification project, Guangquan suggested making some 
mechanical parts himself. He also gave up his holiday and finished the project within 
three months: 
I entered the factory 20 years ago, and I have been working with those 
machines every day. I would feel uncomfortable if I could not hear the 
noise of those machines. My team is responsible for the regular 
maintenance, modification, and periodic inspection of the five production 
lines and seven sets of important supplemental equipment. I told the 
workers from the production lines that if there is a problem during the 
midnight shift, they should go to my home and wake me up. I am ready at 
any time. Therefore, I usually worked nights and during the holidays to 
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repair the machines in cases of emergency. Everyone from the factory, 
even my neighbours, knew that and asked me how I could work for 
twenty-four hours. My home was very close to the factory and it only took 
me ten minutes, so there was no reason for me to refuse their requests. As 
a Communist Party member, I did what needed to be done (Zhou G., 
1995b). 
Thanks to his sacrifice, he saved the factory 250,000 yuan (Zhou G., 1995b). 
Despite Guangquan’s passion for his job, on one occasion his body could not keep up. He 
became ill after working for forty-eight hours straight during an intensive one-month 
equipment-modification project in 1994. He had a fever for three days, so he was asked 
to stay at home. His wife could not take care of him, even though she wanted to, because 
she needed to complete a few jobs for her own work unit. At that time, Jianzhong’s work 
unit was also facing serious challenges from the market transformations. Guangquan 
insisted that he could take care of himself and asked his wife to go to work. One of the 
factory managers found out that Guangquan did not have anyone to take care of him, so 
he sent two workers to Guangquan’s home to take care of him and cook for him. Gossip 
developed in the factory, as people thought Jianzhong did not want to take care of her 
husband. In another example of sacrifice, Guangquan trusted his wife and therefore 
ignored all the gossip, despite the fact that this became the centre of gossip in his 
community. Thus the image of role models was established by the media in Guangquan’s 
case, highlighting positive aspects and rationalising negative aspects to encompass both 
Confucian moral teaching and Chinese socialist ideals. 
 232 
 
Triply Happy? 
In 1995, Guangquan was honoured when he was named Beijing’s Model Worker, 
and his wife Jianzhong was honoured even more as she was named the National Model 
Worker. Guangquan was given an apartment with three bedrooms by his danwei as a 
reward. Before that, Guangquan had been living in a dormitory with his family south of 
the factory for almost ten years. His dormitory had only one room. He did not even have 
a sofa. In April, 1995, Guangquan moved to his new apartment in the tower housing 
north of the paper mill. The first thing he did was to buy a new 5,000 yuan set of 
composite cabinets. He also bought a new Simmons mattress for his parents.96 After 
moving to his new apartment, Guangquan spent almost all his savings. The result of 
Guangquan’s success would eventually drag him into a poverty that he had never 
experienced before. 
With his success, Guangquan finally became an influential and special worker in 
his community. His behaviour was followed by others, and his speeches addressed the 
standards of moral lifestyles because, as a role model in the workers’ community, 
Guangquan was asked to give speeches in front of many people and to tell his story to the 
media countless times. In addition to being influential, Guangquan also gained material 
and personal benefits, such as the apartment and his reputation. It is notable though that 
Guangquan did not seek out power or rewards; rather, they were the direct result of his 
subservience and docility towards the party-state. 
                                                 
96. In the early 1990s, mattress with springs was new to China. Simmons mattress was 
also one of the most famous imported mattress brands at that time. So having Simmons 
mattress was considered as luxury. 
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Still, Guangquan’s subservience and rewards were not enough to improve his life. 
The new apartment, cabinets, and mattress used up all of Guangquan’s savings. This new 
life presented new financial burdens on Guangquan and his family. After being awarded, 
he and his wife were invited to participate in many meetings and occasions, so they also 
had to buy some new formal clothes. His financial situation did not really allow him to 
buy clothes for both himself and his wife, so he put his wife first and bought her the 
relatively more expensive clothes.  
In the summer of 1995, Jianzhong came back from her work unit and told 
Guangquan that she had been advised to continue her studies. Her workers’ union could 
offer her a place to study for an associate’s degree for half a year and then send her to a 
university for further education. The invitation was very valuable because only national 
model workers under forty- five years old could qualify for such an opportunity. However, 
in the end, she had to turn down the opportunity. Guangquan explained in front of the 
media that this decision was made for two reasons. First, his wife had a very basic level 
of education, so going back to school would have been a gigantic challenge for her. 
Secondly, his monthly salary was only around 400 yuan, so his family could not 
financially sustain his wife going back to school. 
Role Model or Victim 
Mei Zhang (1998) found that the two political objectives of role model emulation 
were to promote new policies and to prescribe ideal behaviours for the public. She 
analysed many cases of model workers from primary and secondary sources. Because 
extreme images of model workers were often invented and presented in the media, Mei 
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Zhang searched for criticisms of model workers. Indeed, he found that model workers 
might lose the opportunity to pursue further study and earn higher salaries. Others 
perceived the title of model worker to be too heavy a burden. Model workers were also 
said to be targets of community gossip, and other people who were jealous might isolate 
them from the community. Finally, working very hard was often reported to put strains 
on family and marital relations: 
I do not consider money that much. I think that money is something you 
cannot live without, but enough is good. It is not necessary to pursue it. 
Now, some say that people who do not earn a lot of money are simply not 
intelligent enough. I do not agree with them. These two years, a 
construction company where my father had worked asked me to join them. 
Although they offered a higher salary, I did not accept their offer. My 
colleagues who have moved to international companies, rural enterprises, 
and hotels asked me to leave the factory and join them. I rejected all of 
them as well. I have been working at the factory for twenty years, and 
learnt the skill of repair work there. The leaders of the factory took care of 
me, and they cultivated my education and joining of the China Communist 
Party. So, as a technician and a Communist Party member, I have to 
contribute my effort to the factory (Liu Y., 1995). 
In this case, Guangquan and Jianzhong knew they were going to suffer according 
to the shi of the declining state owned enterprise. Indeed, they had the opportunity to 
escape poverty but chose not to. Guangquan gave up the opportunity to leave his 
company for a better-paid job. Even his friends and his father wanted to recommend him 
to some private companies. Guangquan’s explanation for his decision was that he knew it 
was the most difficult period for his danwei; at this time, experienced workers were in 
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urgent demand. As for Jianzhong, she could have chosen to continue her studies at the 
university. After graduating, she probably could have found a job with a higher salary. 
However, because her husband would not leave the factory for a higher salary, they did 
not have the income necessary to support her studies. Guangquan and Jianzhong felt 
regretted this because they explicitly said that if their financial situation had been better, 
they would have gone to school together. 
The ‘Shougang Model’ 
As explained in the above section, the core idea is the making of role model 
images through rhetorical practices in the media. However, how far is the rhetoric from 
the reality? Shougang is the largest steel and iron manufacturing enterprise in Beijing. 
The full name of Shougang is the Beijing Capital Iron and Steel Cooperative. It was the 
model for the paper mill to follow. 
 In this thesis, two events connect the communities of the paper mill and Linked 
Hybrid with Shougang. The first, which forms the main discussion of this section, 
happened in the early 1990s. At that time, Shougang was named the showcase of Post-
reform enterprise development by Deng Xiaoping. Therefore, there was a political 
movement to encourage other companies to emulate Shougang. The second event is more 
recent. Shougang’s original site was demolished and converted to an industrial park for 
high-technology innovations. The Chinese architect of Linked Hybrid, Li Hu, also 
participated in the strategic planning competition of that project.  
The movement in the early 1990s was called ‘xuexi shougang’ (Learning from 
Shougang). The movement partially stemmed from the managers of Beijing First Paper 
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Mill, who began to take more active steps to adapt to the new market economy. The 
paper mill’s management sent staff to Shougang to learn about its organisation as an 
industrial model, because Shougang was believed to be the most successful enterprise 
during the market reform and was a heroic example among all enterprises at that time. 
However, just one year after the ‘Learning from Shougang’ movement was launched, 
Shougang lost political support when Deng Xiaoping retired, and the financial situation 
of the company deteriorated. After that, its hitherto praised culture and management style 
became highly criticised in academia and by professional institutes. The son of the 
president of Shougang and other senior staff members were arrested for corruption. The 
role model enterprise was discovered to be pure sham.97 
The Emergence of the ‘Shougang Model’ 
The prelude of the movement can be traced back to the 1980s. At that time, the 
management of the organisation of the paper mill was extremely bureaucratic and 
hierarchical. This system began to lose its efficiency and effectiveness during the market 
reform because it could no longer keep up with its speed of development. News reports 
documented the failure of the reforms (Du, 1991). In the late 1980s, the local 
governments were criticised for putting too much investment into infrastructural 
constructions. In 1986, the central government announced new regulations about 
economic development. The main measures were to reduce government investment in 
                                                 
97. On this, see Hassard, Sheehan, and Jonathan (1999) and Stepanek (1992). 
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national-scale infrastructure, light industry, and unproductive industry.98 Despite being 
aware of the predictions of a forthcoming economic recession, the Beijing Commerce 
Bureau still instructed the paper mill to produce 120,000 rolls of printing paper that year, 
neglecting the poor economic outlook. In the end, the market could not adsorb such a 
large supply. The paper mill attempted to lower the price, creating disastrous losses of 
several hundred thousand yuan. These lower prices could not recoup the manufacturing 
costs, and the paper mill’s marketing firms could not find enough buyers. 
I mentioned in Chapter 4 that the president of the paper mill Guo Chunguang 
recognised the ineffectiveness of the planned-economy business model. It was then that 
he started his own research unit to explore new products and markets instead of 
depending on others or on the Commerce Bureau. Finally, his reform ideas were accepted 
within the paper mill, and he launched a series of propaganda activities. One of them was 
‘Learning from Shougang’: 
In 1991, all workers flourished in the entrepreneurial spirit of ‘pragmatism, 
endeavour, sacrifice, innovation’, and they learnt from Shougang to 
further liberalise our minds and deepen the entrepreneurial process. 
Moreover, they also bravely faced challenges from the market, 
strengthened quality control, and increased efficiency. Judging from our 
time and considering our situation, the economic efficiency has increased 
and the enterprise has been developed (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1992a). 
The statement above was published in a press-conference booklet by the paper 
mill in 1992. The ‘Learning from Shougang’ movement was announced as a success to 
                                                 
98. See speech by Wang Bingqian at the Sixth National Representative Congress, the 
fifth meeting, 26 March, 1987. 
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the public. This event was planned as early as 1990, with lectures, forums, and exchange 
programs to learn from the steel enterprise. For example, in 1991, five training courses 
were organised for core management staff members from the paper mill to work at 
Shougang and learn about its methods of managerial reform. It was also reported that this 
movement involved around four hundred department heads, team leaders from different 
technical disciplines in the paper mill, and mid-level management staff (Beijing First 
Paper Mill, 1992a). The objective of this program was to explore the paper mill’s plans 
for reform in the transitional stage between the planned and market economies. These 
programs were launched by the Chinese Communist Party committee in the paper mill 
corresponding to the guidelines of the Sixth Beijing Municipal Government Committee 
Congress (Tenth Meeting). In the press-conference document, the aim was the consensus 
of all workers in the factory. 
Another document, entitled ‘Further liberating our minds, inspiring our morals, 
and learning from Shougang’, was also released to all workers around the same time. In 
this document, a new slogan was used, xushijiehe, yixucushi (integrating the intangible 
and the tangible, using the intangible to enhance the tangible) (Beijing First Paper Mill, 
1992b, 1). This slogan advocated the combination of abstract knowledge and learning 
with tangible everyday working practices, and suggested that the abstract should lead the 
tangible: 
We understand our situation in this way: The core idea of ‘Learning from 
Shougang’ focuses on learning from their management model. We trained 
more than four hundred leaders and backbones in the paper mill to 
facilitate a future, larger-scale extension of the program of learning from 
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Shougang to the public. Our paper mill is an enterprise with almost a fifty-
year history. The enterprise developed from a small workshop with one 
hundred workers to a large factory with three thousand workers. It 
manufactures many kinds of mid- to high-class products. All of this is due 
to the fact that we have a team of fearless staff. With this team of staff as 
the foundation and the knowledge they learned from Shougang, we plan to 
learn and realize the reform. Then our transformation process can be 
speeded up. The improvement of the living situations of many workers as 
an outcome of the reform will be the best evidence for the rest of the paper 
mill’s workers who understand the importance, urgency, and necessity of 
reform (Beijing First Paper Mill, 1992b, 2). 
During the market reform period, the management system and the organisational 
culture of Shougang was widely discussed among academics, politicians, and enterprise 
leaders. Shougang was described as the pearl of the reform (Xu & Zhang, 1992). 
Shougang-moshi (Shougang model) also became a model for other enterprises to follow. 
A Chinese article in early 1991 stated that 
Shougang has been operating within the new system of contracting for ten 
years already. What is the effect of this new contracting system? What are 
the changes? Does it contribute to the state? Is there any value for us to 
advocate and learn from the experience of the new contracting system in 
Shougang? Many of us are concerned with these questions. We went to 
Shougang with these questions personally and investigated its post-reform 
structure, especially the changes related to their new management system 
over the last decade. We also tried to understand how this model 
contributed to the overall economy and to society as a whole. After 
understanding the basic managerial framework and actual practices, I was  
enlightened. The ten years of Shougang’s company practices proved that 
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with the new contracting system… large enterprises, state-owned 
institutions, and social productivity could be revitalised. If we can 
advocate the model of Shougang nationally, the problems in reforming 
operations and management models in large enterprises will experience a 
breakthrough (Kong, Li, & Cui, 1991, 10). 
The outstanding achievement of Shougang was common knowledge and was 
recognised by all Chinese workers and company managers at that time. The new 
contracting system was the key to success. It provided possible ways for other enterprises 
to gradually become independent from the state and adapt to the market economy. 
Shougang’s contracting system was described as a measure of balancing ze, quan, li 
(responsibility, power, benefits) and implanting bao, bao, he (contracting, quality 
guarantees, verification) to all levels of the work force.99 In other words, this new system 
provided autonomy at a new level, but connected all autonomous units together under 
government contracts that controlled the quality of production. The breakthrough was the 
realisation of the decentralization of political power and social responsibility from the 
central government, but still maintaining regulation by the government: a link existed 
between the market-economy and the social-community perspectives, and the movement 
also suggested a certain level of democratization.100 
                                                 
99. The Chinese characters are, ‘责, 权, 利’ for ‘ze, yuan and li’. They mean 
responsibility, power and profit. Moreover, ‘包, 保, 核’ for ‘bao, bao and he’. The first 
bao refers to a contracting system that defines the responsibilities of all departments and 
individuals; the second bao asks for a guarantee of cooperation between all departments 
and individuals from different levels, and it refers to the verification of the quality of 
production. 
100. See Kong, Li & Cui (1991, 16): “After the enterprise gains autonomy (zizhuquan), 
the effect extends to democratization and the scientific governance of the community. 
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Surprisingly, advocacy for public participation can be found already in the early 
1990s, although it was still not then fully implanted in Chinese society. The democratic 
system mentioned by Kong, Li and Cui (1991) may not be exactly the same as those in 
the West; rather, it included setting up professional committees composed of leading 
workers in different professions to participate in the decision-making process of some 
important events. The enterprise also established a more transparent communication 
system to release all information about actions taken by the enterprise, including 
decisions about production strategy, future development plans, and internal personnel 
affairs. An internal inspection committee, made up of representatives elected by 180,000 
workers, was set up to supervise 12,000 leaders in Shougang. Finally, the leaders of the 
enterprises were requested to submit themselves to elections by workers.  
Together with numerous statistics that proved how successful Shougang was in 
the late 1980s, the new contracting-management system and the democratic workers’ 
community became the role model for all enterprises. Other than that, Shougang was also 
the dream place of employment for all Chinese workers in the late 1980s because it was 
                                                                                                                                                 
Workers are allowed to make their own decisions for their community and their 
enterprise. In the framework of the socialist market economy, the measures to maximise 
efficiency and sustain active energy are not limited by how loyal the workers and the 
staff are, but more important it is about how to make the correct decisions in response to 
the market. It also involves conducting research for new products and balancing between 
production and workers’ lives. In the large-scale enterprise of Shougang, a minor mistake 
will cause serious waste and loss. Therefore, after operating in the new contracting 
system and by establishing a well-developed democratic system, workers were given 
more power. General participation can then be created and workers will be the main body 
of the enterprise” (text originally in Chinese, translated by the author). 
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widely believed that the salaries were two to three times higher than those of other 
companies. 
Becoming a Private Boss 
Shougang was established as early as 1919 in the western suburbs of Beijing, an 
area that has become one of the busiest areas of the city today. After 1949, Shougang 
became one of the largest-scale iron and steel producers for the country. In the 1980s, the 
company was the flagship of China’s reform and open policy and was the definition of 
achievement of the Deng Xiaoping era. The success stemmed from the implementation of 
a system called the contract-responsibility system.101 Shougang’s rapid development was 
also due to beneficial policies and resource allocations. ‘Learning from Shougang’ was 
not a slogan limited to the paper mill; rather, it was a nationwide political movement in 
the early 1990s. 
Located in the western part of Beijing, Shougang was reported to boast a 
workforce of 220,000 people (Hassard Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). They do not mention 
the year of this figure, but Stepanke (1992) put the number at 150,000 in the 1990s. 
Among these 150,000 workers, 135,000 were employed to grow vegetables, rice, and run 
the school and hospital for the 15,000 manufacturing workers.102 In the planned 
economy’s social system, other than manufacturing, Shougang also needed to provide its 
large number of workers dormitories, medical care, schools, and other welfare facilities. 
                                                 
101The new system also relates to the emergence of the ‘private bosses’ in the paper mill 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
102. It is interesting to see the ratio of the numbers of worker to supporting staff was 
almost 1:9 in Shougang work unit community. See also Stepanek (1992, footnote 61). 
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At that time, companies took an extremely heavy burden of the public’s economic 
welfare. This gigantic enterprise was the fourth-largest enterprise and the third-largest 
steel producer in China in the 1990s. Around that time, Shougang’s ambition was to 
develop even further into a transnational enterprise. The goal was not brash. The 
company was successfully quoted on the Stock Exchange in both China and Hong Kong 
in the late 1990s, and its international investors came from Hong Kong and other parts of 
the globe.103 The transformation from a pure state owned and state managed enterprise to 
an enterprise operating in the contract-responsibility system enabled Shougang to develop 
dramatically in the 1980s. The realisation of contract responsibility at Shougang started 
from the sixth Five-Year Plan, which covered the period 1980 to 1985 (Hassard, Sheehan, 
& Jonathan, 1999). 
In the pre-reform period, state-owned-enterprise framework,104 companies were 
controlled by the government.105 After the reform, power was decentralised to company 
managers, and state owned enterprises were required to sustain themselves autonomously 
and take more responsibility for their own profits and losses. State-owned enterprises also 
                                                 
103. The billionaire Li Kashing from Hong Kong, the Mesta Engineering Company from 
the United States, and the Hierro iron-ore mine from Peru, all held shares in Shougang 
(Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999, 56). 
104. The official definition of a state-owned enterprise was a company owned by the 
whole public. This definition was criticised by Chow (1997) as not descriptive and useful 
for understanding its meaning. He defined it as a firm that turns over all its profits to 
government entities, who exercise control over the firm’s enterprise and management 
functions, including control over matters that are within the normal business scope of the 
firm (Chow, 1997). This model was how companies were run in the planned-economy 
social system.  
105. In 1978, the president of Shougang could only approve expenditures of the 
enterprise up to 800 yuan, which was about 95 USD at that time (Hassard, Sheehan, & 
Jonathan, 1999). 
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needed to respond to the free market (Hassard, Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). The 
decentralization process of state-owned enterprises began with the slogan sheijian, 
sheikong, sheiyong (who establishes, who controls, who utilises) in the late 1970s. 
Stepanek (1992) interpreted this rhetoric as follows: 
‘Who establishes’ refers to the level of government making the initial 
investment. Thus, if a township government invests in a factory, it 
basically controls it. The words ‘who utilises’ imply that the township 
government would also get to keep the after-tax revenues from the factory 
(Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999, 57). 
The reason for selecting Shougang as the model of decentralization was not only 
its geographic location in Beijing, and not only the scale and significance of the 
enterprise’s industry, but also the personal connection between the president of Shougang, 
Zhou Guanwu, and the leader of the state at that time, Deng Xiaoping. Zhou Guanwu 
served Deng during the war in the late 1940s (Hassard Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). This 
personal connection eventually became the source of speculations as to why Shougang 
always seemed to obtain special treatment during the post-reform era.  
The new contract-responsibility system was two tiered: state-enterprise 
contracting and internal contracting. In the case of Shougang, a certain amount of profit 
needed to be handed over to the state. This rate increased annually. In 1982, the return 
was supposed to be 6 per cent of the profit from 1981 (Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 
1999). But Shougang’s profit was unexpectedly high, so the State Council decided to 
raise it to 7.2 per cent (Hassard, Sheehan & Jonathan, 1999). The remaining profit would 
go back to the enterprise. Shougang signed a fourteen-year contract with the state. The 
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contracted period was extraordinary long, as normally the contract-responsibility 
agreement would only last for three years (Hassard, Sheehan & Jonathan,1999). With 
respect to the second, internal level of the contract-responsibility system, Shougang’s 
vice-president, Luo Bingsheng, said that tasks were contracted by second-level 
(subsidiary) companies with Shougang. These subsidiary companies could further 
subcontract some tasks to other firms, including factories, mines, and individuals 
(Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan, 1999; also see Luo B., 1994, 82). The internal-
contracting system operated in a hierarchical network with Shougang as the central 
point.106 
Role Model Scandals 
It is interesting that although the contract-responsibility system made gigantic 
profits for companies, numerous problems arose during the system’s implementation.107 
One of these problems was triggered by the substantial autonomy granted to enterprises, 
which caused irreversible social inequality in Chinese society. At Beijing First Paper Mill, 
I described in Chapter 4 how many workers started to contract different types of business 
from the enterprise. The Shougang model in the early 1990s introduced the emergence of 
siren laoban (private boss) in the paper mill, thus the guoyou siying (owned by the state, 
                                                 
106. The real history of Shougang is still a mystery. On the one hand, the company was 
reported as the most successful enterprise. On the other hand, it was all a sham and all the 
figures were invented, and it was all a pack of lies. This is because transparency was 
insufficient in the early 1990s. 
107. Hassard, Sheehan, & Jonathan (1999) suggest that those problems include disparities 
between enterprise, short-term thinking, confusion in the taxation system, a lack of 
responsibility for losses, excessive enterprise autonomy, poor management quality, a 
failure to resolve the problem of property rights, and the continued social-welfare burden.  
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operated by the people) idea. The significance of the contract-responsibility also links to 
the first generation of the upper class in China, who can afford the luxury housing such as 
Linked Hybrid. However, the majority of the enterprise workers could not share the 
benefits of the reform, and those workers still living in the workers’ community represent 
this social class. 
Managers of companies operating under the contract-responsibility system often 
took advantage of the autonomy of the enterprise and the power of decision-making for 
their personal gain. They also controlled the majority of the country’s natural and social 
resources. Eventually, private entities stripped the state of its assets. Ding (2000) states 
that the transformation of state-owned enterprises from the early 1980s to the 1990s was 
mainly about the transfer of the ownership of a state-owned firm’s assets by obscuring 
the corporative identity. This was achieved by blurring the organisational boundaries 
between the state-owned enterprise and other, mostly non-state enterprises (Ding, 
2000).108 
                                                 
108. Due to this problematic system, the chairman of Shougang’s Communist Party 
branch, Guan Zhicheng, embezzled more than 1,500,000 yuan during the late 1980s by 
running two consortia (Ding, 2000): the Capital Iron and Steel Mine Company and the 
Beijing Iron and Steel Company. From 1986 to 1989, Guan Zhicheng was the 
Communist Party’s secretary for these companies. During this period, he made use of his 
political positions to order steel products from Shougang for other enterprises with 
cheaper prices in exchange for bribes from these enterprises. The bribes were either paid 
by cash or sent to Guan Zhicheng through another company bank account controlled by 
him. In 1990, Guan Zhicheng was arrested for corruption and taking bribes and sentenced 
to death. After Guan Zhicheng, three other senior managers were also arrested for 
corruption in Shougang under the contract-responsibility system (Zhao & Wan, 2009). 
Other evidence about the excessive autonomy problem in Shougang was due to having its 
own bank. This prestige was believed to be associated with the special personal 
connection between the president of Shougang and Deng Xiaoping. The banking system 
in Shougang further facilitated the stripping of the state’s assets. 
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In 1993, the financial system of Shougang faced an unprecedented crisis caused 
by a series of poor investment decisions and the corruption scandal of President Zhou 
Guanwu’s son. In 1995, Zhou Guanwu was forced to retire, marking the end of 
Shougang’s heyday in the post-reform era. All of these unfortunate events occurred just 
two years after the launching of the ‘Learning from Shougang’ movement.  
The collapse began in the early 1990s. Shougang found it increasingly difficult to 
turn over the required percentage of profits to the government, which was increasing 
annually. To obtain a certain increase, Shougang needed to continue expanding in size 
and had to use more resources to continue to develop. Deng Xiaoping, the primary 
supporter of Shougang, retired, but he was still active in the Chinese political sphere. He 
visited Shougang in 1992, right after his famous nanxun (Tour to the South). Nanxun 
generated numerous entirely new cities and Development Zones in southern China. 
Influenced by that trend, Deng’s visit provided courage for Zhou Guanwu to negotiate 
with the state on behalf of his enterprise. His negotiation included asking for more 
beneficial policies to further expand Shougang. Moreover, he also asked to extend 
Shougang’s responsibility contract after 1995, when it was set to expire.  
However, things did not develop as Zhou Guanwu expected. In 1995, Zhou 
Guanwu was forced to resign from his position at Shougang. Right before this, his son 
was arrested for corruption. Steinfeld (1998) argued that the prosecution of Zhou’s son 
was a clear sign that Deng Xiaoping’s age and his failing health had significantly 
weakened his ability to protect Zhou Guanwu and Shougang from its critics and rivals. 
After Zhou Guanwu resigned, his system, which had originally been praised as a 
democratic system, began to be referred to as a patriarchal dictatorship (Hassard, Sheehan 
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& Jonathan, 1999). Eventually, Shougang adapted two new systems—the modern 
enterprise system and the group-company system—and further involved itself in a series 
of transformations. 
Besides problems with the management process, other criticisms surfaced at the 
same time. The pollution problem in Beijing’s inner city was blamed on Shougang. After 
Zhou Guanwu left, the factory was found to lack modern and environmentally friendly 
equipment, resulting in serious pollution of the city. The problem could be traced to the 
late 1970s. When Zhou Guanwu was in power and Beijing’s municipal-government 
officials were not allowed to carry out any inspections of the factory. After the failed 
inspections, Shougang was moved from Beijing urban core (Wu Y., 2000). 
Learning from Role Models 
After mentioning Lei Feng, the former Chinese partner of Steven Holl for Beijing 
Linked Hybrid, Li Hu smiled. Lei Feng is one of the most famous official role models 
from Mao’s age. Lei Feng was famous for always willing to sacrifice himself for the 
public good: 
I learnt from Lei Feng when I was a child. The city where I spent my 
childhood was the same one where Lei Feng served in the army: Fushun in 
Liaoning Province. I was originally from Shandong, but I studied in 
Liaoning. I attended university at Beijing. At that time, I was the number 
one student from my city. [Laughs.] I used to have this idea about 
changing my major [from architecture] to computer sc ience or biology. I 
regret not doing it now. If I had transferred, I might be a biologist now. 
[Laughs.] Then I worked very hard on practicing drawing, and finally I 
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could draw well. In my university, I did not talk to my teachers that much. 
It wasn’t until my third year that I started to read books by Le Corbusier. 
My interest in society was not solely from that era. At the time, everyone 
wanted to make money, but the reading did have some impact on me. I 
grew up in the 1970s, the age when everyone was learning about Lei Feng. 
Remember, I learnt about Lei Feng in the hometown of Lei Feng. [Laughs] 
(Li Hu, personal communication, 15 July, 2009). 
In this chapter, I reconstruct two cases of role models during the social transformation of 
the workers’ community.  
The Use of Role Models 
The role model mentioned by Li Hu, Lei Feng, was a classic case of a model 
worker.109 Lei Feng was politically powerless and poor, but his absolute loyalty to Mao 
and his willingness to sacrifice himself for others made him an important model in 
modern Chinese history. Because of some of Mao’s essays and the publication of Lei 
Feng’s dairy after his death, Lei Feng’s image was elevated to near sainthood among the 
Chinese people (Larson W., 2009). Mei Zhang (1998) suggested that the image of Lei 
Feng was part of the political propaganda for the mass mobilization of citizenry, a 
symbol of the Communist Party’s highest ideals and its modernization agenda. Therefore, 
we can consider the two aspects of Lei Feng as a role model. One is to understand the 
construction of the individuality of Lei Feng by being loyal to the party-state. The other is 
                                                 
109. Lei Feng was formally named a role model after his death at the age of 22, in Mao’s 
essay, ‘Learn from Comrade Lei Feng’, on 5 March, 1963. 
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to understand the strategy of fabricating Lei Feng as a role model to manipulate a larger 
group of people in the society. 
When Chinese society was undergoing social reform in the 1990s, rhetorical 
practice about role models was again an important tool to stabilise society and justify the 
negative effects brought by the reform (Bakken, 2000). In addition, behind the role model 
rhetoric was the Confucian tradition of the Chinese people (Pines, 2002). Role-model 
rhetoric in the socialist and reform age made use of the traditional Chinese culture to 
fabricate a moral ideals and thus effective society to fuel the production industry, this 
argument is particularly obvious in the model worker Guangquan’s case. The use of role 
models was definitely not new in Chinese politics. Long before modern communist role-
model rhetoric, Confucian teaching had already made use of ancient moral figures and 
stories as role models for people from different social classes to follow (Boden, 2008). In 
this sense, the development of Chinese society is always based on a certain imaginary 
ideal of the past due to the moral nostalgia for Confucian tradition (Zhang L., 2005). 
After Lei Feng’s death, Mao formally named him as a role model. Lei Feng’s 
legend was constructed through the publishing of his diary. The credibility of the 
200,000-word diary, with half the text praising Mao and the other half-documenting Lei 
Feng’s voluntary contribution, was controversial, and it is very possible that the legend of 
Lei Feng was totally invented for the sake of propaganda (Zhang M., 1998). Indeed, 
Guangquan’s and Jianzhong’s stories are very believable and demonstrate the power that 
rhetoric can have on reality. However, the title of role model actually constrained their 
development. Wang Ji, one of my ex-worker informants, was also named as a model 
worker in the 1990s, probably just a few years after Guangquan’s recognition. Wang Ji 
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was still living in the workers’ community. Having been laid off from his job at the paper 
mill in the late 1990s, he used to work as freelance electrician, contracting himself to 
other private enterprises. Currently, he manages the food orders in a restaurant. The title 
of model worker does not seem to be helping him to improve his life in the age of the 
market economy. The consequences of Guangquan and Wang Ji explicate the use of role 
models in contemporary China. It is a political and rhetorical device, but does not 
actually help individuals. Mei Zhang (1998) suggested that two types of role models 
coexisted in the post-reform age. One type was composed of role models who actively 
engaged in the reforms. These people broke the rules of the planned economy and 
introduced competition and a system of material rewards. This type of model was made 
up of the first generation of siren laoban (private boss) discussed in Chapter 4. The other 
type of role model consisted of people such as Guangquan, who resisted giving up his 
loyalty to his socialist work unit. The former type complied with the social structures of 
the new market economy, whereas the latter complied with the old socialist structures. 
Following the discussion about mofan (role models) of this chapter, I will argue in 
the next chapter that the concept of mofan is closely related to the shi (development 
tendency) philosophy that I explored in Chapter 4. In this Chinese way of thinking, the 
subservient model workers who remained within the old social structure for the sake of 
moral integrity to the party-state were, on the one hand, called shunshi  (following the 
trend); but, on the other hand, when they refused to participate in the new market 
economy society, they were considered as the most rebellious agents in the workers’ 
community or nishi (against the trend). Moreover, the Shougang entrepreneur was 
subservient to other powerful political figures in order to manipulate his company. 
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However, this subservience became ineffective once the political figure he depended on 
lost power. These two cases also demonstrate the complexity, relativity and intriguing 
interrelatedness of the concepts of subservience and rebellion, compliance and 
manipulation, in the Chinese system of cultural and social relationships.  
In order to further develop the complex connections between shi and mofan, I will 
explore the ideas of shunshi (following the trend) and nishi (against the trend) to analyse 
how the practitioners of Linked Hybrid, and the specific design process of Linked Hybrid, 
fit into this indigenous cultural context. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SHANZHAI 
Designers of Linked Hybrid 
In this last chapter, I would like to examine closely the different practices of the 
American architect, Steven Holl, his Chinese partner, Li Hu, and the Chinese architects 
from the Local Design Institute. These three types of architectural practitioners all 
worked closely with each other and played very important roles in the designing of 
Linked Hybrid. Moreover, all of them contributed to some important developments in the 
evolution of the design process. However, based on their attitudes about how to respond 
to the what they saw as reality, they behaved quite differently. I discussed in Chapter 1, 
Holl’s critical thinking about Chinese urbanism and his attempt to transform it with his 
design. However, alongside Holl’s critique, architects from the local design institute 
constantly transformed, or appropriated, Holl’s design according to the overriding desire 
of the market and the residents. This appropriated and altered design eventually set up a 
model for others to follow. Using the two indigenous terms I discovered from the last 
chapter, nishi (against the trend) and shunshi (following the trend), Holl’s practice 
belongs to the nishi category and the local design institute’s practice belongs to the 
shunshi category. It is even more interesting to notice that Holl’s Chinese partner, Li Hu, 
took a middle path between Holl’s nishi and the local design institute’s shunshi practices. 
On the one hand, Li Hu intended to comply with the Chinese community perception, but, 
on the other hand, he also attempted to bring changes to it. Li Hu’s practice involved a 
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collective design process involving the general public. It is these ideas and practices that I 
will discuss in this chapter. 
Steven Holl 
In Holl’s recent publication (2010), he addressed two concepts different from the 
conventional architectural model of practice: combined methods to confront a dynamic, 
diverse and intermittent system and a recognition of multiple types of urbanism. In 
addition, his apparent intention of always being sceptical about his work is related to his 
stated intention of always undertaking a reflective process about his professional practice: 
Today, working with doubt is unavoidable; the absolute is suspended by 
the relative and the interactive. Instead of stable systems we must work 
with dynamic systems. Instead of simple and clear programs we engage 
contingent and diverse programs. Instead of precision and perfection we 
work with intermittent, crossbred systems, and combined methods. 
Suspending disbelief and adopting a global understanding is today a priori 
condition, a new fundamental for creative work in science, urbanism, and 
architecture. Working with doubt becomes an open position for 
concentrated intellectual work. The research and preparation required for 
any integrated urban success is quite different from previous periods that 
imposed classical styles or sought to fulfill the absolute aim of modernist 
functional clarity. We aim for twenty-first century architecture in contrast 
to the empirical kitsch of the postmodern. We aim for an architecture that 
is integral: landscape/ architecture/ urbanism, an architecture of deep 
connections to site, culture, and climate, rather than an applied signature 
style. Working with openness and doubt at the outset of each project can 
yield works engaged on levels of both site and culture: many different 
urbanisms, rather than single urbanism (Holl, 2010, 13). 
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I will depart from the specific case of Linked Hybrid and explore the bigger 
picture of Holl’s reflections on Chinese urbanism. In my interview, Holl gave a very 
explicit answer to the question about ethical concerns about international architects 
designing experimental architecture in contemporary China:110 
Is there a bigger meaning to the word ‘ethical’? Let’s get into the heart of 
that word. Personally, I am very enthusiastic about any culture on earth to 
push the envelope for architecture. I think the entire development of the 
earth is suffering under conservatism all the way around. We have a few 
moments in history where someone did great projects. The history of 
architecture also suffers from [people who are] ultra-conservative and 
greedy, only interested in money, or only interested in aesthetically 
recreating the past. So anywhere that sort of terrible retardation can be 
broken is a blessing to the history of architecture. I disagree with [using 
the ethics concept to examine contemporary architectural designs in 
China], and I don’t think the word ethics connects to that. On issues of 
human rights, I do think there is an ethical question. But I also believe that 
                                                 
110. The context of this answer is specific. I was asking what Holl thought about ethical 
concerns when designing experimental architecture in China in recent years. The question 
stemmed from the vigorous debate that followed the construction of the CCTV 
headquarter in Beijing by Koolhaas. The criticism by Chinese conservative scholars 
focused on the exploitation of Chinese natural resources to test radical ideas. One of the 
many criticism during the design and construction process of CCTV headquarter was a 
newspaper article called, ‘Sentence the architect of CCTV to be hanged: Criticisms of the 
competition winning design of CCTV headquarter’, by a Chinese scholar called Qing He, 
published in a Chinese local newspaper. This article was then rapidly disseminated and 
posted at many news websites and online discussion boards. The critique not only 
focused on the lack of understanding of Chinese culture and society, more importantly, 
the author also disagreed with the huge budget of construction. He explicitly criticised the 
project that as a waste of China’s resource to fulfil the personal achievement of the 
Western architect. When Holl heard that question, he was slightly agitated. His response 
mainly focused on the ethical issue of experimenting with new architectural ideas in 
China. 
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architecture has to stand the test of time…This experimentation… you 
need this experimentation for years. If they don’t like something, tear it 
down. Look at the money that is wasted on other things. They can just tear 
it down. If the experimentation is that tragic, recycle it. They can use 
aluminium, and recycle it. I think the potential to push the envelope of 
architecture is necessary if there is to be any growth in architectural 
history. We have seen it in various cultures and various times. That is why 
Asia in general is important (Steven Holl, personal communication, 12 
October, 2009). 
I quote Holl’s response about experimental architecture in China for two reasons. The 
first is that the answer explains Holl’s critique of Chinese urban development by his 
proposal for a different typology of housing, which he thought was more appropriate to 
the Chinese situation, being Linked Hybrid. The second reason, which is more closely 
related to the discussion of this chapter, is that Holl’s answer reveals his attitude against 
current trends in Chinese society. By this, Holl’s practice is comparable to the nishi 
(against the trend) of the model worker, Zhou Guangquan, as I introduced in Chapter 5, 
who refused to change his job when everyone else was leaving the factory. 
The construction of Linked Hybrid directly pitted two cultural systems against 
each other: that of an American architect’s endeavour to influence the sustainable 
development of a society from his perspective against that of the local practitioners’ and 
users’ Confucian-oriented community model of hexie guanxi (harmonious relationship). I 
have presented how the social and spatial orders of the site were disrupted and then 
appropriated by guanxi and mianzi in Chapters 3 and 4. When the Linked Hybrid 
residents and developer chose to close the open community designed by Holl, this 
incident brought the complex and hidden Chinese cultural systems of compliance and 
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manipulation to the surface. Liang Jingyu, a Linked Hybrid user, explained that walling 
or gating was the defacto reaction to the design of residential communities. This reaction 
is a social norm, which people follow without knowing its meaning. He also argued that 
due to this spontaneous action of walling, the phenomenon is beyond the arguments of 
the American gated-community crisis (Liang Jingyu, personal communication, 14 
September, 2010). Indeed, as I have already shown in Chapter 1 and 3, open communities 
are intrinsically alien to social norms in China. 
With Linked Hybrid, Holl finally had the chance to realise his ‘edge of the city’ 
(1991a) idea. Experimentalism, in the sense of being able to critique and take action, was 
the origin of Holl’s intention. However, in the special social and political culture of China, 
architectural experimentalism was constrained. Why? The understanding of the role of 
the local design institute in the design process helps to explain the above question. 
The Local Design Institute 
The transformation of the Linked Hybrid site from a socialist paper mill is a 
process of transformation of the state’s resources and government’s power.  The process 
involves the decentralisation of the social power system and of the transformation of 
social control. Certainly, such decentralisation enables individual entrepreneurial activity 
to emerge, although regulation inevitably limits its expansion. In the area of professional 
architectural practice, the decentralisation process also contributes to emerging private 
architectural firms or local design institutes with government background. In the 
decentralisation process, architects in local design institutes also obtain more autonomy 
to set up design studios with their own name under the larger umbrella of the local design 
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institutes. Because social regulation is still the most important issue in urban 
development in contemporary China, local design institutes with government 
backgrounds have become the most powerful design entities in China: they obtain the 
final legal rights to justify and certify architectural designs; they are the official 
regulatory bodies that all other design practices must submit to. With this professional 
practice model, the state retains the most economically profitable position in the 
urbanisation process and the most effective control over the design of every corner of the 
city. The position of local design institutes in Chinese architectural practice is 
fundamental, but is insufficiently discussed outside China. 
It is interesting to note that some of the local design institutes have been 
privatised, such as the in-house design institute of the developer of Linked Hybrid, 
Shoudu Sheji (Beijing Capital Design). This state-owned design institute was established 
in 1992 and used to operate under the Beijing Planning Bureau. The institute was 
restructured and eventually owned by the Modern Group development company in 2002. 
Still, the institute’s government background continued to play a key role in construction 
certification and project management.  
Ke Jin is the general manager of this institute (Figure 65). He graduated from the 
University of South California with a Master of Architecture degree and a Master of Real 
Estate Development degree. With this in-house design institute, since 2002, Ke Jin and 
the development company were able to monitor the progress of Linked Hybrid’s 
architectural design. However, it is difficult to determine where the origin of power is in 
professional architectural practice of China, even though administratively local design  
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Figure 65: Ke Jin’s name card from Modern Green Development Company and Beijing 
Capital Design Institute titles. (Photo the author, 2 August, 2009). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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institutes gave  the right to make decisions about their own designs. A common reaction 
from non-Chinese design entities is to regard local design institutes as xiangpi tuzhang, or 
rubber stamps in English. On the one hand, local design institutes are given 
administrative power in their professional practice; on the other hand, some professionals 
recognise them only as a tool to realise government agendas.111 From a professional-
practice perspective, Steven Holl’s architectural firm is still part of the mianzi (face) 
engineering in this kind of practical system. The American architectural office design 
team in Beijing needed to work with the local design institute, Shoudu Sheji, because 
Shoudu Sheji is the direct representative of the developer. All the changes of Linked 
Hybrid, including the new wall and the Chinese-style decorative features, were facilitated 
by this local design institute. In addition to those changes, this local design institute also 
facilitated the dissemination of Linked Hybrid ideas to other projects. Local people call 
such dissemination process shanzhai. I will closely examine the implication of this 
shanzhai process by the local design institutes in the next section of the thesis, in which I 
will argue design practice in China is also guided by another form of knowledge 
accumulation and transfer system. 
Li Hu’s Third Path 
Holl’s Chinese partner, Li Hu, who has been working on the Beijing Linked 
Hybrid project on site for half a decade, has a somewhat different reaction to the new 
wall. Instead of considering the problems introduced by suburbanisation and gated 
                                                 
111. I believe that there is an urgent need for in-depth ethnographic research on both 
private architectural offices and local design institutes in China. 
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communities as Holl did, he focused on how the recent, rapid urban development has 
destroyed the public realm. He is concerned that, without immediate action, over-
privatisation will erase the vital urban public space for social interaction, and that the 
very meaning of the city as a place for collective living will be rendered obsolete. Li Hu 
calls for new communal spaces to bring relevance back to the city and has suggested that 
the future of public space will be parasitic within existing structures and boundaries of 
the private domain. His idea, which, as we will see, can be considered close to activism, 
also contributes to the realisation of public space in development projects. He has 
described himself as always trying to subvert political obstacles put up by the developer, 
government officials, and various consultants involved in the Linked Hybrid project (Li 
Hu, personal communication, 17 December, 2009). 
Li Hu’s thinking presents an alternative strategy to the design of Chinese 
communities. In particular, he demonstrated an ability to take action and transform the 
gated community model with his Red Line Park project, which was conducted by his own 
architectural office, OPEN Architecture (Figure 66, Figure 67, and Figure 68). In a 
presentation he said: 
Recent urban development, especially in China, threatens to destroy the 
public realm altogether. Without immediate action, over-privatisation will 
erase the vital urban public space for social interaction; the very meaning 
of the city for collective living will be rendered obsolete. 
Radically new communal spaces are required to bring relevance back to 
the city. The future of the shared city lies within existing structures and 
boundaries of the private domain. Architects must courageously lead a  
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Figure 66: Image of Red Line Park portfolio in Li Hu’s office. The diagram shows how 
Li Hu perceived the strategy of converting a typical gated community wall into a Red 
Line Park. The drawings show Li Hu’s idea about how to transform a gated community, 
by adding programmes on the wall, to an open community. (Unpublished internal OPEN 
Architecture document). 
. 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 67: One of many imaginary variations of public participatory design of Red Line 
Park. (Unpublished internal OPEN Architecture document). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 68: Red Line Park. The idea was realised in the Shenzhen/Hong Kong 
Architectural Biennial 2008/09. After the biennial, Vanke Development Group agreed to 
move the installation to a real community at Guangzhou, China. (Photo captured from 
OPEN Architecture website, http://www.openarch.com). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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movement to artfully and forcefully fold/inject/carve/merge public space 
right into the heart of private developments. 
Gated community walls that once cut up the urban fabric are to be 
transformed into a system of public parks. A zero footprint park that is 
everywhere. So this is what we see as a gated community wall. This is a 
system of grassroots, self- initiated transformation that we call Red Line 
Park building to gradually displace existing walls (Li Hu, speech at 
Megablock Urbanism conference, 23 March, 2009). 
The project used the example of one of the newly developed housing areas of Beijing, 
Wangjing, to demonstrate how he could transform very limited public space into an 
unlimited amount of linear parks with community participation by turning walls into 
parks. Li Hu further explained that he used to be very radical about removing all of the 
walls, but now he tries to work more indirectly, transforming walls to blur the boundaries 
of space. He also tries to balance the benefits of investors and of residents; he designs 
with financial and user considerations in mind. Eventually, he attempted to convince the 
developers from one of the largest development companies of China to take on this 
project. He explained how the development company was very interested in this idea 
because it was something new for them: 
At the very beginning, I was very radical in my hope to remove all the 
walls. But later on, I worked in a more humorous and softer way: 
transforming the wall to blur the boundaries. I first discussed this idea 
with the development company, and they were very interested in it 
because they had not imagined that walls could be used like that. So, I 
think we have to change our ways to solve the current problem. In other 
words, if we cannot solve the problem directly, we have to change 
ourselves. Anyway, I believe the walls will eventually be removed, as 
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society is always changing. As architects, we can indirectly solve this 
problem. This kind of solution can balance the investors and design 
concept in reality, and it is more practical. We can make developers do 
something for the public, and it is a win-win situation (Li Hu, personal 
communication, 14 January, 2010). 
Li Hu’s shift from removing the walls to transforming them demonstrates local 
and cultural sensitivity. Although this strategy requires some compromise, architects can 
still contribute their style and voice to their designs. The strategy introduced new 
concepts to attempt to transform the cultural and social consequences of prevailing closed 
communities in China. So he attempts, in an activist way, to call for general participation 
from the public and convince developers to build his wall and to transform the closed 
community mentality in China. The design strategy and operating method are interwoven 
and involve sociological research, participatory encouragement in the design process, and 
persuasion of the developers. All of these processes are as important as the design, since 
they are linked together. Li Hu’s Red Line Park project is experimental, and is still a 
design on paper. 
I would like to use the Chinese concept, yidu gongdu (using a poison to fight 
against a poison), to understand Li Hu’s strategy. The Red Line Park project suggests a 
completely different approach to the desire to open up Chinese superblocks. This way of 
confronting reality is indirect, subtle, and tactical. Red Line Park attempts to gradually 
convey the new notion of open community by awakening the consciousness of the 
existence of the walls and gates first. The additional programs added to the wall are all 
intended to be public and trigger interactions between and within communities. After this 
process, a more open community may be introduced. Red Line Park project also 
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facilitated alternative working relationships between the architect and developer. It is 
about how to make use of the developer-oriented urban-development model to develop 
new ideas. The marketing of the scheme also raised the awareness of the privatized gated 
community phenomenon in China and disseminated the idea of collective design effort to 
the residents. After understanding the practices of Steven Holl, the local design institute 
and Li Hu’s Red Line Park idea, how can we rethink the professional practice of 
architecture in contemporary China? 
Who Was Designing? 
The most important questions to ask about the different practice models of Holl 
and the local design institute are how this Chinese design model works and how the 
Chinese perceive this it. The Linked Hybrid research shows how Holl’s design practice 
has developed within the Chinese context. 
Thanks to the employment of big-name foreign architects to produce mianzi (face) 
architecture, Chinese architects  have thus been able to introduce their own individuality 
in terms of architectural forms, novel community lifestyles and even their own public 
images. The social and economic changes in China have triggered the emergence of 
small-scale, independent architectural firms, which have introduced private-sector 
architectural innovations in China. There are three main generations of this kind of 
private-sector Chinese architect. The first generation involved the architects who were 
born in the late 1950s or the early 1960s, who were educated and practiced in China after 
the Cultural Revolution (1977 and onwards), but who have also experienced studying, 
teaching, or practicing abroad. The second group involves a generation of younger 
 268 
 
architects who emerged during the economic boom after the year 2000.They are currently 
in their early and mid-thirties, were educated after the reform age in 1980s China or 
overseas in leading architectural schools in America and Europe, and practice in well-
known design firms worldwide. Firms in this generation, including MADA s.p.a.m., 
Urbanus, Atelier Zhanglei, Standardarchitecture, and MAD, do research and design 
forurban and architectural developments in China.112 Both generations of architects bring 
their critical ideas to China. Zhu (2007; 2009) suggested that critical ideas about 
architecture flow in two directions since the 1990s:  
On the one hand, a new generation of Chinese architects have brought 
Western ideas of reflexivity and autonomy into China, …on the other hand, 
some Western architects and theorists—or at least some of the most ‘edgy’ 
ones—have begun to bring ideas of efficiency and ‘constructivism’ from 
China and Asia into the West (Zhu, 2007, 301).  
He argues that the outflow of Chinese ideas challenges the critical tradition of the 
West in that it also exports China’s urban development paradigm—based on speed, 
market economy, and mianzi gongcheng (face engineering)—to the West. Zhu called this 
urban paradigm ‘postcriticality’. In order to evaluate Zhu’s concept of ‘critical dialogues 
between the East and the West’ (2007; 2009), meaning the exchange of methods of 
design, it is necessary to develop a larger context for this concept. The Chinese architects 
and architectural offices that I mentioned above have indeed brought novel and critical 
                                                 
112. For a detailed discussion of the young generation of architects in China, see Liauw 
(2009). 
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ideas to China. However, local design institutes essentially dominate the professional 
practice in the country.  
Ren (2011), in her most recent publication about urban developments and 
professional transformations of the practice of architecture in contemporary China, 
suggested that scholars usually examine contemporary Chinese urbanism from the 
institutional perspective.113 Therefore, in her research, she attempted to use ethnographic 
research methods, such as interviews with practitioners and users, observational 
fieldwork at development sites and at architectural offices, so that she could establish a 
theory about what is happening from a Chinese perspective. Her argument is that the 
increasing numbers of transnational individuals, who consume, produce, and interpret 
Chinese urbanism, are constructing the global cities of China. By ‘transnational’, she 
refers to the flow of knowledge, ideas, and people across national borders. The 
negotiation processes between all these individuals provides the context for the 
construction of the built environment, including the urban scale.  
However, Ren’s (2011) argument about ‘transnational architectural production’ 
and Zhu’s (2009) argument about ‘postcritical practice’ are both based only on studies of 
a few individual architects and their intentions. Ren and Zhu assume that individuals and 
architectural practices in China operate the same way as in Western society. The 
limitation of this research assumption is that it neglects some important actors in the 
construction processes of contemporary Chinese urbanism who are not considered agents, 
                                                 
113. By institutional perspective, Ren (2011) refers to the study of the social and political 
order for the rapid development. The critique is that there is insufficient study about the 
practitioners.  
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such as, in my research, the community members from Beijing First Paper Mill. This 
directly links to the next part of my thesis – the introduction of shanzhai creativity. 
Implications of Zhang Lian’s Routine Bus Tour 
In the summer of 2008, I needed to quickly wrap up my interview with Zhang 
Lian in his office to catch the shuttle bus back to the city. Three twenty-six seat buses 
were scheduled to leave at 4:45 p.m. to avoid the rush hour. The passengers of the shuttle 
buses were usually administrative staff because the manufacturing workers were all hired 
locally as per the conditions established by the development zone. Zhang Lian had 
forgotten to bring some of his documents when he arrived to catch the bus. The driver, a 
local resident, told me that to minimise expenses, the shuttle bus drivers were asked to 
drive on the local roads instead of the Jingcheng Highway, thereby increasing the driving 
time by over an hour. He said he would definitely wait for Zhang Lian because he was 
one of the important cadres in the factory. Zhang Lian went and retrieved his documents, 
and when he returned he sat in the first row of the bus. As the bus began moving, four of 
the senior cadres sitting at the front began to play a poker-style game called doudizhu 
(fighting landlords), which has been very popular in China for the past few decades. 
Other workers sat quietly in the back (Figure 69). A junior accountant in his twenties was 
sitting behind me. He called himself Jack. He began to speak to me in English after 
realising I was an architectural researcher from London. He told me he was from Beijing 
and that he had witnessed many changes in the city. His childhood courtyard house had 
been demolished. He admired the freedom and human rights in the West. This was a 
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Figure 69: Poker-style game in the shuttle bus from the new paper mill campus to the 
workers’ community. Zhang Lian and three other factory cadres played poker on the front 
of the shuttle bus. I sat on the second row. The rest of the passengers were quietly sitting 
at the back. (Photo the author, 18 July, 2009). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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typical Chinese critique by balinghou (the post-1980s generation).114 The bus made three 
stops between the factory and the workers’ community. Half of the workers stayed on the 
bus until the last stop. I got off the bus with the workers, but Zhang Lian stayed with the 
driver to do some maintenance on the bus. 
The paper mill’s move from the city centre to the suburban area changed the 
residents’ daily life patterns. Having to spend two hours on a shuttle every day is a direct 
consequence of the spatial development of the city. It generates new spaces for the 
factory workers. First, to adapt to the new lifestyle, playing doudizhu on the bus became 
an everyday practice for Zhang Lian. The workers also recorded the final score at the end 
of each day so that they could continue the game the next day. Secondly, the shuttle bus 
time became a time of discussion for the workers. The criticism from the young 
accountant, Jack, indicates a transformation of ideology in Chinese society. Jack was 
educated in China but his English language skills allowed him to read news from 
international websites. My fieldwork on the shuttle bus highlighted two different aspects 
of the emerging social order. The first aspect was represented by the doudizhu game on 
the shuttle bus: community reactions always arise to cope with socio-political 
transformations, thus triggering new daily experiences for ordinary citizens. The second 
aspect was demonstrated by Jack: the dialogue between the East and the West had 
                                                 
114. The ‘post-1980s generation’ is one of the most popular terms used in China. It 
means one was born after the 1980s. This term was quickly disseminated after the state 
used it in the 60th Anniversary military parade in 2009 to describe the new generation of 
soldiers. The emergence of this term is also derived from the emergence of new 
ideologies in the younger generation in China. 
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entered the everyday lives and conversations of ordinary people.115 Jack’s individual 
response to China’s contemporary politics and society is not only his own emergent 
criticism of the market-oriented development model, but reveals also the attitude of a 
whole new generation of Chinese. 
In this very last chapter of the thesis, I relate these two practices to a modern 
Chinese concept, shanzhai, which is not simply an emergent practice of adaptation, 
compliance, and conformity, but also one that critically reacts to the market-oriented 
development model and to the new modernist realities. I will extend the discussion of this 
reaction and of shanzhai to its application to urbanism and to the dissemination of design 
knowledge. Indeed, shanzhai continues to develop concepts of collectivism both of 
ancient China and of socialist China as a reaction against the new market-oriented 
economy of China. This concept, shanzhai, is different from the Maoist or communist 
collectivism, in which the emphasis was on the identities or sameness of individuals. The 
fundamental coherent force of that kind of collectivism came from the central 
government’s politics, education and propaganda. However, the shanzhai type of 
collective emphasises that a diverse collection of people can act against the homogenising 
force of the market-oriented development monopoly and even against centralised 
government ideology. In Chapter 4, I introduced mofan, or role model. It was understood 
as the political rhetoric to showcase some ideal behaviours to be emulated. Moshi, which 
can also be translated into model, refers to an effective system of manipulation. The 
extension of these two social practices to a large-scale trend in the market economy 
                                                 
115. This form of criticality by the young worker is different from that of the older 
generation of Wang Ji and Zhang Lian, who tended to express their views more subtly. 
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constitutes the practice of shanzhai. Shanzhai literally means ‘mountain cottage’. It 
implies the informal and unofficial location of production and the independence from the 
legal system; therefore, a shanzhai economy or a shanzhai culture originally refers to the 
unofficial production of legally registered products.116 The emergence of shanzhai culture 
is the reaction to the hegemony of the market economy and to the domination of global 
enterprises. Ironically, the reaction is still highly consumerist or even more market-
oriented: the practice makes use of the unregulated sector of the market and of the 
consumerist behaviour fabricated by it, in order to counteract the markets with their 
monopoly domination. This follows the yidu gongdu (using poison to fight against poison) 
idea I introduced: using consumerism to fight against consumerism. 
Developer’s MOMA Production Lines 
The Chinese name for Linked Hybrid is Dangdai MOMA (当代MOMA or 
Contemporary MOMA in English). The explanation for the Chinese name was the 
developer’s attempt to associate the community with the image of the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York MoMA.117 A Beijing architect Hui Wang (2009) pointed out 
that the Chinese name implies the notion of shanzhai behind the practical logic of the 
developer. The identification with MOMA became very popular after the design of 
                                                 
116. There is only a very limited literature about the concept of shanzhai. Y. J. Lin (2011) 
in her fieldwork research about fake cell phones, showed that it is very difficult to predict 
the future development of this kind of informal economy due to its complexity. She 
suggested it is impossible to judge the limit between illegal counterfeit products and 
innovative products. 
117. The connection was emphasised when the Linked Hybrid salesman explained to 
visitors why Linked Hybrid is called MOMA. The architectural tour was part of an event 
in the Linked Hybrid theatres in 2009. I was asked by the developer to organise the event. 
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Linked Hybrid. It meant a special serial product of the Modern Group with innovative 
green-building technology and a sustainable quality of life.  
Holl was retained by the developer after a first-round competition provided 
conventional and unsatisfactory responses to their call for ‘green architecture’ (Chen Yin, 
speech at the Megablock Urbanism symposium, 15 March, 2009). It is notable that the 
architect’s own design remained effectively unchanged throughout the design and 
construction processes. Five different types of sustainable technologies are employed: 
constant interior humidity and a slab-embedded, temperature-controlled system; air 
exchangers; exterior walls with thermal mass; geothermal wells; and a grey-water 
treatment system. The first two building technologies had already appeared in the 
previous phases of the development, but the last three systems were introduced by Steven 
Holl. Through this process, the developer’s perception of green architecture was 
transformed from simple energy-saving techniques to more holistic sustainable systems. 
This transformation of insight also changed the firm’s image and differentiated it from 
conventional developers; in 2005, the company even reformed its internal structure and 
changed its name from Modern Group to Modern Green Development. This process has 
been recognised by Ke Jin, the in-house architect at Modern Group:  
If you look at our projects, there are changes from Phase 1 to the present.  
The changes are about the transformation of our products. And we also 
changed from a general developer to the leader of sustainable development 
and architectural design (Ke Jin, personal communication, 18 December, 
2008). 
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The branding strategy of the project has also changed from ‘an international 
artistic community’ to ‘an artistic endeavour heralding sustainability’. “Technology 
builds a wonderful life” became the slogan in the developer’s latest internal publication, 
‘Dangdai Ren’ (Jiang P., 2009). As the development concepts have been changing, the 
architects’ ideas have also been disseminated and have influenced the developer’s 
production process. Speaking from one of the Beijing Linked Hybrid’s bridges during a 
conference, the director of the technological research department, Wang Zhengyu, 
introduced the firm’s ten production lines (Wang Z. Y., 2009; and see Figure 70). The 
primary line is generated by ‘Dangdai MOMA’ (Linked Hybrid), an experiment in mega 
scale housing developments, new ecological technologies, and new communities and 
lifestyles (also see Ren, 2006 for more cases). The hybrid community model has also 
been taken up as a unique line of research by the developer. In this sense, Linked Hybrid 
becomes the prototype to follow. The local development of this community successfully 
transforms an object of architecture into a set of ideas. Thus, with this process the 
architects have introduced new ideas to challenge the perceptions of the developer. Some 
of these ideas have ultimately been ignored by both developers and residents in favour of 
conventional design, but some of them have had a major impact on the future projects 
and even on the strategic direction of the developer.  
There are three layers of meaning in the case of shanzhai MOMA or Linked 
Hybrid. First, Linked Hybrid, or more precisely the Chinese version of Linked Hybrid as 
Dangdai MOMA, is a ‘fake’ (shanzhai) copy in the Chinese community of the MoMA 
brand from New York. Through its Chinese name, the developer markets the community 
with an artistic and high-end international lifestyle to the public. Thus, on this level, the 
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developer intended to project a model of lifestyle. Second, the appropriation of the 
project design, either by the residents, the developer, or the local design institute, 
transforms Steven Holl’s design into a shanzhai product of Holl’s original intention. So 
the process is more about adopting and adapting the original design. One can 
straightforwardly criticise the taste and design of Chinese residents and developers; 
however, I argue that this second layer of shanzhai is actually more productive, because 
the transformed Linked Hybrid is able to respond to local needs. Regardless of whether 
this style moves Chinese architecture in a positive or negative direction, Linked Hybrid 
becomes easier to accept within a local cultural and societal context. Thirdly, when 
Linked Hybrid becomes the MOMA prototype for the developer, the knowledge, 
ecological concerns, and eco-technology solutions are actually disseminated in China. 
This is the unintended consequence of Holl’s design and the process helps to bring large-
scale changes in China. 
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Figure 70: 
Prototyping MOMA. 
(Diagram the 
author, based 
on Wang Z. Y.’s 
speech on 16 May, 
2009). 
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Community Intervention  
The three levels of shanzhai process, which I introduced above, involved only a 
limited social circle of practitioners. In addition to these, how did informal community 
activities further change the new architecture and the new community in terms of 
shanzhai? 
The most obvious community intervention was the development of an informal 
market between Linked Hybrid and Wanguocheng MOMA (see Figure 1), located under 
the bridge of the airport expressway and along the canal (Figure 71). Currently, three 
types of activities take place in this informal market. The first is the commercial activity 
of illegal hawkers. They sell second-hand books, fake antiques, and second-hand 
domestic appliances. Some hawkers are amateurs. They bring their used things to sell at 
the market. Some of them are professional. They collect materials from different 
communities and nearby demolition sites to sell them at the market. Inspectors from the 
city management bureau come every day to stop the illegal activity. According to a 
second-hand book vendor, the inspectors usually come at 2 p.m. There are some very 
interesting dynamics between the vendors and the management bureau officials, which I 
will discuss later. The second type of activity is the recreational activity of local residents 
and workers. This includes fishing along the canal, playing musical instruments, and 
sleeping under the bridge. One of the musicians in this area is an old saxophone player. 
He indicated that the acoustic conditions under the bridge are the biggest reason that he 
plays there (Figure 72). The canal cools down the temperature and the bridge shades him 
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Figure 71: Informal market under airport expressway in front of Linked Hybrid Under the 
shade, illegal vendors were selling second-hand goods on the ground. The photograph 
was taken around 10 a.m. Residents from surrounding areas stopped by and shopped. 
(Photo the author, 21 June, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 72: Resident playing musical instrument along the canal. (Photo the author, 30 
June, 2009). 
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from the sun. Many workers from construction sites around this area also come to this 
place to take a nap in the afternoon. The third type of activity is the parking and resting of 
taxi drivers. At some moments in the day, hundreds of taxi-drivers park their cars in the 
shadow of the bridge. Some drivers even park their cars and sleep overnight. The history 
of this market was recalled by Qiu Lai. The market used to be one of the most famous 
marketplaces in the district. Fresh meats, fish, and vegetables could also be found there. 
The new unofficial practices formed in the late 1980s and became well developed in the 
1990s: 
The piece of land used to belong to our paper mill, on the two sides of the 
canal… But we did not use the land. In the past, the property’s owner was 
not clear: it belonged to whoever was using it. Our paper mill did not use 
it and did not wall it. So it gradually became an informal marketplace…In 
the beginning, there were just a few stalls; then many other people joined. 
Afterwards, the Hebei Province Beijing office built a wall and started to 
manage the market and charge them management fees. Then it became 
semi-official… When the paper mill was demolished, the market was also 
demolished (Qiu Lai, personal communication, 14 July, 2010). 
However, after the paper mill and the marketplace were demolished, vendors 
came back to continue their businesses. Qiu Lai explained this phenomenon in the 
interview as well: 
The market used to be gigantic, but many of them were forced to move 
away. All of them are not licensed, so the city management bureau is 
working on the situation. How can this area remain as an informal market? 
It is a place beyond the control of the government. This side is the 
Dongcheng District, but that side is the Chaoyang District. So this place is 
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the intersection of two municipal districts… Sometimes inspectors from 
the Dongcheng District may come and sometimes those from Chaoyang 
may come. The hawkers know about this. So when those from Chaoyang 
come, they will move to the other side and vice-versa. They just need to 
move their goods by pulling the clothes under them (Qiu Lai, personal 
communication, 14 July, 2010). 
The uncertainty of the ownership of the land was settled by the redevelopment of 
the site, but the ambiguous municipal responsibility was another reason that the hawkers 
were able to remain on the site. Apart from the institutional reasons, I found another 
reason for the market to remain on the site—an informal network of guanxi. This 
informal network exists between the hawkers and the city-management inspectors. The 
relationship between the hawkers and the inspectors is not purely between those who 
hold power in the community and those who do not; instead, they know each other 
personally. I found that not every inspection caused a serious hindrance to the informal 
market. On some days, the inspectors came and chatted with the hawkers like friends, and 
no one moved away. Some hawkers even revealed the fact that they sometimes give free 
goods to the inspectors to maintain their relationship.118 
The resilience of this informal urbanism between the two housing communities is 
an intriguing phenomenon of the site. The informal and unofficial activities colour an 
entire superblock community. Qiu Lai and other vendors told how they use various 
tactics to continue the informal market. Indeed, those concepts I introduced in this thesis, 
                                                 
118. The hawkers did not use the word ‘bribe’ in the interview. However, they mentioned 
sometimes that the inspectors would take away their things and they were forced to 
concede. 
 283 
 
including guanxi and mianzi, are all common strategies for taking action against the total 
control and privatisation of the area. Secondly, the findings from my market fieldwork 
put in question the state bureaucratic structure and emergent individual behaviour. 
Politics are ineffective in this type of social organisation.119 Finally, the informal market 
blurs and deconstructs the territorial boundaries. In terms of spatial organisation, the two 
separated superblocks were reconnected by the sharing of the in-between space. This 
community de-territorialisation process suggests an alternative form of construction of 
public space in what is otherwise a highly institutionalised city structure in China. 
Upgrading Workers’ Community 
Like the chai character on the wall, which we saw in Chapter 3, the dakong 
characters can also be easily found in all old housing units, including some one-story 
danwei dormitories (pingfang) and tower dormitories (loufang) built in the early 1990s 
(Figure 73). However, they have different ideologies behind them. Chai was introduced 
as a representation of institutional power enabling rapid urban development by 
demolition, based on the assumption that the living conditions of the demolished housing 
are well below the standards of modern life. Dakong operates from the other end: it 
represents a continuous improvement to the living conditions of poorly designed housing 
in a sustainable way. 
Dakong (打孔) literally means drilling holes. The two characters are usually 
printed in the hallways of old-style residences. I also found these markings at the paper-  
                                                 
119. This finding also closely relates to what T. Gold (1998, 222) meant by Chinese 
society being regulated by social order, instead of law. 
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Figure 73: Dakong advertisement outside Wang Ji’s flat. Before entering Wang Ji’s flat, I 
found the advertisement on the wall outside when I left . The advertisement is translated 
as ‘Installing AC, hole drilling, piping’. Wang Ji said the advertisements were vandalism. 
The residents’ committee had already cleaned the wall once before, but the 
advertisements came back very quickly. (Photo the author, 1 September, 2010). 
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mill housing units of both Wang Ji and Zhang Lian (Figure 73). Wang Ji’s tower is 
slightly newer than Zhang Lian’s, but both severely lack infrastructure. At the time when 
the two types of housings were being built in the early and mid-1990s to solve the living 
problem of the workers, the housing designs were severely underdeveloped. Some of the 
basic domestic infrastructures, including air-conditioning systems, hot-water supply 
systems and telecommunication cables were not integrated into the construction of the 
housing. Within no more than twenty years, the living environments and building 
technologies in this kind of housing were considered backwards and unacceptable. 
Therefore, a pervasive and informal network of businesses evolved to help residents to 
drill holes in their concrete walls to install pipes for air conditioning, water, and electric 
systems. Chai and dakong signs are the two concepts that are emerging in Chinese 
society to deal with new, rapid urban development—total redevelopment and gradual 
renovations. Linked Hybrid took the first approach by totally replacing an industrial site. 
The workers’ community, without any financial support, used the second method through 
ad hoc hole-drilling activities. 
When I visited Zhang Lian’s home in September, 2010, he had just moved back to 
his new apartment after a two-month renovation job. He explained that his son rented a 
place near his office and lived alone, so Zhang Lian and his wife decided to use the 
opportunity to reorganise the space in their own apartment. They had new air 
conditioners and a hot-water boiler installed. These additional installations required the 
assistance of the hole-drilling workers. They did not contact these people directly, but 
their renovation team coordinated it for them. At Wang Ji’s tower, hole-drilling 
advertisements were glued or printed everywhere on the walls of the hallway. When 
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Wang Ji installed his air conditioners, he asked the people, whose adverts they were, to 
drill holes in his walls. 
The informal marketplace and the hole-drilling businesses are considered 
antithetical to the notion of a modern city, which is why both are considered illegal. Can 
the hole-drilling businesses fulfil the rapidly increasing expectations for obtaining higher 
living standards? The short answer is a disappointing no: the environmental impacts of 
the air-conditioner installations by hole-drilling businesses lag far behind the high-tech 
sustainable building technologies of places like Linked Hybrid. As long as Linked Hybrid 
remains an exclusive community for the rich, sustainable-building technology is no more 
than a branding instrument for the developer to please a trendy ‘low-carbon’ culture. 
Thus, sustainable building technology is only accessible to the higher class, while gradual 
renovations are marginalised and become the only expedient for the lower class. The 
advanced technology may always be only accessible to the wealthy. But what I would 
like to address in this section is that the dakong business, specifically as a kind of 
community-oriented building upgrade strategy in China, actually suggests a more 
efficient and sustainable way to handle the massive scale urban redevelopment practice in 
contemporary China. Different from chai, which takes the tabula rasa strategy, dakong 
involves the idea of adding new infrastructure to old buildings. 
A Community for Netizens 
Due to the particular political atmosphere, explicit critiques and direct 
confrontations of different ideas are still limited and inaccessible to the public in China. 
Critical dialogue between different views and ideologies only takes place in some 
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architectural forums in the city. However, in recent years, the proliferation of digital 
communities in China seems to provide an alternative and more accessible sphere. 
Technological communities are capable of providing the infrastructure for the emergence 
of new voices to be heard with in superblock spatial organisations. 
China is the country with the world’s largest population of ‘netizens’—nearly 300 
million Internet users in 2008, which represents a 56 per cent increase over 2007. Indeed, 
the China central government has perceived the Internet as a platform for facilitating a 
‘harmonious society’. On a societal scale, some individual reactions will be ‘harmonised’ 
by the market or political means, such as in the chai story I introduced in Chapter 3 about 
how the power of signs on wall controlled residents. But recent events indicate that 
perceptions may be shifting towards enabling the development of ‘harmonious society’ 
via the safety of Internet expression.120 Secondly, the development of a virtual society is 
also a response from society’s grassroots in reaction to the market-economy oriented 
society. The popularisation of virtual technology, such as the internet and its applications 
in third-generation cellular phones, are becoming an emergent and gigantic force of 
globalisation. 121  However, from the community perspective, it allows communities to 
                                                 
120. A Chinese sociologist, Li Y. (2007), suggested two moments in the development of 
virtual communities in China: the lack of coherence and the uncertainties of approved 
‘freedom’. He suggests that virtual communities can allow the public a discussion of the 
injustices and inequities they face in actual society. This allows a temporary catharsis by 
the people, while the forum administrator can delete some communications to avoid their 
dissemination. 
121. Apart from the Internet, cell phone SMS communication is also an important subject 
of study to understand the phenomenon of digital social activities in China. It is argued 
that the proliferation of SMS communication is because the Chinese are deeply 
influenced by Confucian education to desire a more indirect way of communication. See 
Ning (2007). 
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form and therefore enforces local identities. This allows local closed communities to 
form in opposition to large-scale developments. Thirdly, the intentions behind virtual 
censorship, which involves a series of defensive policies undertaken by the Chinese 
authorities, is to prevent China’s domestic cyberspace from being merged with foreign 
cyberspace, and to keep the apolitical and political domains of computer-based 
communications separate (Qiu, 1999, 3). This censorship is similar to mianzi engineering: 
to hide the zang luan cha (dirty, messy and poor condition) areas of the city. Finally, the 
rapidly developing cyber domain in China is not any slower than the speed of 
urbanisation. We can even imagine another layer of digital urbanisation mirroring the 
actual urban-development process in the Chinese cities: the organisation of virtual space 
follows the organisation of physical space into superblocks. This means that the 
wangshang xiaoqu (virtual micro-community) websites have already established 
individual virtual communities according to all actual communities in China and that they 
wait for the residents to join.122 If a critical mass of residents joins the virtual 
communities, it becomes a platform for residents from the same community to share 
information, organise activities, and even generate collective decisions of governance. 
Therefore, on the on hand, virtual space helps to connect the fragmented territories of 
community by providing channels of communication, but, on the other hand, it also 
reinforces the concept of the territory by following the physical gated community model. 
Numerous virtual platforms have been developed in different fields, creating gigantic 
database exchange networks, such as Zhulongwang and architectural discussion-board 
                                                 
122. See microdistrict web site, www.wsxq.com. 
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systems in the architectural field.123 Therefore, the virtual community in China becomes 
an emerging source of power to generate more community participation in politics, 
society, and governance. 
The virtual activity of the Wanguocheng MOMA communities is active on the 
Sohu Focus website (http://house.focus.cn). The website was established by a real-estate 
trading interface company. There are more than four thousand people registered on the 
community’s online discussion board. Among these four thousand netizens, many are 
real-estate agents, interior designers, and local community-service workers. Below is a 
discussion from the online community about an accident that occurred in the MOMA 
communities, including Linked Hybrid: 
A [Resident]: On 27 June, at 19:00, what happened to the person who 
jumped from the eighth floor? Armed police, 110, and 119 all came. 
Accidentally fell from the eighth floor.  
B [Nonresident]: I heard it was someone who repaired the A/C and 
accidentally fell down.  
A [Resident]: Actually, someone just accidentally fell down. 
C [Resident]: There were four or five armed policed cars. Someone forgot 
to bring the keys. Seems like the thing he grabbed broke, then…  
A [Resident]: Foreigner tenant, the keys were lost on the eighth floor, so 
he tried to climb from the seventh floor, but fell down. 
A [Resident]: I saw it personally. Someone fell down from the seventh 
floor. 
D [Nonresident]: It seems like a Chinese person. Not fatally injured, only 
                                                 
123. See Zhulongwang, http://www.zhulong.com. Architectural Online Discussion Board 
System, http://www.abbs.com. 
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broken bones; [I saw him] still using his phone. He must be a tenant from 
the eighth floor.124 
The residents speculated about what actually happened in their community. In the 
virtual community, residents comment on issues, promote their services or ideas, operate 
businesses, and call for general participation to protect their legal rights. Adam 
Greenfield’s (2009) concept of ‘technosocial organisation’ attempted to explain similar 
phenomena. Greenfield (2010) clarified the concept of ‘technosocial’ with five 
characteristics:  
- The use of data visualization by municipal government to refine the 
delivery of services, more precisely target interventions, and otherwise 
realize latent efficiencies; 
- The use of data visualization to deepen the collective understanding of 
the spatial distribution of issues and resources in cities; 
- The use of networked informatics to connect citizens directly with 
municipal government; 
- The use of networked informatics to support initiatives in deliberative 
democracy, and other forms of collaborative problem-solving; 
- Citizens using networked informatics to coordinate their own activities, 
and supplant the inadequate measures of underfunded or entirely 
absent government (Greenfield, 2010). 
My case study fulfils the last four of them. The development of virtual Chinese 
superblock contexts transforms consumers to constituents and communities to social 
networks. This digital social network may potentially develop into a feedback system that 
                                                 
124. http://house.focus.cn/msgview/122/192940038.html, accessed on 14 April, 2011. 
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will become more at attuned to its constituent parts, both to expand interactions and to 
provide real-time responses to service availability and allocation. Another ad hoc term on 
the Internet, digital socialism, creates a contrast to the traditional political socialism of 
pre-reform China.125 The difference between new digital socialism and traditional 
Chinese socialism is the recognition of individual agency. The new digital socialism 
provides an open platform for individuals to act and react. It is a collective of different 
behaviours and ideologies. In the old socialism in China, authority and agency was 
centralised among elite officials. Another posting was found on the same bulletin board: 
Since Zhaoshang Housing Management was replaced by Savills Property 
Management, property owners have been tortured. Today they rebuild the 
gate, tomorrow they dig the ground, the day after tomorrow they change 
our resident card and add 100 security guards. (Interestingly, the new 
cards are the old cards with a sticker, but they were portrayed as 
something high-tech.) The nice 40 meters wide gate has been closed, 
leaving just 10 meters for people to use. They explain this as tight 
management. Regrettably, they rent out the basement to the migrant 
workers. Their big families freely walk in and out of our towers and our 
elevators. Even with more security guards, there are more burglaries, and 
finally we had to depend on the police. Now we are not even allowed to 
enter the gate if we do not have our resident card. Originally it cost 10 
yuan, but now it costs 60 yuan…Once the new gate was constructed, each 
household only has three cards. If you ask for more, they will tell you too 
many cards slow down the system. If you lose your card, do not 
complain—it is too expensive to replace one at 60 yuan. The guard will 
only recognise the card but not your face. If you feel upset, they will only 
                                                 
125. For further discussion about digital socialism, see Kelly, 2009. 
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tell you to speak to their supervisors. If you really talk to them, they will 
only tell you that these are the rules to see if you will get angry or not. 
(Wangguocheng MOMA resident).126  
Internet communities are constructed from residents’ subjective opinions and 
personal whims, so virtual space is an emotional and often irrational space. Rumours, 
reactions, and conflicts between social groups disseminate faster and exaggerate easily. 
The above quote is from a resident who responded to the newly constructed gate at 
Wanguocheng MOMA in 2009. Over one year, there were 3,449 clicks on this angry 
comment. The direct link between digital-community and physical-community transfers 
the subjectivity and uncertainty of the digital world to the actual built environment. Once 
more residents become the constituents of the community; they take ownership over the 
design, use, and definition of the space.  
Shanzhai Culture and Urbanism 
I have discussed the practice of shanzhai as being more than a simple criticism of 
Chinese illegal counterfeit production in recent years. I borrow the explanation from 
IDEO, a creative marketing firm in America who introduced this concept in one of their 
company publications. IDEO argued that the practice of shanzhai is about enlarging the 
range of design strategies by the practice of prototyping: 
Shanzhai mobile phones have at least 2 SIM card slots. This may not be an 
award-winning design concept, but it effectively addresses the needs of 
                                                 
126. See http://house.focus.cn/msgview/122/177107861.html. Website accessed on 14 
April, 2011. 
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Chinese residents who often use an additional local number when they 
travel. Shanzhai is about implementing resident needs in a short period of 
time. It runs on the spirit of ‘put it out there and see how it goes’. 
Production cycles are very short and quality may be compromised, but 
over time the product is improved and becomes more stable (IDEO, 2010). 
Thus, model emulation in China developed into the design idea of prototyping 
(adapting or adopting prototypes for specific design contexts): the prototypical 
transformation adapts products to the current needs of society, such as the fake iPhone 
design with 2 SIM card slots. 127   
I argue that two essential notions make up the idea of shanzhai. The first one has 
to do with the informal side of urban evolution and transformation. Mehrotra (2010) 
proposed that informal urban developments go beyond the normal understanding of 
poverty and marginalisation. The informal city creates the essential conditions for 
correcting or compensating for the unequal distribution of resources and that it is more 
about tactics, innovation, and long-term survival than merely participating in an 
                                                 
127. James Leach (2004) suggested two modes of creativity. The first is called 
‘appropriative creativity’. This type of creativity is mainly based on the Euro-American 
perspective on individual agency, hence the ideas of appropriating from nature (man over 
nature), producing objects and owning the objects. Therefore, law is set up to protect the 
rights of an individual’s creative work (e.g., copyrights) and fake products are prohibited. 
Leach called the second mode ‘distributed creativity’. This mode of creativity was 
discovered his research in Melanesia, where he observed indigenous people making a 
type of artwork by developing their ideas based on other people’s ideas. According to the 
Chinese practice of shanzhai, or reproducing or adapting other people’s designs, Linked 
Hybrid’s design can be broken down into many ideas that became prototypes of 
architectural form, ecological strategy, branding, and real estate model for developers and 
designers to follow nationwide in China. In addition, Chinese designers evolved with the 
study and application of Linked Hybrid’s methods. Therefore, the design of Linked 
Hybrid evolved through the collective efforts of many ‘designers’ in China. Therefore, 
studies of shanzhai can further develop the idea of ‘distributed creativity’ with the 
Chinese context. 
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unofficial system. In the case of Linked Hybrid, the informal market I introduced 
previously is the reaction of institutionalised urban control and mianzi gongcheng (face 
engineering). If urban control and mianzi gongcheng represent the institutional 
appropriation of the space and the aesthetics of the city, then the resiliency of the 
informal market enables the suppressed use of space and reaction to this political 
idealism and challenges the institutionalisation of urbanism. Mehrotra understood the 
fundamental essence of informality as tactics, which are also related to the practice of 
guanxi and mianzi, which I introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. 
The second notion (and particularly the informal essence) of shanzhai urbanism is 
related to the discussion of civil society in China. Chamberlain (1998) used the 
expression ‘civil society with Chinese characteristics’ in his review of Brook and Frolic’s 
book (1997) on civil society in China. Chamberlain (1998) also noted that Brook’s 
chapter (Brook, 1997) expressed ambivalence about the connection between Chinese and 
Western civil society, and argued that the internal logic of socialist propaganda is not a 
real component of civil society. This argument reflects the self-organised community 
activities I introduced in Chapter 2—for example, when the workers came together to 
donate money and help the victims of a fire accident in their community.  
I would also like to emphasise the difference between the Western idea of civil 
society and equivalent ideas from China.128 The criticism of the majority of current 
                                                 
128. Many other terms are used by the Chinese to talk about what they see in Chinese 
history as the equivalent to civil society (Des Forges, 1997), such as ‘civilised society’in 
the seventeenth century, ‘city people’s society’ (shimin shehui) in the nineteenth century, 
and ‘public people’s society’ (gongmin shehui) in the twentieth century. Walker (1999) 
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research on Chinese civil society is that it puts too much emphasis on formally organised 
and voluntary institutes and not enough on informal associations (Walker, 1999). Frolic 
(1997) suggested Confucian teaching emphasised service to the state, and then 
communist practices during Mao’s age further reinforced this idea. Therefore, Chinese 
civil society is defined more by elites persuading the state to implement certain reforms 
instead of a critical mass of dissidents challenging the state. In this way, civil society in 
China is expected to lubricate the state system. So, this again reinforces the idea of a 
Chinese culture of compliance and manipulation that I explored in Chapter 4, or of how 
to effect changes without rebelling. 
From an anthropological perspective, S. Lu (1999) discovered a special civic 
activity created by residents in a Chinese community, called kandashan (literally 
translated as fervent talk about random topics), which seems to add a civil society 
element to Chinese communities. This kind of community activity aims at two objectives: 
one is to simply to amuse, and the other is to express individual influence by showing off 
knowledge about politics. In S. Lu’s study (1999), she discovered that a group of people 
speculated about which political leader had more power than others. The shuttle bus story 
I described provides a new environment for residents to indulge in ‘fervent talk’. The 
young accountant’s critique of the disappearance of historical urbanism exemplified this 
argument. Nesbitt-Larking and Chan (1997) argued that Chinese youth has recently 
developed the idea of cynicism, or scepticism, of ideologies and social values. 
Specifically, an increase in the support of tradition and a decrease in the support of 
                                                                                                                                                 
also suggested that the idea of civil society comes from a set of problematic theoretical 
assumptions and historical connotation rooted in European philosophy. 
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government leadership has occurred. It is interesting that Chinese civil society reverts to 
the interpersonal relationships, or guanxi, that I introduced in Chapter 2. As Hjellum 
(1998) suggested, Confucian-oriented Chinese society is not composed of discrete 
associations, like Western society, but of layers of interpersonal networks of different 
categories of social relationships.129  
How does the discussion of civil society in China relate to the specific shanzhai 
phenomenon? Yang (1994) pointed out in her research about guanxi the Chinese notion 
of minjian, which means non-governmental and interpersonal regime in Chinese society. 
Minjian can be translated as ‘within people’s space’. This Chinese term also describes the 
community order that is on the reverse side of the official social order. Yang’s idea of 
minjian opened up a novel and profound field for further research about the Chinese 
equivalent to civil society in the Western world. The shanzhai practice fits with the 
description above and, in Yang’s words, would be a pure minjian practice. In the above 
section, I reviewed the stories of informal urbanism in the Linked Hybrid area with their 
shanzhai and minjian implications. They are the results of the resiliency of the informal 
economy, the social upgrading old-style superblocks, and the digital assembly of critical 
voices. These three stories demonstrate a community appropriation of the political, social 
and architectural aspects of Chinese urbanism. These three stories also help to further 
define Chinese civil society and its impact on urban development and architectural 
practice.  
                                                 
129. Hjellum (1998) further argued that the difference between Chinese and Western 
civil society is based on the difference between individual autonomy in the Western case 
and multiple linkages of self in China. 
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CONCLUSION 
AFTER LINKED HYBRID 
Practices of Adaptation 
In the morning of 2 July, 2009, a group of police officers entered the 
Wanguocheng MOMA community, the first phase of the overall development.130 I saw 
them patrolling the community and checking if foreigners had obtained a legal 
registration card from the local police station. After that, they also checked all apartments 
in the towers. A group of six police officers knocked on the door of my flat and asked 
politely if there were any foreigners in the apartment.131 They also asked if I knew any 
foreign neighbours living in the building. The inspection of the community took several 
hours that morning. Afterward, the police officers went to another community to continue 
the inspection. According to Chinese law, foreigners should report to a local police 
station within forty-eight hours after entering China. They need to register their address if 
they are not living in a hotel, as hotel staff will send guests’ information to the police 
station if required. Police notices about this rule are usually located on the bulletin board  
                                                 
130. Linked Hybrid is the fourth phase of the development. See label ‘Phase 1-3 of 
MOMA Development’ in Figure 1. 
131. The story happened on 23 July, 2009. At that time, I was staying at the 
Wanguocheng MOMA community for research. During my stay, I worked closely with 
the Linked Hybrid’s developer to help them organise academic events and the Chinese 
partner of Steven Holl, Li Hu. I usually left the apartment at 9 a.m. On the day of the 
inspection, I was on my way back to the apartment from a breakfast restaurant at 8:30 
a.m. Other than meeting with the architects from Steven Holl’s office and the developer’s 
company, I also visited the workers’ community almost everyday. I spent a week in the 
paper mill new factory in Shunyi, from 6 July to 10 July, 2009. During that period, I took 
the paper mill shuttle bus from the workers’ community. 
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Figure 74: Notice on MOMA community elevator’s wall. During my fieldwork stay at 
the MOMA community, I found this notice was posted in all elevators and lobbies. 
(Photo the author, 13 July, 2009). 
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in the elevators and the lobby (Figure 74). The notices were in three languages: Chinese, 
English and Russian. 
This experience of mine shows the tension between the centralised politics and 
changing forms of communities in contemporary China. So, at the end of this thesis, I 
will relate the transformation of Chinese communities to the larger political context. With 
respect to the political dimension, I will relate the different ideas of community with four 
generations of political leaders in China, including Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao.  
Starting from Deng Xiaoping, the political leaders recognised that two (or more) 
ideologies can exist at the same time: the new market economy and the old socialist 
legacy. This transformation directly influenced urban space and community forms. But, 
more importantly, I would like in this conclusion to explore how individuals during these 
four generations of political leaders adapted to those ideologies by examining their lived-
in spaces. I hope this last part will not only provide a conclusion for the thesis about the 
context of architectural design in China, but also open up the thesis to other potential 
research topics based on these findings. 
Pingfang in Mao’s Socialism (Pre-1976) 
Prior to 1976, Chinese communities were based on the danwei model, which had 
become the basic residential zone under a highly institutionalised spatial organisation.132 
Each danwei was responsible for its production work, as well as the housing and social 
                                                 
132. During this period, there is no bureaucratic or urban fragmentation, because the 
danwei system was indeed an excellent coordination apparatus in a bureaucratic society. 
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welfare of the workers. As an urban strategy, danwei implied a spatial zone defined by 
walls and gates, including collective workspaces, residential areas, and other social-
service facilities (Lu D., 2006a). It was an autonomous unit within the urban region, but 
its mixed programming was very different from the current situation of distinct districts 
for financial, economical, administrative, and industrial zones. The communities within 
the danwei were classified and systematised: one community included a number of ‘street 
offices’ in charge of two thousand to ten thousand residents; street offices were the 
lowest class of government office, each responsible for around eight hundred residents 
(Lu D., 2006a, 50). During the pre-reform period (before 1976), Chinese cities and 
society were more unified due to this system, and social harmony was attained through 
the danwei’s strong spatial structure. Individuals, institutions, and the government were 
all connected by the danwei system. 
In my case study, the pingfang (or workers’ single-story dormitory) community in 
the paper mill’s danwei superblock was demolished to create an image for the Olympics 
(Figure 75). This process is relevant to the Maoist pro-production ideology and the 
danwei urbanism of the early age. Pingfang can be translated as ‘flat house’. It refers to a 
one-story welfare-housing community or a traditional courtyard house area. My 
interviewee, Wang Ji, who spent more than ten years in the pingfang area, recalled that 
his original flat was around 30 square meters and that he shared this space with a migrant 
worker from rural Beijing (Wang Ji, personal communication, 15 September, 2009; 
Figure 76). Families were provided with a private room, such as the flat of the model 
worker Zhou Guangquan (see Chapter 5). Zhou Guanwu lived with his wife, his daughter, 
and his parents in a small room at that time. A Communist Party publication, Beijing 
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Zhibu Shenghuo (Liu Y., 1995, 1-2), reported that they did not have much furniture in 
their room. Guangquan could not even find a place to sit down in the night after his tiring 
work. The concepts of ‘public’ and ‘collective’ dominated the overall setting of the 
community; all infrastructures were shared, including water, lavatories and cooking 
spaces. Even within relatively more private spaces, such as in the rooms of Wang Ji or 
Zhou Guangquan, everyone had to share the space with other family members or 
roommates. Ex-factory worker Shao Xiao recalled her memory of the living environment 
of Zhang Lian when Zhang Lian and his family lived in the Pingfang area in the early 
1980s. Shao Xiao could not remember the exact year of her visit, but she thought that 
happened on March, when the weather was still very cold. At the same time, she also 
drew me a sketch of the area and the floor plan (Figure 77): 
On one afternoon in March, she [the wife of Zhang Lian] asked me to 
follow me to her home, so that we could chat and she could also collect 
her bed sheets hanging outside her house. That was the first time for me to 
see her house. In the past, they lived in single sex dormitories. 
I remember their door is facing towards the north. The structure [of their 
house] was an extension structure from an existing pingfang, which was 
facing South. Originally, the distance between rows of pingfang was wider, 
but after adding the extension, there was only a narrow alley leading to 
everyone’s home. Fortunately, her house was at the edge, so at the left 
hand side of her door was the public corridor, therefore visually it was 
more spacious. To the left-hand side of her house, there was a metal string 
[for hanging clothes or for clothes to soak sunshine]. Under her eaves, 
there were some charcoals for the hearth. 
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Figure 75: Beijing First Paper Mill pingfang dormitory. (Photo Cressica Brazier, 6 July, 
2006). 
Figure 76: Household registration form of the demolished workers’ community. The 
handwriting is the monthly rental cost of space. The size of the unit is usually from 15 
square meters to 20 square meters.  (Historical household registration document provided 
by Qiu Lai). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 77: Shao Xiao’s sketch of Zhang Lian’s pingfang flat in 1980s. During my 
interview with ex-factory worker Shao Xiao, she tried to remember the living 
environment of the pingfang area. One of her visits to Zhang Lian’s flat gave her the 
deepest impression. She drew the above sketch when she tried to explain the situation to 
me. (Label translations: 1.Xiangheyuan road; 2. West; 3. North; 4. Public lavatory; 5. 
Zhang Lian’s home; 6. Metal wire for hanging clothes; 7. South; 8. East; 9. Double bed; 
10. Window; 11. Door; 12. Bookshelf; 13. Folded table; 14. Wash basin rack; 15. Earth; 
16. Wardrobe; 17. Dish cabinet. (Sketch by Shao Xiao.) 
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After collecting the bed sheets, we entered the house. I think it was about 
10 square meters. Even though it faced the north, the west sunlight was 
shining in the room so that I did not feel it was too dark. In front of the 
door, there was a metal stand for a washbasin, a cooker, and a cabinet for 
dishes and bowls. Next to the cabinet, there was a big wardrobe. A metal 
double-bed was placed to the right, in the south-north direction. There was 
probably a small bookshelf in the small space between the bed and the 
wall. A folding table was placed by the door. The room was simple but 
tidy (Shao Xiao, personal communication, 13 April, 2011). 
This description also echoes the dayuan memories of Wang Ji in Chapter 1. The 
lifestyle of Zhang Lian and Wang Ji clearly demonstrates the community lifestyle of a 
socialist work unit, or, more precisely, a dayuan community. 
Loufang Space in ‘Socialism With Chinese Characteristics’ (1978–2002) 
In 1978, the introduction of the market economy began to transform urban spatial 
organisation. On the one hand, the ideology of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
preserved the institutionalised social outlook that focused on the former proletarian class 
and the centralisation of authority (Chen J., 2001). On the other hand, the transformation 
provided society with the alternative possibility of a market-oriented and economic 
focus.133 In terms of city development, both domestic and private developers began to 
                                                 
133. Dirlik (1989) suggested the transformation from socialism in Mao’s age to 
‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ in Deng Xiaoping’s age is the transformation 
from socialism to post-socialism in the form of ‘market socialism’ or ‘planned 
commodity socialism’. 
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turn danwei into private cities.134In terms of domestic space, I will discuss how private 
space became better defined from pingfang to xiaoqu to gongyu in this section. Chinese 
cities fragmented and became increasingly complex. The privatisation of some state-
owned units and foreign developers also played a role in these urban transformations. 
Privatised, gated communities (xiaoqu) and some danwei communities became 
autonomous, coexisting in the same area. 
In Deng Xiaoping’s era of urban and social space restructuring, the political 
rhetoric of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ involved social duality, with one 
segment of society seeking a materialistic lifestyle and pragmatic development, while 
others remained within the former socialist lifestyle (Qiu, 2000).135 By allowing some 
people to get rich first, the parts of the city inhabited by the new wealthier class became 
closed.  
Chinese scholars also suggested that the existence of the massive demand for 
housing in China is due to the self-motivation of Chinese people and the volume of their 
consumption (Zhang P., 2004). Unfortunately, this point of view was not thoroughly 
discussed. First, the self-motivation can be understood as a reaction to the shortage of 
urban housing and the Chinese traditional mentality towards property ownership. The 
housing shortage is not a new issue; it can be traced far back to the danwei era of 
the1950s when housing was categorised as a non-productive and therefore low-priority 
                                                 
134. For how developers transformed Chinese urbanism into private cities, see Pow 
(2007) and Webster (2001). 
135. One of the Chinese economists and the architects of the reform, Xue (2011) argued 
that more people recognised that there are multiple forms of socialism according to 
national characteristics, allowing socialism to retain its validity. 
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expenditure (Zhang X. Q., 2000). In the years of reform, the government was unable to 
increase the housing investment and eventually the severe housing shortage stimulated 
the growth of the real-estate market (Zhang X. Q., 2006, 333).  
The Chinese traditional mentality towards property ownership is very different 
from the European one and the contemporary Chinese market economy. Schurmann 
(1956) tried to understand the concepts of ownership, possession and occupancy in the 
Chinese traditional context: 
It is well to point out that the terminology we [European] are using, such 
as ‘property’, ‘ownership’, ‘possession’, are creations of our own 
society. … In [Chinese] land deeds, statutes, and other sources on property 
relations, the terms used to designate landed property to be transacted or 
transmitted as inheritance generally do not connote ownership but 
productiveness. Such terms are, for example, t’en [tian], ‘cultivated fields’, 
ch’an [chan], ‘productive medium’, yeh [ye], a term denoting cultivation 
in the abstract sense. … Possession was expressed by the term yu [you], 
‘hold’ and chan [zhan], ‘to appropriate for oneself’. Whereas the 
distinction between possession and occupancy was known, the European 
distinction between ownership and possession was unknown in China 
(Schurmann, 1956, 508-509). 
As Schurmann pointed out, “[in the Song and Yuan dynasty], other things than 
land were ownable in China, but land represented one of the most important objects of 
possession (1956, 508)”. In contemporary China, this statement is still valid, because the 
land is always owned by the Chinese central government and leased to developers, and 
individuals can only possess the buildings on the land, but not the land itself. The market 
and social reform in modern China opened up channels for individuals to possess 
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buildings on the land, but not the land. Moreover, the traditional idea of ‘productive 
inheritance’, purchased and inherited, is still very obvious in the contemporary real estate 
market.   
Second, the volume of consumption and the rising culture of consumerism were 
triggered by the country’s rapid economic development.136 The increase in average 
household income, driving economic growth, resulted in a high consumption rate. In 
2001, every hundred urban households owned 165 bicycles, 170 electric fans, 91 washing 
machines, 81 refrigerators, and 120 colour televisions (Zhang X. Q., 2006). Housing too 
became one of the products of the consumer market. There were around sixty thousand 
residential apartments on the real-estate market in Beijing in October 2009, and each day 
there were around six hundred new apartments on the market. However, statistics also 
show that in 2006 the vacancy rate of housing in China reached 26 per cent, compared to 
the international standard of 10 per cent. Additionally, 50 per cent of those housing units 
had been vacant for more than one year (Zhang X. Q., 2006). Housing properties became 
both investment and speculative tools. I suggest this phenomenon was related to the 
immature financial and banking system and the lack of investment products in China. 
The traditional idea of ‘productive inheritance’ and the new consumerism 
combine and form a disastrous social consequence in contemporary China: people 
purchase multiple properties but do not live in them. This phenomenon is slightly 
different from the investment or speculation in real estate markets in the West, because 
                                                 
136. In 2009, real-estate investment constituted 20 per cent of the overall investment of 
China, and it was10 per cent of the national GDP. 
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the concept of ownership is lacking in China, and the Chinese may treat the property as 
an inheritance to keep.  
Supporting evidence was found in my research at Linked Hybrid to demonstrate 
the interesting phenomenon when property is just possessed, instead of used. One Linked 
Hybrid user, Wang Zhenfei, who told his life story at the beginning of the thesis, 
recounted another interesting fact about Linked Hybrid. He learnt from his friend, who 
worked in the development company, that the developer’s original intention of 
constructing Linked Hybrid was to create an ‘inheritance’. He agreed with his friend that 
an apartment of only 250 square meters with two bedrooms but three bathrooms is not 
reasonable. He agreed that Linked Hybrid became an inheritance for rich people to 
collect as they collect expensive antiques (see Figure 78, Wang Zhenfei, personal 
communication, 10 December, 2010). 
The domestic environment and the concept of loufang (multiple-story housing, 
such as the welfare housing in the northern zone of the paper mill) was the spatial product 
of Mao’s socialist and collective ideology in work units (Figure 79 and Figure 80).137 
This type of housing was not only a solution to increase the density of Chinese cities with 
multiple-story welfare housing, but was also the result of the transformation from Mao’s 
socialist welfare society to Deng’s market-oriented society. Indeed, loufang housing is 
the only type from the socialist era being privatised by its residents. The difference 
between luofang and pingfang is that the former went through the process of privatisation 
                                                 
137. Even though luofang, a denser typology of housing was widely built in Urban China, 
there was still the problem of housing shortage (Song, Chu, & Chen, 2004; Groves, Muris, 
& Watson, 2007). This was due to the undeveloped housing allocation system based on 
rank, seniority, and the availability of public housing stock (Song, Chu & Chen, 2004). 
 309 
 
Figure 78: Advertisement To Possess Linked Hybrid. The translation of the title is that 
“Dangdai MOMA (Linked Hybrid) set up the collection order of luxurious space”. On the 
right hand side, the developer tried to compare fine art  with the delicate interior space of 
Linked Hybrid. (Image captured from marketing booklet, Modern Group, n.d., Dangdai 
MOMA, n.p.). 
  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Luofang
Zhang Lian, when the factory (northern industrial zone) was being demolished for the 
construction of Linked Hybrid. (Photo Zhang Lian). 
 
 
Figure 80: Workers’ community. The image shows the six-story tall loufang in the 
workers’ community. This type of luofang, with concrete and brick structure, is the 
commonest type constructed in the 1970s and 1980s. The loufang in the image was the 
oldest workers’ housing in the paper mill community. (Photo the author, 16 June, 2009). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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(through buy-out of the property by the users) in early 2000, but the latter was mainly 
demolished during the same period (such as the demolition site I introduced in Chapter 3). 
Both the ex-worker Wang Ji and the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian eventually 
participated in the privatisation process (or buy-out scheme in their own words) of their 
welfare housing in the early 2000s. This also represents the transformation of the danwei 
welfare dormitory to an actual private xiaoqu.138 
After buying their properties, Wang Ji and Zhang Lian had a greater interest in 
putting money into the renovation. The renovation personalises the home, which was 
never the case in pingfang spaces during Mao’s period. Wang Ji’s flat is located on the 
sixth floor of a nine-story building. The flat is a two bedroom, one living-room (liangshi 
yiting) unit (Figure 81). The size is around 60 square meters with private bathroom and 
kitchen. A small living room is located right near the entrance of the flat (Figure 82 and 
Figure 83). Wang Ji put a small dining table, a shelf, and a big refrigerator in this room. 
Two rooms are located at the southeast and southwest corners of the flat to obtain 
maximum sunlight. Wang Ji’s bedroom is on the southeast corner, with a balcony facing 
east (Figure 84). This room is bigger than the living room, and Wang Ji can put a sofa, a 
small table, a king-size bed, a cupboard, and a television in this room. The balcony is 
enclosed with aluminium windows to give extra space to the flat. The other room at the 
                                                 
138. Forrest (2008) also showed that the privatisation movement of welfare housing in 
China demonstrated the political and ideological change of the Chinese government 
towards new social and economic structures. For Forrest, the change involved housing 
providers becoming enablers, and tenants becoming customers; moreover, government 
gave more freedom to private and semi-private development agencies or institutes. In my 
research at Linked Hybrid, the former change relates to the dramatic change of lifestyle 
in the workers’ community while the latter relates to the redevelopment of the factory and 
the very opportunity to construct Linked Hybrid.  
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southwest corner is occupied by his daughter, who is a high-school student (Figure 85). 
This room is relatively smaller, but it is big enough to have one single bed, bookshelves 
and a desk for study. A linear kitchen is between these two rooms. 
Another factory worker, the propaganda cadre Zhang Lian, lives in a different 
building in the same community. His tower was built slightly earlier than Wang Ji’s. The 
tower is a slab building facing east. Zhang Lian and his wife live on the ninth floor of this 
fifteen-story building. Their son has just moved out and lives by himself in another rental 
flat closer to his workplace at Wangjing on Northeast 4th Ring Road. The western side of 
the building is made up of linear corridors connecting the flats (Figure 87). Therefore, 
only the eastern side of each flat has windows. 
Zhang Lian’s flat measures approximately 60 square meters (Figure 86). The size 
and arrangement of the rooms are similar to Wang Ji’s flat, consisting of a small living 
room with no windows, a private kitchen and bathroom, and two bedrooms on the eastern 
side of the flat. The master bedroom also has an enclosed balcony facing the buildings of 
Linked Hybrid (Figure 89 and Figure 90).139 Zhang Lian recently removed the wall of the 
kitchen to enlarge the living room. A small dining table, some chairs and a small cabinet 
almost occupy the entire living room. As Zhang Lian’s son has just moved out, he 
converted the master bedroom to a living room so that he could put a full-size sofa bed 
and a television in this room (Figure 88).140 The balcony is used as a storage room for his 
                                                 
139. This is the side of the apartment that was influenced by the construction of Linked 
Hybrid. 
140. Zhang Lian’s son was living with his parents until 2010. Zhang Lian explained that 
the reason he moved was that his son would like to live closer to his place of work in the 
Wangjing area. They had no choice but to rent their apartment. Zhang Lian and his wife 
 313 
 
son’s things. He explained that they will clear this space later when his son has settled 
down. Zhang Lian and his wife sleep in the smaller bedroom, which used to belong to 
their son. 
The layout of these two flats at the workers’ community represents a transitional 
stage from the collective and open lifestyle of pingfang to the privatised and consumerist 
lifestyle of the new community. Residents tend to reverse the public and private zones in 
their flat, such as using the private master bedroom as a public gathering space. The 
limitation of the size of apartment might influence such actions. Moreover, in terms of a 
northern Chinese culture, the bed, or kang, functions the same way as a sofa in the West, 
serving as a seat for guests. Small living rooms and big bedrooms also reflect the 
utilitarian functions in this type of flat, because, first, social gatherings may take place in 
the community space in the factory and, secondly, they facilitate two families sharing one 
flat.141 Wang Ji’s flat keeps most of the original settings, whereas the changes made by 
Zhang Lian show how domestic life has changed. The two main changes, opening up the  
                                                                                                                                                 
also complained to me about the unaffordable real estate prices in the area. Forrest (2009) 
suggested that one of the unintended consequences of neoliberalisation on housing policy 
is that the younger generation will enter homeownership at a later stage than did their 
parents. His research focused on analysing cases from Japan and the UK. His study may 
also apply to the Chinese case, even though Zhang Lian’s case is more complex due to 
the situation in Beijing. Zhang Lian and his wife entered homeownership through the 
overall privatisation of the welfare housing. So this meant the purchase of their property 
was still affordable and regulated: and this process did not change Zhang Lian’s family’s 
financial situation. When their son tried to buy a home, he was confronted with a free 
market that lacked regulation. 
141. As Zhang Lian pointed out, there are still many flats in his building with the same 
layout as his that are shared by two families. In this way, each family can have a bigger 
bedroom, while the living room, kitchen and bathroom are used as shared communal 
spaces. 
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Figure 81: Wang Ji’s 60 square meters flat floor plan. 1. Entrance; 2. Living room; 3. 
Dining table; 4. Cabinet; 5. Refrigerator; 6. Kitchen; 7. Bathroom;8. Daughter’s bedroom; 
9. Bed; 10. Desk; 11. Master bedroom; 12. Table; 13. Desk; 14. Sofa; 15. Bed; 16. 
Balcony. (Drawing the author, not to scale). 
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Figure 82: Entrance of Wang Ji’s entrance. (Photo the author, 11 September, 2009). 
 
Figure 83: Living room. Wang Ji is standing in the photo. The interview with him was 
done on the glass table at the bottom left corner of the photo. In the photo, Wang Ji was 
walking toward his bedroom to talk to his wife. (Photo the author, 11 September, 2009). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 84: Wang Ji’s bedroom. The master bedroom is the largest room in the apartment. 
There was a sofa at the bottom right corner, a dining table at the bottom left corner of the 
photo. Sometimes Wang Ji invites friends to chat in his bedroom, because the living room 
is too small. (Photo the author, 11 September, 2009). 
 
Figure 85: Bedroom of Wang Ji’s daughter. Wang Ji’s wife is standing at the left-hand 
side of the image. She was cleaning the room. (Photo the author, 11 September, 2009).   
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 86: Zhang Lian’s 60 square meters flat floor plan. 1. Entrance; 2. Living room; 3. 
Dining table; 4. Kitchen; 5. Bathroom; 6. Living room (original son’s bedroom); 7. Sofa; 
8. Television; 9. Balcony; 10. Master bedroom; 11. Bed; 12. Television. (Drawing the 
author, not to scale). 
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Figure 87: Corridor to Zhang Lian’s flat. In the photo, Zhang Lian is walking towards his 
apartment. The window at the right is facing east. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 88: Zhang Lian’s converted living room. This room used to belong to Zhang 
Lian’s son. The window at the end of the room is facing Linked Hybrid. (Photo the 
author, 15 September, 2009). 
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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Figure 89: Zhang Lian’s master bedroom. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 90: View from Zhang Lian’s living room. (Photo the author, 15 September, 2009).  
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kitchen to have a bigger living room and converting a bedroom to a gathering room, met 
one larger goal: to have a bigger public space separate from his private space. 
Xiaoqu Space in Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represented Interests’ (2002–2005) 
In 2002, Jiang Zemin proposed the ‘Three Represented Interests’ ideology and 
expanded the constitution of China’s Communist Party from the representation of only 
the proletarian vanguard to the representation of the fundamental interests of the Chinese 
majority (Killion, 2006). In other words, this repositioning recognised the overarching 
market-oriented system.142 However, because of the rapid economic development, an 
overemphasis on market returns, and the focus on economic construction and 
development among multiple economic systems, social coherence became fragmented. 
The right to shape space was placed in the hands of the private developers of the old 
closed communities of the danwei work units. Xiaoqu became independent, private 
territories synonymous with concrete urban and social restructuring. In this 
transformation, the immigrant population became an important component of the social 
structure within the xiaoqu, bringing about a number of problems due to social 
stratification and injustice.  
In Jiang Zemin’s era of social and urban restructuring, the ‘Three Represented 
Interests’ ideology was an attempt to take advantage of the market-oriented development 
                                                 
142. This transformation of ideology also justified the concern for wealth. As in the 
‘Three Represented Interests’ ideology, economic development and wealth became 
benefits to the general public. This ideology is different from Dengist ‘Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics’, in which socialism is still superior to capitalism (Xue, 2011). In 
Jiang’s ‘Three Represented Interests’ ideology, the relationship between capitalism and 
socialism became more ambiguous. 
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to further restructure the social order (Solinger, 2004). In other words, the central 
government shifted from absolute domination with a primary centre to absolute but 
invisible domination with multiple centres. The central power was influenced to a greater 
degree by individual citizens.143 The city became even more dynamic with the weakening 
of the government centre in the era of Deng Xiaoping—from state-owned housing to 
private developments to the urbanisation of rural zones.144 This dynamism broke through 
the rigidity of historical systems of plans and statistics, leading to an even more mixed 
and diversified urban China (Wu F., 2004). The remains of historical development 
schemes have led to arbitrary decisions by developers and lack of overall social cohesion. 
Xiaoqu or small zone, which was used by Wang Ji in the workers’ community to 
describe the new private development of their factory, is relevant to Jiang Zemin’s pro-
market ideology. In the case study, the first three phases of the MOMA development at 
the southern zone of the original paper mill campus represent the concept of xiaoqu. 
Xiaoqu emphasises the notions of total privatisation, community management and 
engineering of superblocks, to show the social prestige of the residents, and consequently 
results in disconnected superblock urbanism.145 
                                                 
143. C. T. Huang (2011) argued that the China Communist Party is learning to face this 
reality. 
144. I have mentioned the privatisation of the welfare housing by socialist workers Wang 
Ji and Zhang Lian. For more information regarding the new dynamics of rural China’s 
urbanisation, see D. Zhou (1997) and Fan, Heberer, & Taubmann (2006, especially Part 
4). 
145. This definition of xiaoqu is based on my research materials; it may not be the same 
as in planning theory—microraion (microdistrict, see Lu D., 2006a, 37). 
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The housing manger, Qiu Lai, gave his explanation about the differences between 
the workers’ welfare housing (dayuan) and private housing (xiaoqu), such as the MOMA 
developments: 
I am living at Tiantongyuan. My flat over there is basically the same as the 
flats here (gongfang). They were all from the early 1990s. The housing of 
the 1990s usually shared a similar layout: no living room and two 
bedrooms. The living room, bathroom, and kitchen were very small. The 
modern housing units are different. They have big bathrooms, kitchens, 
and living rooms, but small bedrooms. They also have a bigger average 
size. In the 1990s, flats with 80 to 90 square meters could be considered 
large. But now, the size of the average flat is around 130 to 140 square 
meters, and some of them can be up to 190 square meters (Qiu Lai, 
personal communication, 14 July, 2009). 
Qiu Lai’s explanation focused on the changes in spatial organisation, instead of 
the political transformations. He pointed out some of the major changes of apartment 
design in China, such as the increase in size and the prioritisation of the living room 
(Figure 91). Wangguocheng MOMA (Figure 92), which is located at the southern 
industrial zone of the factory and was built in 2000, seems to be the new type of housing 
described by Qiu Lai. In Wanguocheng MOMA, the unit size ranges from 88 square 
meters for a one-bedroom flat to 337 square meters for a four-bedroom flat. For the 
biggest flats, the entire floor of the building belongs to one flat, and the elevators go 
straight to the flat. New programmes have also been introduced in these flat designs, such 
as a laundry room, a domestic helper’s room, and an ensuite master bathroom. Public and  
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Figure 91: Wanguocheng MOMA 120 square meters flat floor plan. This was the rental 
flat of my fieldwork stay in the community during the summer of 2009. The flat used to 
be rented by a Taiwanese girl, who worked in Beijing. The layout was set up by the 
previous tenant. 1. Entrance; 2. Living room; 3. Sofa; 4. Television. (Drawing the author, 
not to scale). 
 
 
 
Figure 92: Wanguocheng MOMA Xiaoqu. (Photo the author, 07 June, 2009).  
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private zones have been defined more clearly by locating all public spaces close to the 
entrances. 
Linked Hybrid Space in the ‘Harmonious Society’ (2005–Present) 
President Hu Jintao coined the term ‘harmonious society’to describe the new 
basic principle of Chinese society in 2005 (Zheng & Tok, 2007). In the context of discord 
in contemporary China, S. J. Liu (2005) suggested that Hu Jintao attempted to reconcile 
social contradictions and to re-establish social order via highly institutionalised methods. 
President Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious society’ increased the complexity of urban space and 
its social systems even more. This new institutionalised power closely linked private 
community zones to central authority. But, then, a new form of criticism of this new 
institutionalised power due to the globalisation and development of information 
technology introduced a whole new dimension to this situation by the formation of a 
completely new and powerful media platform. The voices utilising this platform often ran 
counter to the centralised concept of ‘harmonious society’. This platform demonstrated 
the emergent uncertainties in contemporary China. But this platform also heightens the 
importance of community-development strategies, allowing us to explore the possibility 
of new styles of communities, such as at Linked Hybrid. However, these experiments 
also brought on a series of more complex social problems, causing China to reconsider 
the social, cultural, and ecological sustainability of the new conception of community. 
These reconsiderations became particularly important after the global financial crisis of 
2008. At Linked Hybrid, for example, the developer became more aware of the fragility 
of the market. As Li Hu mentioned to me in the interview, he believed that the developer 
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would not have accepted the innovative design of Linked Hybrid if it had been proposed 
after the crisis (Li Hu, personal communication, 14 September, 2008). 
In Hu Jintao’s era of social and urban restructuring, ‘harmonious society’ was a 
reaction to the weakening of institutionalisation. The weakening institutionalisation is 
leading spatially to two distinct outcomes: the formation of many closed xiaoqu, and 
attempts at developing special, alternative and completely open xiaoqu by developers 
trying to distinguish themselves from other numerous competitors.146 
Linked Hybrid (Figure 93 and Figure 94) was constructed in 2003. This type of 
real estate development went beyond the typical modern housing development and those 
common housing typologies I introduced previously. Steven Holl introduced China to the 
concept of ‘hinged space’, which emphasises movable interior spatial partitions and a 
continuous spatial experience.147 In Linked Hybrid, several partitions can be folded or 
closed to create more open space. The introduction of this architectural idea also allows 
social transformations to lived space in contemporary Chinese domesticity. 
Liang Jingyu is an architect, and his office is located in one of the seven towers at 
Linked Hybrid. The open plan resulting from the hinged space design facilitates this kind 
of home-office. Liang Jingyu’s flat is a three-bedroom, 170 square meters unit located in 
                                                 
146. In China, Jianwai SOHO is a completely open residential and commercial hybrid 
community. The community was built around the same time as Linked Hybrid. 
147. ‘Hinged space’ is the idea of Steven Holl using moveable partitions to separate 
space. This design strategy further sets free the floor plan, which can be transformed 
according to particular programs during different periods of the day. Holl (2000, 226) 
explained this idea that “beyond autonomous, room-by-room space is interactive space, 
where ‘participating walls’ reorder domestic environments”. Holl also tested this idea in 
projects in the Manhattan Cohen Apartment, MoMA Tower and Theological Apartment, 
and in his Fukuoka housing design. 
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the first tower of the Linked Hybrid complex (Figure 95). His office has three long tables 
and four staff members working in the living room (Figure 96 and Figure 99). He 
converted a smaller bedroom into a closed office. However, the movable walls allowed 
an opening of this private space on some occasions (Figure 97). Liang Jingyu covered the 
larger bedroom into a meeting room (Figure 98). He explained that he chose his flat for 
the office because “the size is a reasonable working space” (Liang Jingyu, personal 
communication, 16 September, 2009). The increase in the average size of flats in the new 
market economy satisfies both the luxury lifestyle and the operational needs of small-
scale offices.  
However, Liang Jingyu’s decision to relocate his office to Linked Hybrid was 
made in 2008, when the residences were still considered an open community. During my 
interview with him, he explained that the closing of the community in July of 2009 was 
inconvenient for his home-office (Liang Jingyu, personal communication, 16 September, 
2009). The conversion of the residential space to office space follows the ‘hybrid’ 
programme concept initiated by Steven Holl to allow people to live and work within a 
superblock. But this adaptation of the residential building to home-office works best with 
the original open community design. And so, coming to the end of this thesis, I showed in 
Chapter 1 and the beginning of this Conclusion, how the residents of Linked Hybrid  
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Figure 93: Linked Hybrid courtyard. The highlighted part is the workers’ community. It 
is the housing where Zhang Lian is living. (Photo the author, 14 June, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 94: Linked Hybrid’s new proposed typology for housing. (Photo the author, 17 
December, 2008). 
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Figure 95: Liang Jingyu’s 170 square meters flat floor plan at Linked Hybrid (Dangdai 
MOMA). Liang Jingyu converted the Linked Hybrid flat to an office space. The floor 
plan shows how he had arranged the space before my visit on 14/09/2010. 1. Entrance; 2. 
Model-making room; 3.Working space; 4. Conference space; 5. Kitchen; 6.Storage; 7. 
Bathroom; 8.Office space; 9. Private office space; 10. Meeting room; 11. Bathroom. 
(Drawing the author, not to scale). 
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Figure 96: Living room used as model-making area. (Photo the author, 14 September, 
2009). 
 
 
Figure 97: ‘Hinged’ space in Linked Hybrid. The highlighted area is a small room 
enclosed by folding panels. When I was visiting the office, the room was totally open and 
was part of the working space. (Photo the author, 14 September, 2009). 
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Figure 98: Guest bedroom as meeting room. The interview took place in this room. The 
highlighted area is the small room I mentioned in Figure 97. (Photo the author, 14 
September, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 99: Living room as office space. The right-hand side of this space is an open 
kitchen. (Photo the author, 14 September, 2009). 
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broke down and adapted its architectural design, its ideas and its interior spaces in many 
ways in accordance with Chinese society and culture, and according to the Chinese 
practice of shanzhai (reproducing or adapting other people’s designs). 
In addition, this is leading to still more and new developments according to 
shanzhai practices. Linked Hybrid’s design has been broken down into many ideas that 
have become prototypes for new architectural forms, ecological strategies and branding, 
which developers and designers follow and adapt and develop nationwide in China. Thus, 
the design ideas of Linked Hybrid continue to evolve through the collective efforts of 
many designers in China. Furthermore, this process is based on a trial-and-error strategy, 
so that the more appropriate and adaptive ideas are being reused and developed by others; 
conversely, inappropriate ideas are not being disseminated. This raises a question: though 
some shanzhai practices are considered illegal and inappropriate according to 
contemporary law and professional ethics, does the example of Linked Hybrid show that 
the indigenous cultural system of shanzhai is an alternative mode from which we can 
learn? After all, it is an efficient knowledge dissemination and accumulation system, 
through which Holl’s Linked Hybrid has become an open source of knowledge. Indeed, 
after Linked Hybrid, Steven Holl is working on another housing design, ‘Sliced Porosity 
Block’, at Chengdu, a city in the interior of western China (Figure 100), but Li Hu has 
left Steven Holl’s office and is not working on this new project. Instead, he has set up his 
own architectural office, OPEN Architecture, and is currently working on projects 
outside China, for example in India. Recently, Li Hu even moved his office into Linked 
Hybrid (Figure 101). 
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Thus, to conclude this thesis, Holl’s, Li Hu’s, the developer’s and the residents’ 
involvement with Beijing’s Linked Hybrid were just the beginning of another stage in an 
on-going and continuous design evolution process. The case study of Linked Hybrid and 
its design evolution process questions existing theories of ‘postcriticality’ (Zhu, 2009) 
and ‘transnational architectural production’ (Ren, 2011), which are based on non-Chinese 
concepts, by the exploration of the indigenous Chinese concepts of dayuan, guanxi, 
mianzi, shi, mofan and shanzhai, and their relevance to Linked Hybrid. 
The findings of this thesis about these Chinese concepts of dayuan, guanxi, 
mianzi, shi, mofan and shanzhai, and about how they have affected, and continue to 
affect, the built environment in one case study only in Beijing today, Linked Hybrid, adds 
another complex cultural and social layer to explain urban development paradigms in 
China today.   
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Figure 100: Sliced Porosity Block design at Chengdu. (Image Steven Holl Architects 
website). 
 
Figure 101: Li Hu’s OPEN Architecture office in Linked Hybrid. In the image, the 
highlighted floor is occupied by Li Hu. (Image captured from OPEN Architecture 
website, http://www.openarch.com).  
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
[Copyright image removed. Refer printed version in UCL library.]
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APPENDIX 
METHODS AND THESIS STRUCTURE 
The ethnographic research methods and the related thesis structure itself, which 
are used in this thesis for studying a case of building production and inhabitation, 
differentiates this research from conventional architectural history and theory studies, 
bringing it closer to standard ethnographic studies, and thus making it interdisciplinary.148 
Following ethnographic conventions and procedures, my involvement in the analyses, 
and my presence in the writing, plays a strategic role because in fieldwork the researcher 
constantly and necessarily participates in order to explore and test theoretical and 
methodological hypotheses. For example, I needed to carefully practice guanxi 
(interpersonal relationships) with the local residents and the architects enabling me to 
participate in daily life in my chosen building, Linked Hybrid (see pp. 76-88). However, 
besides applying guanxi as a specific research technique to the Chinese context, I was 
also able to test existing understandings of guanxi through my practice of it. Another 
example is that I organised a forum to create an opportunity for the Chinese architect, Li 
Hu, and the developer of Linked Hybrid to confront each other directly (see pp. 274-275).  
My personal connections to the factory workers and to the architects, whom I 
introduce at the beginning of Chapter 2, allowed me to study the case in greater depth. 
Ethnographic studies of contemporary Chinese architecture are lacking because 
                                                 
148. An example of the ethnographic study of architecture is Blier (1995). In her research 
into the architectural traditions of the Batammaliba in Africa, she studied the meanings 
and symbolisms of the designers and the occupants. Blier called her methodology of 
studying the everyday life and the ceremonial life around the architecture ‘the anatomy of 
architecture’.  
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researchers need such personal connections, which most do not have.149 While language 
skills and cultural sensitivity are two main barriers that prevent Western researchers from 
conducting such research, lack of guanxi is a barrier to all, including native, researchers. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss ways of becoming an insider in China. Practicing guanxi, 
recognising and interpreting ganbu-nese and baixing-nese are keys to these research 
strategies. Paradoxically, and in a circular way, all these strategies require the researcher 
to have a profound understanding of Chinese language, culture and society in order to 
gain further access to study Chinese language, culture and society in greater depth. In all 
ethnographic works, indeed, the researcher habitually treads a fine line between being an 
insider and an outsider by playing, and switching between, the roles of insider and 
outsider. 
                                                 
149. There are two ethnographic studies of contemporary architects outside China, which 
I would like to discuss. One is the study of the Office for Metropolitan Architecture 
(Yaneva, 2009) and the other one is the study of Kengo Kuma (Houdart & Chihiro, 2009). 
For both studies, researchers approached the architects (Koolhaas and Kuma) personally 
and proposed their research idea. After approval by the architects, they arranged day-to-
day research activities in the architectural offices. Methodologically, these two research 
projects are quite similar: the researchers conducted many interviews with the architects 
and studied their design process and wrote about specific stories in the architectural 
offices. A major methodological difference between these two research projects and my 
Linked Hybrid research is my use of guanxi in the research process to extend the 
discussion of architecture from only architects’ intentions to the study of the total process 
of production and inhabitation of the built environment. They focus on only the architects, 
thereby contributing to the mythical view of the design powers of architects. I explode 
this mythical view of architects by bringing in the entire context of building production 
and inhabitation from the point of view of all the people involved, including even those 
who have been displaced and discriminated against. 
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Writing Emic Insights 
The ethnographic approach explores culturally specific perceptions that are 
meaningful to the social actors involved. The ethnographic approach also relies on oral 
history into how ordinary people experience changes in their built environments. Oral 
history in this thesis, again following ethnographic procedures, was collected through 
rumours and gossip, which also allowed insights behind the image of social harmony 
promoted by the establishment.150 In Chapter 3, I discuss the rumour about how 
politicians made decisions about demolishing workers’ dormitories while driving by 
Linked Hybrid. Such rumours represent ordinary people’s perceptions and derogatory 
interpretations of political realities and of newly built environments such as Linked 
Hybrid. 
Researching the oral history of Linked Hybrid is based on the standard 
ethnographic premise that people act strategically on the basis of their cultural and social 
beliefs, preferences and structures, and not on abstract and objective facts. In the writing, 
I therefore let people speak through quotations (sometimes necessarily long) and 
paraphrases of my interview transcripts. These paraphrases and quotations are also meant 
as historical records of their time for other researchers to examine in the future. In order 
to analyse these paraphrases and quotations, I situate them in their Chinese cultural 
                                                 
150. See Gluckman (1963) on the relevance and importance of gossip in ethnography. 
Gluckman explored how gossip about scandals is highly functional. He pointed out a few 
uses of gossip, such as the maintenance of the morality and unity of communities. The 
use of gossip is thus an important component in the very making of communities. 
Gluckman particularly discussed the role played by gossip to define insiders and 
outsiders of communities. My approach of using guanxi to conduct research and to 
become an insider in order to hear baixing-nese, because much baixing-nese is gossip 
about scandals, follows this ethnographic tradition. 
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contexts. But I also use them to critically address and question what other researchers 
have written about Chinese cultural contexts. The quotations and paraphrases are 
therefore not merely reflections or illustrations of contexts described by others, but 
provide evidence from which contexts can be explored and analysed, and the findings of 
other researchers can thus be refined and/or critiqued. My primary source quotations and 
paraphrases are, in other words, used as evidence. For the social actors involved in 
Linked Hybrid, including residents and architects and developers, all operate strategically 
in a dynamically transforming society. In order to understand their reactions within and to 
their cultural contexts, I analyse the relevancy of the shi philosophy (see Chapter 4). But 
the interpretation of the paraphrases then required yet another insider and native point of 
view, which, as it turned out, was very relevant to Geertz’s classic ethnographic idea of 
‘thick description’ (1973). Geertz’s notion of ‘thick description’ attempts to confront the 
problem of hidden meanings of apparently incomprehensible behaviour patterns in 
foreign cultural contexts. Geertz writes about his “constructions of other people’s 
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to” (1973, 9). In my case, when 
the dayuan community is discussed in Chapter 1, I suggest that the intention behind 
Wang Ji’s emphasis on the details of the government officials’ visit was to express his 
criticism of the mianzi (face) engineering of such a visit, even though he did not openly 
do so. With this hypothesis in mind, I intended to search for supporting evidence when I 
interviewed Wang Ji again. Then I found that Wang Ji was also critical of the seemingly 
harmonious community when he told me the story about how a neighbour of his 
community died but no neighbours were willing to help. The process of research 
including its developing methods and theories, in the very process of writing the thesis, is, 
 338 
 
according to standard ethnographic procedures, iterative. Therefore, again respecting and 
following standard ethnographic procedures, my methods and theories form part and 
parcel of the research findings and the on-going research process, from which they cannot 
be artificially separated into discrete chapters. 
Advantages and Limitations of Methodology 
The emic insights from native people challenge and enlarge conventional 
perspectives about architectural agency. Architects are no longer the only intentional and 
conscious agents in the making of the built environment; instead native people and their 
ideas, which are usually considered immaterial (see pp. 87-90), become relevant, as well 
as local cultures and their symbolic systems. I consider Steven Holl as only one of many 
agents who participate in the production of the architecture. The paper mill workers and 
the residents of Linked Hybrid are as important as the architect, Steven Holl.  
 
However, a methodology based on guanxi networks and practices is necessarily 
limited to the personal connections of the researcher. At the outset of the research process, 
I planned to include voices from government institutions about the new developments in 
the Linked Hybrid area. In contrast to my connections with the paper mill community and 
with the architectural office, I found no channels to connect with the highest 
governmental and planning institutes. Without strong guanxi connections, it would also 
be difficult to make such people speak baixing-nese to me. From the methodological 
perspective, the missing voices of the government and planning institutes is proof of the 
guanxi-oriented research methodology, which clearly defines its limits. Because guanxi is 
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personal and relative, the limitation of the methodology is also personal and relative to 
different researchers. So one needs to clearly understand these limitations before 
designing the research method and defining the scope of the research. 
Thesis Structure 
The thesis sets out to explore native theories collected during fieldwork in order 
to understand existing processes of contemporary Chinese urbanism and society. 
Therefore, I develop the thesis not in a chronological order (commission then design then 
construction then inhabitation), but in an iterative sequence that is based on six Chinese 
cultural concepts. The thesis therefore departs from a narrow analysis of architects and 
architectural design in order to aim at analysing the Chinese cultural and social systems 
involved in the entire process of production of the architecture, including its reception. I 
keep many Chinese terms in the writing of the thesis, in turn making use of the fieldwork 
evidence to explore and further refine our understanding of those terms, some of which 
have been the subject of previous studies. This use of Chinese terms allows the thesis to 
be more sensitive to seemingly ordinary Chinese expressions and concepts, thereby 
avoiding misinterpretations and the loss of specific meanings through translation. 
The six concepts were chosen from among many Chinese native concepts from 
the field. The choice of these particular concepts is based on their significance and 
relevance to the study of Chinese urbanism, culture and society and to my particular case 
study. These terms are also closely related to, and sometimes challenge, existing research 
and theories. There are two sources for the selected concepts. The first source consists of 
local residents and local media materials. The study of this type of source, therefore, 
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relates to native perceptions and knowledge about urban regeneration in contemporary 
China. The first five terms – dayuan, guanxi, mianzi, shi and mofan – belong to this type. 
The second source is myself, the researcher. The last term – shanzhai – is the only one of 
this type. At the end of the thesis, I conclude by theorising the native concepts. This term 
is also widely used in contemporary Chinese society, though not by my informants. 
Structure of Thesis 
The thesis uses the six emic Chinese concepts, which I found through my 
ethnographic research, to explain the practices and behaviours of the social actors in the 
production and inhabitation and use of the architecture. In Chapter 1, dayuan originally 
refers to the specific collective lifestyle of socialist China. This term also describes a way 
to define the territory of a large scale community for a particular group of people for the 
sake of effective governance, management and factory production. The discovery of this 
term in the Linked Hybrid case study was a big surprise to me, because before going to 
the field, I did not expect to find so many socialist legacies in contemporary architecture. 
Wang Ji’s memories about his paper mill community help to define some important 
notions of dayuan spatially and socially. Li Long’s travelling journals reflects the 
emergent modernity in the paper mill community. I suggest that the modern vision, or 
xiandai, described by Li Long is an indigenous one to the paper mill community. In Li 
Long’s way of thinking, the other side of this indigenous modern vision is xiangzhen, a 
term to describe rural conditions. The making of the urban environment was the major 
driving force for the replacement of the factory and the commissioning of Linked Hybrid. 
However, Steven Holl, the American architect, proposed a design beyond the imagination 
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of the developer and the local residents – a housing complex with no walls and many 
spatial connections. Ironically, after the building was completed, the developer and the 
local residents asked to add a wall to enclose the community. Thus, Linked Hybrid 
became a typical Chinese dayuan (big compound). 
In order to understand the dynamics between the two intentions, that of the 
architect and that of the locals respectively, I study two very important terms, guanxi 
(interpersonal relationships) and mianzi (face). The former refers to interpersonal 
transactions and the latter refers to the social values. These two concepts reveal many 
intangible and complex connections and negotiations between the workers’ community 
and the Linked Hybrid community. The study of guanxi also has many methodological 
implications. I experiment and analyse my interactions with the local residents, to further 
examine this idea iteratively. Besides that, the idea of guanxi is also used to explain how 
conflicts were resolved between the two different communities during the construction of 
Linked Hybrid, and why the open community of Linked Hybrid needed to be 
appropriated by the locals. 
In Chapter 3, the idea of mianzi is used to understand two political statements 
found in the field during the construction of Linked Hybrid. The sign of hexie (harmony) 
was printed on the wall of Linked Hybrid; and the sign of chai (demolition) was printed 
on the wall of some workers’ dormitory. These two signs represent two different 
practices of the urban regeneration process at the site. The former is a practice to 
rhetorically emphasise social consensus; the latter is a practice to publicly label and avoid 
disharmony during the redevelopment process. Mianzi engineering is the term widely 
used to describe such phenomena.  
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In Chapter 4, I intended to further study how ordinary people reacted to such big 
transformations of their living environments. Many workers chose to jump into the ‘sea’, 
or leave the state-owned enterprise to work for private enterprises. Many of them became 
siren laban (private bosses). Then eventually the paper mill declined and was replaced by 
the development of Linked Hybrid. I discovered the philosophical concept of shi 
(situation tendency) in an open letter from the paper mill. Shi implies a specific way of 
thinking about following, or complying with, the perceived general tendency. This 
concept was used to justify the decline of the factory. Shi philosophy originates from 
Chinese military culture and is still commonly used in contemporary everyday life. So 
this chapter also links the contemporary practices to traditional thoughts. Such links 
between past and present, individual actions and cultural structures, also arose iteratively 
and unexpectedly during the research. Lastly, this chapter therefore plays a critical role in 
also linking the discussion of contemporary social phenomena to the discussion of 
historic cultural systems in China. 
The objective of Chapter 5 is to discuss in detail two specific cases of how people 
face social changes. The first case is about a worker who received an award and became a 
model in the community. The second case is about an entrepreneur who privatised his 
business and this privatisation strategy became a model for other enterprises to follow. 
Ironically, both of them suffered in the end. The model worker struggled due to poverty 
and the entrepreneur was forced to give up his position because his guanxi network was 
no longer able to support him. The idea of mofan (role model) is meant to create the seeds 
of large scale trends in the society. The use of those role models explains how particular 
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political practices were developed on the basis of the specifically Chinese culture of 
compliance. 
In the last chapter, I extend the discussion of the culture of compliance to the 
contemporary phenomenon of shanzhai. I propose this indigenous concept to further 
examine the Linked Hybrid case. Shanzhai refers to the informal social practice of 
following, and also adapting, existing products or models to Chinese local culture and 
lifestyle. This idea challenges the conventional notion of design agency, which originates 
from a centre and is protected by the legal system. Linked Hybrid was transformed by 
adding walls to adapt to local cultural expectations, thus becoming a case of shanzhai. 
Moreover, my discovery of the dissemination by developers and other native architects of 
the altered and appropriated Linked Hybrid model also supported my shanzhai 
hypothesis. The study of the shanzhai processes at Linked Hybrid then develops the idea 
of Chinese appropriative agency, thereby challenging the relevance of the application of 
modernist ideas of sole authorial agency in architecture to the Chinese context. 
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GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS 
baixing. 百姓 ordinary people. 
balinghou. 八零后 post-1980s generation. 
chai. 拆 demolition. 
chuangguan.闯关 breaking through the barriers. 
da shichang da wuye. 大市场大物业  Big market big enterprise property. 
dagong. 大公 Large public. 
daguofan. 大锅饭 big wok rice. 
dajiefang. 大街方 superblock. 
dangci. 档次 social hierarchy. 
dangdai moma. 当代 MOMA Contemporary MOMA. 
danwei. 单位 work unit. 
dayuan. 大院 big community compound. 
dazhishang hexie. 大致上和谐 generally harmonious. 
dazhong shuiping. 大众水平 popular standard. 
doudizhu. 斗地主 landlord (a kind of Chinese bridge). 
fajia. 法家 Legalism. 
fazhan xingshi.发展形势 development trend. 
ganbu. 干部 government official. 
gongyu. 公寓 condominium. 
guanshang sixiang. 官商思想 bureaucratic business perception. 
guanxi. 关系 relationship. 
guiding de. 规定的 regulatory. 
guojixing xiandai daduhui. 国际性现代大都会 International modern metropolis. 
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guoyou minying.国有民营 state owned people operate. 
hexie. 和谐 harmony. 
hexie aoyun. 和谐奥运 harmonious Olympics. 
hutong. 胡同 alley. 
jia-da-kong. 假大空 fake big empty. 
jicengfang. 基层房 grassroot housing. 
jiechulaoziguanxi. 解除劳资关系 eliminating employee-employer relationship. 
jiedao banshichu. 街道办事处 street office. 
jieduanxing mubiao. 阶段性目标 stage objective. 
jumin weiyuan hui. 居民委员会 residents’ committee. 
kang. 炕 bed in northern China. 
kaogongji. 考工记 Book of Craft and Technology. 
kexue fazhan. 科学发展 Scientific development. 
laodong-mofan.劳动模范 model worker. 
laomo.劳模 model worker. 
lian. 脸 face. 
linli. 邻里 neigbourhood. 
maiduangonglin. 买断工龄 buy-out of labour service. 
men-hu. 门户 door and windower. 
mianzi. 面子 face. 
mianzi gongcheng. 面子工程 face engineering. 
minying qiye. 民营企业 people owned enterprise. 
mo-fan. 模范 role model. 
mo-shi. 模式 model. 
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nanxun. 南巡 south inspection of Deng Xiaoping. 
ni-shi. 逆势 against the megatrend. 
pingfang. 平房 row houses. 
qu-shi. 趋势 trend. 
renyuan fenliu. 人员分流 dismissal of staffing. 
rujia. 儒家 confucianism. 
shanzhai. 山寨 mountain cottage (fake products). 
shequ. 社区 community. 
shi. 势 trend. 
shirong. 市容 the appearance of city. 
shougang moshi. 首钢模式 Capital Steel model. 
shun-shi. 顺势 following the trend. 
siren laoban. 私人老板 private boss. 
tandabing. 摊大饼 making a big pancake. 
tiefanwan. 铁饭碗 iron rice bowl. 
toutou-momo. 偷偷摸摸 secretly. 
wangshang-xiaoqu. 网上小区 internet small zone. 
xiahai. 下海 get into the sea. 
xiangzhen. 乡镇 county-village. 
xiaoqu. 小区 small zone. 
xiaoshou. 销售 selling. 
xing-shi. 形势 situation and tendency. 
xingxiang gongcheng. 形象工程 image engineering. 
xingzhengke. 行政科 administration department. 
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xunxu jianjin. 循序渐进 gradual development. 
yezhu. 业主 property owner. 
yingxiao. 营销 marketing. 
youshi. 优势 advantageous trend. 
zao-shi. 造势 creating trend. 
zhangwo. 掌握 manipulate. 
zhengji gongcheng. 政绩工程 political achievement engineering. 
zijiren.自己人 our own people. 
zimo zhiye. 自谋职业 self-developed employment. 
zizhuquan. 自主权 autonomy. 
zuankong. 钻孔 drilling holes. 
 
